XENOPHON

Memorabilia II

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XENOPHON

THE MEMORABILIA

BOOK II

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XENOPHON

THE MEMORABILIA

BOOK II

Edited by

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PREFACE.

THIS edition is not intended for beginners; for the book presents not a few difficulties both of language and of subject-matter. To a thoughtful student, who knows some Greek, the *Memorabilia* must needs be full of interest and charm. Such readers will, I hope, find in this edition the help which they require. My obligations to various writers are acknowledged as they occur. From previous editions I have gathered very little; for they are chiefly remarkable for their meagreness. Very few of the textual changes advocated by Cobet, Hartman, and others have been introduced. It has been thought wise to omit a few passages, amounting to about 50 lines in all.

G. M. E.

CAMBRIDGE,
July 27, 1901.

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INTRODUCTION.

I. XENOPHON.

(A) Xenophon the disciple of Socrates.

XENOPHON was the son of Gryllus, an Athenian belonging to the rural *deme* (or parish) of Ercheia about twenty miles from the city. Our information about his early life is extremely meagre and uncertain. The date of his birth is a matter of conjecture; the slender evidence available seems to point to the year 435 B.C. The date usually given—444 B.C.—is unquestionably incorrect. While still a boy, Xenophon met in a narrow street one remarkable for his satyr-like physiognomy,—the flat nose, thick lips, and prominent eyes of a Silenus. Stretching out his staff to bar the boy's progress, this strange being proceeded to catechise him, enquiring where various commodities could be purchased. To all these questions Xenophon returned ready answers. But when he was asked *Where are οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοί*[1] *to be found?*, he shook his head in sore

[1] The following passage from Mr Godley's *Socrates and Athenian Society* (pp. 116, 117) is an excellent commentary on the Greek conception of καλοκαγαθία and also on Socrates' way of dealing with the young:—

'In Plato's dialogue called *Charmides* the title-rôle is played by a youth who is receiving the homage which we reserve for female beauty. To us beauty in a man is a matter of small importance. But in Hellas different ideas prevailed; on Socrates' return from the campaign of Potidaea all the talk is of the rising generation of youths; the girls who would now be the reigning belles of a small town are simply left out of account altogether in Plato. All the attention and admiration is for their brothers.

perplexity. To the words which came next *Follow me and learn* he rendered a willing obedience, and became the devoted disciple of his questioner[1].

This was none other than the 'Great Cross-examiner, Socrates son of Sophroniscus the sculptor. He had retired from his father's profession to take up the mission of making men *accurate talkers* (ἀκριβολόγοι)—according to the sneering, but unconsciously most true description of the satirist Timon—or, in other words, to carry on a crusade against the false conceit of knowledge without the reality. It has been well remarked that Socrates reminded a world filled with intellectual pride and in bondage to phrases that it was better to collect one's thoughts and to enquire, with the help of others and by means of conversation, in which one man corrects another, what was the meaning of all the fine words which every one made use of, and then, after calm reflection on their true significance, to order one's life on a rational basis[2]. A life without cross-examination he held to be no life at all[3]. *If you kill me*, he says in the forcible language of the Platonic Apology, *you will not easily find another like me; for I am a sort of gadfly given to the State by God; and the State is like a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly which God has given the State, and all day long and in all places*

It was they and not the Attic damsels whom Pheidias chose to represent as the types of the highest human grace....Charmides is the *mould of form* of young Athens. *All gazed at him*, says Socrates, *as at a statue*. Moreover, he is not only perfectly beautiful; he is high-born, a descendant of one of those old families which Athens, for all her democratic institutions, still delighted to honour; and he has the saving grace of σωφροσύνη or steadiness, so especially necessary to an Athenian stripling. Here, as in the *Lysis*, the Platonic Socrates is a picture of the philosopher paying philosophic homage to an outward beauty which, if it is to be perfect, must be accompanied by a corresponding perfection of the mind within. After his first bewilderment at sight of the noble grace of Charmides, his demeanour to the young man is instinct with that kind wisdom (made earnest by the deep reverence of mature age for the bright actuality and brighter possibilities of youth) which is the distinguishing characteristic of all Socrates' intercourse with the young.'

[1] Diogenes Laertius, *Life*, § 2.

[2] Holm, *History of Greece*, vol. II. p. 454.

[3] Plato, *Apology*, 38 A.

am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you[1]. 'For thirty years—for those thirty years which extend through the whole period of the Peloponnesian war, in the crowded streets and squares, when all Attica was congregated within the walls of Athens to escape the Spartan invasions—during the horrors of the plague—amidst the excitements of the various vicissitudes of Pylos, of Syracuse, of the revolution of the Four Hundred, of the tyranny of the Thirty, of the restoration of the democracy, Socrates was ever at his post, by his presence, by his voice, by his example, restraining, attracting, repelling every class of his excitable countrymen. The philosophy of Socrates was in every sense the philosophy of the market-place. Very rarely he might be found under the shade of the plane-tree or the caverned rocks of the Ilissus. But ordinarily, whether in the city, in the dusty road between the Long Walls, or in the busy mart of Peiraeus, his place was amongst men, in every vocation of life, living not for himself, but for them, rejecting all pay, contented in poverty. Amidst the gay life, the beautiful forms, the brilliant colours of an Athenian multitude and an Athenian street, the repulsive features, the unwieldy figure, the bare feet, the rough threadbare attire of the philosopher must have excited every sentiment of astonishment and ridicule which strong contrast can produce. And to this we may add the occasional trance, the eye fixed on vacancy, the total abstraction from outward objects[2]—or again

[1] Plato, *Apology*, 30 E.

[2] 'We are told of Socrates that he would suddenly fall into a reverie, and then remain motionless and regardless of all attempts to interrupt or call him away. On one such occasion, when in the camp at Potidaea, he was observed to stand thus transfixed at the early dawn of a long summer day. One after another the soldiers gathered round him; but he continued in the same posture, undisturbed by their astonishment or by the noon-day heat which had begun to beat upon his head. Evening drew on, and still he was to be seen in the same position; the inquisitive Ionians in the camp took their evening meal by his side, and drew out their pallets from their tents to watch him. And the cold dews of the Thracian night came on, and still he remained unmoved, till at last the sun rose above Mount Athos, and still found him on the same spot where he had been since the previous morning. Then at last he started from his trance, offered his morning prayer to the Sun-god, and retired. Abstraction from the outer world so complete as this would of itself prepare us for the extraordinary disclosures which he has left of his *divine sign*. It is

the momentary outbursts of violent temper—or lastly the sudden irruptions of his wife Xanthippe to carry off her eccentric husband to his forsaken home[1].'

'When Socrates appeared, it was—so his disciples described it—as if one of the marble satyrs, which sat in grotesque attitudes with pipe or flute in the sculptors' shops at Athens, had left his seat of stone and walked into the plane-tree avenue or the gymnastic colonnade. Gradually the crowd gathered round him; at first he spoke of the tanners and the smiths and the drovers who were plying their trades about him; and they shouted with laughter as he poured forth his homely jokes. But soon the magic charm of his voice made itself felt. The peculiar sweetness of its tone had an effect which even the thunder of Pericles failed to produce. The laughter ceased; the crowd thickened; the gay youth, whom nothing else could tame, stood transfixed and awestruck in his presence. There was a solemn thrill in his words, such as his hearers could compare to nothing but the mysterious sensation produced by the clash of drum and cymbal in the worship of the great Mother of the Gods. The head swam, the heart leaped at the sound, tears rushed from their eyes; and they felt that, unless they tore themselves away from that fascinated circle, they would sit down at his feet and grow old in listening to the marvellous music of this second Marsyas[2].'

Brought up under this unique influence Xenophon reached the age for military service while Athens was still suffering severely from the stress of the Peloponnesian War[3]; and the 'military brother of the Socratic family' doubtless took part in the defence of the city down to its capture by Sparta in 404 B.C.

impossible not to be reminded by it of the language in which the Hebrew Prophets are said to have heard in the midnight silence of the sanctuary, or in the mountain cave, or on the outskirts of the desert, the gentle call, the still small whisper, the piercing cry of the Divine Word'—Dean Stanley, *Lecture on Socrates* (included in *Lectures on the Jewish Church*, Series III. pp. 201, 202).

[1] *Ibid.* pp. 205, 206.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 207, a paraphrase of Plato, *Symposium*, p. 215.

[3] The story of his preservation from death by Socrates at the battle of Delium in 424 B.C. is evidently a fiction, like many other legends in Greek literary biography.

He seems to have belonged to the 'Knights.' Several of his books manifest a keen interest in horses and horsemanship. Any one familiar with Aristophanes' picture of the 'Thousand good Knights' and their aristocratic contempt for the demagogue will to some extent appreciate that strange feature in the life of Xenophon, his antipathy to the Athenian democracy and his enthusiastic admiration for Sparta and all things Spartan. Still it is very remarkable that one who evidently owed his success in life mainly to his training in democratic Athens should display a marked preference for the Spartan system of education and government. Before Xenophon left Athens in 401 B.C. he had probably completed the first two books of his *Hellenica* or *History of Greece*, a continuation of the unfinished work of Thucydides. These books describe the closing scenes of the great war, the tyranny of the Thirty and the restoration of the democracy by Thrasybulus in 403 B.C. The extremely interesting essay *on the Athenian Constitution*, ascribed to Xenophon, is the earliest remaining specimen of Attic Prose ; it must have been written when Xenophon was quite a boy, and cannot be his work. It is now generally thought to have been an anonymous publication ; and different critics have suggested Alcibiades, Critias, and even Thucydides as possible authors of the treatise.

Xenophon's departure from Athens was due to the expedition of Cyrus described in the *Anabasis*. Cyrus, the younger and abler of the two surviving sons of Darius II King of Persia and his queen Parysatis, came into prominence in 408 B.C., when at the early age of seventeen he was appointed Satrap, or Viceroy, of Lydia, Phrygia and Cappadocia and Commander-in-chief of the royal troops in those parts. He was thus practically supreme in Asia Minor. In 404 B.C. Darius died before the Queen could obtain from him a declaration in favour of Cyrus on the ground that the elder son Artaxerxes was born before his father's accession,—an argument which in old days Atossa had advanced on behalf of Xerxes. The young prince, nursing the bitterest feelings of hatred and revenge, conceived the brilliant idea of collecting a Greek force, in addition to his large Asiatic

army, to fight Artaxerxes for the throne. The circumstances of the time were highly favourable to this policy; for at the end of the Peloponnesian War began the rise of mercenary troops in the Hellenic world. The general demoralisation caused by a long period of war and the dissolution of family ties hastened the decay of patriotism and kindled the passion for a roving life of profit and adventure.

Cyrus saw his opportunity; despatching his agents in all directions, he drew together to his court at Sardis many Greeks of ruined fortunes. A born leader of men, he dazzled the Greek imagination by his brilliant personality, his youthful enthusiasm, and his open-handed generosity. Hellenic patriotism was practically dead; and here, apparently at the dawn of a new era, was a prince with a great future, having at his disposal 'the gold of Asia and the men of Hellas.' He demanded no sacrifices,—so ran his magnificent invitation to Sparta,—without ample rewards. The soldier who came on foot should receive a horse; he who came on horseback, a chariot and pair. Owners of fields should be made masters of villages; and masters of villages lords of cities. So successful was this policy that early in 401 B.C. Cyrus had concentrated at Sardis a force of 8000 men, whom his Greek officers had collected in the Peloponnese, Thessaly, Ionia, and elsewhere. Among the Greek officers whom Cyrus had attracted to Sardis was the Theban Proxenus, an old friend of Xenophon. From his description of Proxenus as a disciple of the rhetorician Gorgias, and as one who recognised the importance of culture as an element of distinction in public life, we may infer that the bond which united the two friends was of a literary character. Moreover we are told elsewhere that Xenophon, who was a few years older than Proxenus, had acted as his tutor. Hence it appears probable that Cyrus wished to secure, through Proxenus, the services of Xenophon as a *civil* officer to aid him in his ambitious schemes. Xenophon expressly tells us that he joined the expedition *neither as general nor captain nor soldier*. Early in 401 B.C. he received from Proxenus a letter, in which he undertook to introduce him to Cyrus, adding the cynical remark that he considered the friendship of such a patron

was *worth more to himself than his native city*,—a striking illustration of the decay of patriotism during this period.

Xenophon communicated the proposal of Proxenus to his master Socrates, who feared that his young friend might provoke the hostility of the democracy, if he threw in his lot with one who had been the bitter enemy of Athens and had actually furnished Sparta with the means of crushing her. He accordingly advised him to consult the oracle at Delphi. Thither Xenophon repaired. But, instead of asking the god, 'Shall I go to Sardis or shall I forbear?' he put the narrower question: 'Having a journey in view, to which of the gods must I offer prayers and sacrifices in order to make it propitious?' The oracle indicated to him the proper deities. Socrates, however, was displeased with his disciple because he had not submitted the question with perfect frankness. 'Nevertheless,' he added, 'since you have elected to put the question in your own way, you must act on the answer vouchsafed.' So Xenophon set sail after duly performing the necessary rites. Probably he was not sorry to leave his native city; for Athens under the restored democracy cannot have been an agreeable residence for a member of the Knights, the class which had been the chief support of the atrocious tyranny of the Thirty.

(B) **Xenophon and Cyrus.**

Xenophon reached Sardis in the spring of 401 B.C., and found Cyrus and Proxenus preparing to set out on an expedition directed, so it was alleged, against the Pisidians, a refractory robber tribe in a distant part of the prince's satrapy. They both expressed a strong wish that Xenophon should accompany them. He was deceived by their statements, for which, he adds, Proxenus was not responsible; for neither Proxenus nor any other Greek officer except Clearchus, the intimate friend of Cyrus, had at present any suspicion that the expedition was really directed against the King of Persia. Cyrus had completed his preparations. The 8000 Greek troops now concentrated at Sardis he placed under the command of his Spartan

general Clearchus, an outlaw from his native city, having been condemned to death by the Lacedaemonian authorities for disobedience to their orders. The Asiatic troops of Cyrus, numbering 100,000, were commanded by his friend Ariaeus the Persian. Cyrus still told the Greeks that the object of his enterprise was merely to secure the frontiers of his province against the Pisidian freebooters; and, in order to deceive Artaxerxes, he gave out that the Greek force which he had collected was designed for service against his jealous rival, Tissaphernes, Satrap of Caria. But Tissaphernes suspected the real designs of Cyrus, and, when he heard of the magnitude of the prince's army, started with all speed to inform the Great King, who at once began his preparations.

On arriving at the port of Issus Cyrus received further reinforcements brought by his fleet, amongst them 700 Spartan hoplites under the command of Cheirisophus, sent, it was said, by the Lacedaemonian government. The number of his Greek force now reached 14,000. Abrocomas, who was in command of 300,000 men, seems to have been alarmed by the rapid progress of the invader and fled from the Syrian coast into the interior. At Thapsacus, just before crossing the Euphrates, Cyrus at last publicly informed the Greeks that he was leading them to Babylon to fight against the Great King. Hitherto Cyrus had been advancing with overweening self-confidence; for he had been allowed to pass without resistance all the natural obstacles of which the Persians might have taken advantage to bar his progress, and now he seemed to think that victory would be his without a struggle. This feeling was only increased when, three days after leaving Pylae, he found quite undefended the great trench which Artaxerxes had caused to be dug across the plain for a length of 40 miles. It had been abandoned from some unaccountable panic. Cyrus now imagined that the Persians would never face him in the plains of Babylonia. And when one day early in September his troops were about to halt for their morning meal at the village of Cunaxa, it was announced that a vast Persian host of 900,000 men was approaching in order of battle over the open plain. The story of the battle, which

resulted in a Cyreian victory marred by a disastrous loss—the death of Cyrus himself—need not be related here.

On the morning of the day after the battle Clearchus and the other Greek generals supposed Cyrus to be still alive. On learning the disastrous news they were deeply grieved. The one hope of the expedition was gone, and here they were in the heart of the Persian empire entirely destitute of resources and surrounded by treacherous foes. Still, with splendid self-confidence, as conquerors in the battle of Cunaxa, they proceeded to offer their prize of victory, the Persian throne, to Ariaeus, who had commanded the Asiatic troops of Cyrus. He politely declined their invitation; probably he had already made up his mind to seek the favour of Artaxerxes and to betray his brothers in arms. Clearchus seems at first to have placed a blind confidence in Ariaeus, who undertook to conduct the Greeks to the sea by a route different from that by which they had come. Accordingly it was resolved to begin the retreat in his company. The Greeks soon began to suspect that Ariaeus was playing them false; and great distrust arose between the Hellenic and the Persian portion of the Cyreian army. They kept clear of one another both on the march and in their encampments. While resting on the banks of the Greater Zab, Clearchus attempted to put an end to the constant bickerings between the Greek and Asiatic troops; and he consented to a conference with Tissaphernes, who promised that, if the Greek generals would come to his tent, he would give them the name of the treacherous person who was causing all the trouble. On the next day Clearchus went to Tissaphernes accompanied by four generals, twenty captains, and two hundred soldiers. On their arrival the generals were seized and their companions massacred. Four of the generals, Clearchus, Proxenus, Agias, and Socrates, were taken to the Persian court and soon afterwards beheaded. The other general Menon, who was the reputed traitor, was kept alive under torture for a year and then put to death. After the seizure of the generals, Ariaeus summoned the Greeks to surrender; but in an indignant and contemptuous message they declined.

(C) Xenophon as General.

The situation of the Greeks now seemed more desperate than ever; Xenophon speaks of it in most pathetic language. Their spirits were however speedily revived by his own energetic action. During the night after the disaster he awoke from a remarkable dream and at once aroused the captains who had served under Proxenus. In a midnight council of war he urged them with simple and stirring eloquence to take measures for the common safety. They at once recognised his fitness for command and called upon him to fill the place of his friend. At Xenophon's suggestion, the captains of the other divisions were convened, and they nominated four other generals. At daybreak the new generals summoned the soldiers, who met after the fashion of a Greek Ecclesia and proceeded to discuss the future conduct of the expedition and to confirm the appointment of the generals proposed. They had soon risen from the paralysis of despair to a sense of their national greatness. The meetings of the Ten Thousand are an exact reproduction of the citizen-assemblies at home. The army is a wandering political community; and the national characteristics of the race are wonderfully brought out in the narrative of the Retreat.

It is very remarkable that an Athenian should have exercised a commanding influence over the Ten Thousand. For Athens was now unpopular in Greece, especially in the Peloponnese; and a large majority of the soldiers were Peloponnesians, more than half being Arcadians or Achaeans. Xenophon was almost the only Athenian taking part in the expedition, and he had come 'neither as general nor captain nor soldier.' His extraordinary rise to power is doubtless due to the Athenian democratic training, which had given him flexibility and resource and, above all, persuasive eloquence. He displays throughout a marvellous faculty of dealing with mixed multitudes and embarrassing circumstances; and possesses in Athenian perfection the threefold power of thought and speech and action.

'The Athenian alone,' says Curtius, 'possessed that superiority of culture which was necessary for giving order and self-control to the band of warriors barbarised by their selfish life, and for enabling him to serve them in the greatest variety of situations as spokesman, as general, and as negotiator. And to him it was essentially due that, in spite of their unspeakable trials, through hostile tribes and desolate snow-ranges, 8000 Greeks in the end reached the coast.'

'The sea! The sea!' was the triumphant cry of the Greeks, when the Euxine burst upon their view early in March 400 B.C. after five months of weary marching and fighting. In two days they reached the Greek colony of Trapezus, where they rested for a month, fondly imagining that all their troubles were over and that they could easily return to their homes by sea. They were bitterly disappointed. Sparta was supreme in the Grecian world, and her officials on the Euxine refused to provide the Cyreians with means for their return. After great difficulties they at last reached Byzantium. There, owing to their cruel treatment by the Spartan admiral Anaxibius, they resumed their profession of mercenaries, accepting the offer of the Theban Coeratidas, who promised them ample rewards if they would undertake a campaign in Thrace under his leadership. This agreement soon fell to the ground; and in 399 B.C. we find them in the service of the Thracian prince Seuthes, assisting him to subdue some rebel tribes. They fought for two months; but met with cruel injustice as their reward.

Now, however, came a complete change in the policy of Sparta, which determined to support the Greek cities in Asia Minor against the satraps Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. This meant war with Persia. Thimbron, the Spartan general, who was sent into Ionia, finding himself in want of reinforcements, invited to his aid Xenophon and the remnant of the Cyreians, whose numbers had now dwindled away to 6000. Smarting under the treatment they had just received from Seuthes, they obeyed the summons with alacrity. Xenophon crossed over into Asia and conducted his troops over Mount Ida to Pergamus. 'Then,' he says in the last words of the

Anabasis, 'Thimbron took over the army and incorporated it with the rest of his Greek force, and fought against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus.' So Tissaphernes, to quote again from Curtius, 'saw before him once more the hated men whom he had assumed on the day of Cunaxa to be doomed to perish hopelessly under the swords of the Carduchi or amid the snow-fields of Armenia.'

(D) Death of Socrates, later life of Xenophon, his Socratic and other writings.

Before Xenophon handed over his troops to Thimbron in the spring of 399 B.C., he was, he tells us, *preparing* to return home; for, he adds, the decree of banishment had *not yet* been passed against him at Athens. These words have an important bearing on the vexed question of the date of his banishment. They certainly support the view that the blow came *soon*. He seems to have expected such a disaster for some time past; for he speaks of hoping for an asylum with Seuthes the Thracian prince, and his project of founding a colony of his own on the Euxine was probably due to the same fear. The decree of banishment was passed on the proposition of the orator Eubulus. His alleged offence is differently stated by two authorities. He was banished either (1) 'because he had taken part with Cyrus, the greatest enemy of the Athenian democracy, in an expedition against the Great King their well-wisher,' or (2) 'for *Laconism*,' i.e. for favouring Sparta. But these two statements may be looked upon as practically identical; for taking part with Cyrus, who had shown his friendship for Sparta by providing her with the 'sinews of war' against Athens, might well be looked upon as *Laconism*. This view is strongly supported by the anxiety of Socrates on the subject (see above p. xv). Grote, however, owing to an apparent misunderstanding of a passage in the *Anabasis* (V. iii. 7), places

Xenophon's banishment in 394 B.C. after the battle of Coroneia, when he actually fought for Sparta against his native city.

Xenophon was 'preparing to return.' Whether he actually did return to Greece in 399 B.C. is uncertain. The trial and death of Socrates took place in the summer of this year. We do not know when Xenophon heard the story of the closing scenes of the great Master's life,—those 'scenes which Plato has invested with such surpassing glory. The Hebrew prophet, the Christian martyr, might well have couched their farewells to the audiences before which they, like him, often pleaded in vain, almost in the same words: *The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our ways. I go to die, and you to live. Which is better God only knows.* Then ensue the long thirty days which were passed in prison before the execution of the verdict, the playful equanimity and unabated interest in his habitual objects of life amidst the uncontrollable emotions of his companions, after they know of the return of the sacred ship, whose absence had up to that moment suspended his fate. Then follows the gathering in of that solemn evening, when the fading of the sunset on the tops of the Athenian hills was the signal that the last hour was at hand. Then the fatal hemlock enters; we see the immovable countenance, the firm hand, the wonted scowl of stern defiance at the executioner; we hear the burst of frantic lamentation from all his friends, as with his habitual ease and cheerfulness he drained the cup to its dregs; we watch the solemn silence enjoined by himself, the pacing to and fro, the cold palsy of the hemlock creeping from the extremities to the heart, and the gradual torpor ending in death[1].'

At such a time it was not likely that the Athenian democracy would show any tenderness to one of the Socratic brethren; and the decree of banishment against Xenophon was probably passed very soon afterwards. Anyhow, in a few months we find him again in command of his old Cyreian troops in Asia Minor, serving first under Dercyllidas, who succeeded Thimbron in 398 B.C., and then under King Agesilaus, who went out in 396.

[1] Stanley, *l.c.* p. 217.

For Agesilaus he entertained the warmest admiration and became his intimate friend. But the King was not allowed to remain long in Asia Minor; for, on the formation of the confederacy of Athens, Thebes and Corinth against Sparta, he was summoned to fight for his country in Greece. Xenophon and his troops accompanied him into Boeotia and took part in his victory at Coroneia.

When Xenophon's service under Agesilaus was over, the Spartans gave him a house and grounds at Scillus, near Olympia. Soon after Xenophon had settled there he met Megabyzus, High-priest of the Ephesian Artemis, who chanced to have come to the Olympic Games. He paid over to Xenophon a sum of money, which represented a part of the tithe of plunder devoted by the Cyreian army to Artemis and deposited with her priest. With this money Xenophon purchased an estate near his own residence, which he consecrated to the goddess, and built thereon a chapel containing a statue, a copy in miniature of the great Ephesian temple. He appointed himself Conservator of the demesne of Artemis, which consisted largely of wild ground well stocked with game. He was an ardent sportsman; every year he held a hunting festival on a large scale, to which he invited his neighbours and entertained them lavishly at the expense of the Huntress Queen, who, he says, 'provided the fare.'

At Scillus Xenophon was joined by his wife Philesia and his sons Gryllus and Diodorus; and there he lived a happy country life for twenty years, spending his time not only in sport, but in great literary labours, one of which was the composition of the *Anabasis*. Here too he probably wrote the *Memorabilia* of his master Socrates, 'whose loss,' he says, 'the good even now continue to mourn,' with its appendix, the *Apology of Socrates*; and part of books III—VII of the *Hellenica*. We must ascribe to a later time the *Cyropaedeia* or *Education of Cyrus the Great*, a political romance in eight books, 'not historically accurate nor a true picture of Persian thought and manners, but rather an encomium on Socratic principles and Spartan practice, in which Cyrus himself, drawn with some touches from

the young Cyrus whom Xenophon had known, is half a Socrates and half an Agesilaus[1].' Two Socratic dialogues by Xenophon are extant, the *Oeconomicus* and the *Symposium*; also another dialogue called *Hiero* and a treatise on the *Spartan Constitution*. The *Panegyric on Agesilaus*, ascribed to Xenophon, is probably a rhetorical exercise of later date. Three essays on horses and horsemanship are assigned to the time of his residence at Scillus :—(1) the *Cavalry Officer's Manual*, (2) *on Horsemanship*, in which he specially inculcates the duty of kindness to horses, (3) *on Hunting*, the work of a keen sportsman and lover of dogs, treating chiefly of hare-hunting. The hare, in the eyes of Xenophon, is a 'charming creature to hunt.'

In 371 B.C. after the battle of Leuctra, by which the power of Sparta was finally broken, the Eleians expelled Xenophon from Scillus. He then settled at Corinth. When Sparta became the ally of Athens against Thebes, his sentence of banishment was revoked on the motion of the same Eubulus who had proposed it. Xenophon's two sons,—the *Dioscuri* (or Great Twin Brethren) as they were called,—who had been educated at Sparta under the oversight of Agesilaus, fought on the Spartan side against Epameinondas at Mantineia, 362 B.C. The elder son, Gryllus, fell fighting with great bravery in the cavalry engagement at the gates just before the general battle began. From some passages in the essay *on the Athenian Revenues* it appears probable that towards the end of his life he spent some time at Athens. He died at Corinth. The date of his death is not known; but it cannot have been earlier than 355 B.C.

[1] Jebb, *Primer of Greek Literature*, p. 113.

II. THE MEMORABILIA.

(A) The purpose and character of the work.

'Xenophon was the first to give to the world the sayings of Socrates under the title of *Memoirs* (Ἀπομνημονεύματα), basing his work on notes of his conversations.' This is the statement of Diogenes Laertius, and there seems no reason to doubt it. It is quite reasonable to suppose that Xenophon would have taken notes of the conversations of his beloved master, not only of those at which he was himself present, but also of others reported to him by friends. These notes he would have preserved till his first opportunity for literary work after the death of Socrates, i.e. when he had settled down at his delightful country home at Scillus (see p. xxii). He would have thrown his materials, quite provisionally at first, into some sort of literary form (combining with the conversations some biographical details), and now and again he would have taken up the work to retouch it; but evidently it never underwent anything like a final revision. We find in the *Memorabilia* many instances of undue repetition, abruptness, and inferior literary workmanship in the dovetailing together of the various conversations. Some of the alleged faults of the book may doubtless be due to its avowedly informal character; but this will not explain everything. If we are prepared to believe that the work was never finally revised by its author, there is no need to resort to the drastic methods of the Higher Criticism, which 'has laid the unhappy *Memorabilia* on the torture bed of Procrustes, until, through the tender mercies of Krohn and Lincke, a bare torso of seven or even fewer chapters has been left as representing this particular *original source* for Socrates[1].' A supposed posthumous editor—Xenophon's 'grandson executor' —looms very large in the recent criticism of the *Memorabilia*.

[1] H. G. Dakyns on the *Socrates of Xenophon* in the *Classical Review*, vol. vii., p. 259.

Of the witnesses of Socratic talk 'the best known to us,' says Grote, 'are Xenophon and Plato, though there existed in antiquity various dialogues composed, and memoranda put together, by other hearers of Socrates, respecting his conversations and teaching, which are all now lost; e.g. Simon the leather-cutter took memoranda of conversations held by Socrates in his shop, and published several dialogues purporting to be such[1].' Xenophon may certainly be regarded as our best witness for the character and teaching of Socrates. Plato, essentially a poet,—a creator, touches the personality of the Master with a magician's wand and employs him as a spokesman for his own highly-developed philosophy[2]. 'How this young man libels me!' Socrates is said to have exclaimed on hearing Plato read one of his dialogues. Xenophon, on the other hand, eminently simple-minded and unimaginative, and moreover hampered by no philosophic system of his own, may well be supposed to give us genuine examples of Socratic talk. It has been thought by some that the *Memorabilia* is a collection of *Imaginary Conversations*, generalised from many real discourses at which Xenophon had been present. But it may well be questioned whether Xenophon possessed this particular literary gift. In the *Memorabilia* he would appear to be a Boswell rather than a Landor.

On another side it has been urged that many sayings here recorded are too naive and commonplace, and altogether unworthy of the genius of Socrates. To this we may answer that we find similar trivialities ascribed to Socrates even in the dialogues to Plato. As Professor Sidgwick has pointed out, 'in the eyes of Socrates any rational and useful human labour had an interest and value which contrasts strikingly with the contempt commonly felt by cultivated Greeks for base mechanic toil. Xenophon has recorded at length a dialogue with a corslet-maker, in which Socrates gradually draws out the

[1] Chapter lxviii.

[2] 'It would seem that Plato in his idealised portrait gives his hero credit not only for a deeper philosophical insight, but also for a greater urbanity than facts warrant'—H. Jackson, *Socrates*, in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, vol. xxii., p. 233.

rationale of corslet-making; and we find out that his talk was ridiculed for its continual reference to the analogies of vulgar trades,—for his perpetual harping on shoemakers and carpenters and braziers and herdsmen. The truth was that—as Plato makes him say in his defence before his judges—the common artisans differed from professional politicians and professors in knowing their business. In the great work of transforming human life into a completely reasoned adaptation of means to definitely known ends, the vulgar arts had led the way and were far in advance; they had learnt a great part of their lesson, while the *royal art* of life and government was still struggling with the rudiments[1].' If this is grasped by readers of the *Memorabilia*, the presence of many seeming trivialities—especially in the later chapters of the Second Book—will be adequately explained.

The *Memorabilia* begins as an apology, but soon passes insensibly into panegyric. *I have often marvelled*, Xenophon says at the outset, *by what arguments the accusers of Socrates could have persuaded the Athenians that he was deserving of death at the hands of the state.* The accusers (οἱ γραψάμενοι) here mentioned are evidently the three official accusers at the trial[2]. Later on in the book Xenophon several times mentions ὁ κατήγορος, which, we should have supposed, would denote one of the prosecutors (presumably Anytus, the most powerful of the trio) or perhaps 'the prosecution' generally. Cobet, however, has put forward a theory[3], which has met with wide acceptance,

[1] *History of Ethics*, p. 30.

[2] 'In 399 B.C. suddenly, and as it would seem without any previous warnings, Socrates was put on trial for his life. His accuser was Meletus, an insignificant young man, who seems to have been incensed against Socrates by his attacks upon the poets. With him were associated as συνήγοροι Anytus and Lycon. Of the last we know nothing except that he was the mouthpiece of the professional rhetoricians. Anytus on the other hand was one of the most powerful and popular Athenians of the day. By profession a tanner, he was a strong supporter of the Athenian democracy. Though nominally only συνήγορος, he was in reality the most dangerous of Socrates' accusers: it was mainly due to his influence and exertions that Socrates was condemned'—J. Adam, Introduction to *Apology*, p. xxvi.

[3] *Novae Lectiones*, p. 622 sqq.

viz. that ὁ κατήγορος is the sophist[1] Polycrates, who wrote a Κατηγορία Σωκράτους, a fictitious harangue put into the mouth of Anytus. This production, which is no longer extant, is mentioned by Quintilian as if it were the actual speech delivered in court. But Isocrates[2] makes it clear that it was only a show scholastic harangue; many such were composed by the rhetoricians of that day. Internal evidence proves that it was written not earlier than 392 B.C., i.e. seven years after the trial of Socrates. Cobet argues with much plausibility that Xenophon wrote the *Memorabilia* as a direct reply to the Κατηγορία of Polycrates.

Hartman has made in his *Analecta Xenophontea* (p. 105 sqq.) what seems a convincing answer to Cobet's contention. An

[1] Readers of the *Memorabilia* must not regard *Sophist* as a necessarily invidious term. The following passage from Prof. Sidgwick's *History of Ethics* (pp. 21, 22) supplies some valuable information on the Sophistic movement: 'This emergence of an art of life with professional teachers cannot thoroughly be understood, unless it is viewed as a crowning result of a general tendency at this stage of Greek civilisation to substitute technical skill for traditional procedure and empirically developed faculty. In the age of the Sophists we find, wherever we turn, the same eager pursuit of knowledge and the same eager effort to apply it directly to practice....The art of music (μουσική) had recently received a great technical development; and a still greater change had been effected in that training of the body (γυμναστική) which, along with music, constituted ordinary Greek education. If bodily vigour was no longer to be left to nature and spontaneous exercise, but was to be obtained by the systematic observance of rules laid down by professional trainers, it was natural to think that the same might be the case with excellences of the soul. The art of Rhetoric again is a specially striking example of the general tendency; and it is important to observe that the profession of Rhetorician was commonly blended with that of Sophist. Indeed throughout the age of Socrates Sophists and Philosophers were commonly regarded, by those who refused to recognise their higher claims, as teaching an *art of words*. It is easy to see how this came about; when the demand for an art of conduct made itself felt, it was natural that the Rhetoricians, skilled as they were in handling the accepted notions and principles of practice, should come forward to furnish the supply. Nor is there any reason for regarding them as conscious charlatans for so doing, any more than the professional journalist of our own day, whose position as a political instructor of mankind is commonly earned by a knack of ready writing rather than by any special depth of political wisdom. As Plato's Protagoras says, the Sophists in professing to teach virtue only claimed to do somewhat better than others what all men are continually doing; and similarly we may say that, when tried by the touchstone of Socrates, they only exhibited somewhat more conspicuously than others the deficiencies which the great questioner found everywhere.'

[2] *Busiris*, 4.

eminently practical man like Xenophon would, he holds, heartily despise the unreal and futile declamations of a scholastic rhetorician. Moreover, the informal, good-natured, and life-like character of the *Memorabilia* militates against Cobet's supposition; an artificial and scientifically arranged harangue would naturally provoke a rejoinder of the same character. Again, only a portion of Xenophon's work could possibly be looked upon as an answer to the thesis of Polycrates that Socrates was justly condemned; and Hartman points out that almost the whole of the Fourth Book and important parts of the earlier Books do not in the least bear on this subject. Finally he comes to a very common-sense conclusion:—(i) that Xenophon's primary object was to hand on his master's memory to posterity, (ii) that, being a practical man, he selected for record chiefly those conversations which taught practical virtue, not altogether neglecting good examples of Socrates' dialectic method, (iii) that in such a work he could not altogether disregard the opponents of Socrates, whether they were his accusers in 399 B.C. or other critics, such as Polycrates, whose Κατηγορία was now in the hands of the public.

Xenophon states the indictment against Socrates as follows:—*ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων*, *Socrates is a wrong-doer* (1) *in not believing in the gods recognised by the state, and introducing new divinities of his own; also* (2) *in corrupting the young* (I. i. 1). Xenophon has no difficulty in rebutting the first count of this indictment; it was in fact based on a misconception. Socrates used to say *τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ σημαίνειν*, *the divine thing gives me a sign*[1]; and he would constantly recommend his associates to do this or to refrain from doing that on the authority of its warnings.

[1] The *δαιμόνιον σημεῖον* of Socrates is discussed at length by Dr Jackson in the *Journal of Philology*, vol. v., pp. 232—247. He summarises his own conclusion thus:—'My theory is then, in brief, as follows: Socrates was subject to hallucinations of the sense of hearing, which, so far from implying any aberration of his reasoning faculties, were the momentary expressions of the results of rapid deliberation, and derived an extraordinary value from the accuracy and delicacy of his highly cultivated tact' (p. 247).

It was no more an innovation than the art of divination (ἡ μαντική). The 'divine sign' was in no sense a 'new divinity'; it was simply a God-given revelation. Further, no one ever saw Socrates do anything impious or irreverent, though he lived ever in the public eye. On the contrary, so full of reverence was he, that he even eschewed all speculations as to the nature of the Universe. His religious character was further manifested in his obedience to the oracle at Delphi, his prayers and sacrifices, and his firm belief in divine omniscience.

The second count—the really grave element in the indictment—was supported by four distinct allegations:—

(i) That Socrates incited his associates to despise the established institutions of Athens, particularly election by lot. To this charge Xenophon replies that, though Socrates thought it his duty to criticise some Athenian institutions, he was really prepared to yield a ready obedience to all.

(ii) That the teaching of Socrates was responsible for the outrageous misdeeds of Critias and Alcibiades. The gist of Xenophon's answer is that, so long as they associated with Socrates, they continued to be sober-minded under the fascination of his teaching and example; but when parted from their master they were puffed up by wealth and power, and, demoralised by many tempters, they became lawless and overbearing.

(iii) That he taught the young to disobey their parents and to prefer his own authority; that he set them against their kinsfolk and friends. Xenophon replies that Socrates simply intended to teach that folly, even when displayed by a parent or a friend, is undeserving of respect.

(iv) That he used to make questionable citations from Homer and Hesiod to the detriment of morality and democratic institutions. To this flimsy charge Xenophon answers that the quotation of a few lines of poetry ought not to be set against clear evidence of exemplary patriotism; further that

the prosecution might fairly be suspected of misrepresenting Socrates' interpretation of the passages in question[1].

Even in the First Book Xenophon has already passed from apology to panegyric, when he sums up in favour of Socrates as *a friend of the people and a philanthropist* (δημοτικὸς καὶ φιλάνθρωπος), shedding lustre on the state, and pouring out his treasures on all who cared to receive them (I. ii. 60, 61); and he urges that both counts of the indictment are absurd in the case of one who was (1) pre-eminently devoted to the service of the gods, and (2) conspicuous for the zeal with which he strove to curb the evil desires of his associates and to foster in them a passion for the most fair and queenly virtue (I. ii. 64). In the later books Xenophon dwells almost exclusively on the edifying and helpful character of Socrates' conversation and example,—a theme evidently much more to his taste than the arraying of arguments to meet specific accusations.

Socrates was, as we have seen, δημοτικός, *a friend of the people.* It is important to realise his missionary attitude towards political life. Xenophon tells us (I. vi. 15) that the sophist Antiphon asked Socrates how he expected to make others into politicians when he did not take part in politics himself. Socrates answered: *I will also ask you a question, Antiphon,—Which would be the more statesmanlike course for me, to engage in politics single-handed or to endeavour to qualify as many others as possible for political life?* Though not a politician, Socrates entertained very high views of the importance of the state and of men's obligations towards it. 'In the *Memorabilia*,' says Zeller[2], 'we see him using every opportunity of impressing able people for political services, of deterring the

[1] 'To the modern reader Xenophon's reply will probably seem sufficient, and more than sufficient. But it must not be forgotten that Athenians of the old school approached the subject from an entirely different point of view....It was because Socrates was an innovator that we, who see in him the founder of philosophical enquiry, regard him as a great man; it was because Socrates was an innovator that the old-fashioned Athenians, who saw in the new-fangled culture the origin of all their recent distresses and disasters, regarded him as a great criminal'—JACKSON, *Socrates, l.c.*, p. 235.

[2] *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, p. 167.

incompetent, of awakening officials to a sense of their duties, and of giving them help in the administration of their offices. He himself expresses the political character of these efforts most tellingly by including all virtues under the conception of the ruling art (βασιλικὴ τέχνη, II. i. 17).'

By playfulness no less than by earnestness was Socrates helpful to his associates (IV. i. 1). No account of Socrates would be complete without some notice of his 'Irony' (εἰρωνεία), the humorous affectation of characteristics the opposite of his own[1]. This quality is far more prominent in the Platonic than in the Xenophontine Socrates; it would not have appealed strongly to the practical, matter-of-fact mind of our author. Dr W. H. Thompson has a very interesting passage on the subject in his edition of Plato's *Phaedrus* (p. 153):—'That this irony was to some extent calculated is more than probable; it disarmed ridicule by anticipating it, it allayed jealousy and propitiated envy; and it possibly procured him admission into gay circles from which a more solemn teacher would have been excluded. But it had for its basis a real greatness of soul, a hearty and unaffected disregard of popular opinion, a perfect disinterestedness, an entire abnegation of self. He made himself a fool that others by his folly might be made wise; he humbled himself to the level of those among whom his work lay that he might raise some few among them to his own level; he was 'all things to all men, if by any means he might win some.' *Of you who are present*, says Alcibiades in the Symposium of Plato, *there is not one who understands Socrates; but I will unfold to you his true character....His ignorance is boundless—he knows absolutely nothing. Yet all this is counterfeit; it is the grotesque Silenus-mask which conceals the features of the god within; for, if you remove the covering, how shall I describe to you, my friends and*

[1] The Irony of Socrates was doubtless considerably heightened by his personal appearance. 'Outwardly,' says Dr Jackson, 'his presence was mean and his countenance grotesque. Short of stature, thick-necked, and somewhat corpulent, with prominent eyes, with nose upturned and nostrils outspread, with large mouth and coarse lips, he seemed the embodiment of sensuality and even stupidity' (*l.c.*, p. 232).

boon-companions, the excellent virtue you will find within?... He spends his whole life dissembling and playing with the rest of mankind. Whether any of you have seen him in his serious mood, when he has thrown aside the mask and disclosed the divine features beneath it, is more than I know. But I have seen them, and I can tell you that they seemed to me glorious and marvellous, and truly godlike is their beauty.'

(B) The Dialectic of Socrates.

Ὁ Σωκράτης ἦν ἐν παντὶ πράγματι καὶ πάντα τρόπον ὠφέλιμος (IV. i. 1). This thought—the *usefulness* of Socrates—runs through the whole of the *Memorabilia*. Xenophon, as a man of action and also as an apologist for his master, was naturally inclined to represent him as a practical and philanthropic educator[1], and to dwell on his positive teaching, especially that part of it which was designed to correct defects in particular individuals. At the same time he indicates quite clearly, though without special emphasis, that the conversation of Socrates often had the negative character which is so prominent in Plato. Thus, after mentioning (I. iv. 1) a current opinion that Socrates was a very powerful stimulus towards virtue, but was not really able to introduce people to it, Xenophon proceeds to minimise the importance of ἃ ἐκεῖνος κολαστηρίου ἕνεκα τοὺς πάντ' οἰομένους εἰδέναι ἐρωτῶν ἤλεγχε, *what he did by way of chastisement or discipline in cross-examining those who thought themselves omniscient*, and prefers to dwell on the edifying nature of his ordinary daily conversation. Socrates does indeed wage war against ἀλαζονεία 'imposture' or 'the conceit of knowledge without the reality'; but his object therein is to induce his associates to devote themselves to virtue (I. vii. 1). The Socratic Elenchus (Cross-examination) was without doubt one

[1] 'Socrates was not a *philosopher*, nor yet a *teacher*, but rather an *educator*, having for his function *to rouse, persuade, and rebuke* (Plato *Apology* 30 E)'—JACKSON, *Socrates*, p. 236.

of the causes of the Master's unpopularity[1]; hence his apologist would not care to make it unduly prominent. Further, as has been pointed out[2], Xenophon, being a mere reporter of Socrates' conversations, gives the results and troubles himself little about the steps which led to them.

A simple example of the Socratic dialectic[3] is given in *Memorabilia* IV. vi. 13—15:—*If a disputant with no definite arguments was discussing some subject, and without any attempt at demonstration alleged that so and so was wiser, a better statesman, more courageous, and so on, than another, Socrates would bring back the discussion to its starting-point, thus:—'You affirm that so and so, whom you applaud, is a better citizen than my friend?'—'Yes, I do'—'Then ought we not first to enquire what is the function of a good citizen?'—'By all means'—'To*

[1] 'In truth, the mission of Socrates, as he himself describes it, could not but prove eminently unpopular and obnoxious. To convince a man that, of matters which he felt confident of knowing, and never thought of questioning or even of studying, he is really profoundly ignorant, insomuch that he cannot reply to a few pertinent queries without involving himself in flagrant contradictions—is an operation highly salutary, often necessary to his future improvement; but an operation of painful mental surgery, in which indeed the temporary pain experienced is one of the conditions almost indispensable to the future beneficial results. It is one which few men can endure without hating the operator at the time; although doubtless such hatred would not only disappear, but be exchanged for esteem and admiration, if they persevered until the full ulterior consequences of the operation developed themselves. But we know (from the express statement of Xenophon) that many, who underwent this first pungent thrust of his dialectics, never came near him again. He disregarded them as laggards; but their voices did not the less count in the hostile chorus. What made that chorus the more formidable was the high quality and position of its leaders. For Socrates himself tells us that the men whom he chiefly and expressly sought out to cross-examine were the men of celebrity as statesmen, rhetors, poets, or artisans,—those at once most sensitive to such humiliation and most capable of making their enmity effective'—GROTE, chap. 68.

[2] Jackson, *l.c.*, p. 236.

[3] 'Though he had neither the right nor the power to force his opinions upon another, he might by a systematic interrogatory lead another to substitute a better opinion for a worse, just as a physician by appropriate remedies may enable his patient to substitute a healthy sense of taste for a morbid one. To administer such an interrogatory and thus to be the physician of souls was, Socrates thought, his divinely appointed duty; and when he described himself as a *talker* or *converser*, he not only negatively distinguished himself from those who, whether philosophers or sophists, called themselves *teachers* (διδάσκαλοι), but also positively indicated the method of question and answer (διαλεκτική) which he consistently preferred and habitually practised'—JACKSON, *l.c.*, p. 236.

begin with finance, we shall, I suppose, give the palm to one who increases the resources of the state?'—'Certainly'—'And, in time of war, to one who makes the state superior to her adversaries?'—'Of course'—'In diplomacy, to one who procures her friends instead of foes?'—'Naturally so'—'In debate, to one who allays party spirit and promotes harmony?'—'I suppose so.' By thus bringing back the argument to its starting-point he would make the truth manifest even to the disputants themselves.

'Socrates,' says Xenophon, 'in his discussions handled every one just as he pleased.' We have an excellent example of this wonderful power in the conversations with Euthydemus given in the Fourth Book, which are too lengthy to reproduce here. Socrates there applies his Elenchus in order to break down a false conceit of knowledge and produce a consciousness of ignorance by a series of ἀπορίαι 'perplexities' (chapters ii., vi.). For fuller illustration of Socrates' method we must go to the dialogues of Plato. With his usual irony, Socrates, professing ignorance, would put a question on some subject. Receiving an off-hand reply given without due reflection, he then put fresh questions on the explanation or definition vouchsafed. To these questions, which would generally refer to special cases of the subject under consideration, the respondent would be compelled to return an answer inconsistent with the first, thus proving that the definition was, to say the least, defective. Then would follow attempts on the part of the respondent to amend his answer; but this only landed him in further inconsistencies. The dialogue would end with a purely negative result, the respondent being compelled to acknowledge that he was unable to answer the original question in a way which would satisfy even himself. Thus Euthydemus (in IV. ii. 39), thoroughly driven into a corner by the remorseless Elenchus, and compelled to make an utterly absurd admission, says: *Clearly it is my own stupidity which forces me to make this statement. I fear it is best for me to hold my tongue; for I shall soon be convicted of knowing absolutely nothing.* So, says Xenophon, he departed utterly despondent, despising himself, and persuaded that he was no better than a slave. In such

conversations Socrates would maintain to the end the position of a learner having no positive theory of his own to champion, sometimes expressing disappointment at not gaining the instruction so rashly promised by the interlocutor.

But Xenophon is always anxious to emphasise the moral purpose of the Elenchus: e.g. III. viii. 1:—*Once Aristippus set himself to cross-examine Socrates, just as he had himself been cross-examined by Socrates before. Socrates, only wishing to benefit his associates, gave answers, not like a debater guarding against perversions of his argument, but as one persuaded of the paramount importance of right action.* It is clear, however, not only from Plato, but also from Xenophon, that the negative vein was by far the more prominent in the discourses of Socrates. Several passages in the *Memorabilia*[1] show that its readers would be inclined to believe that Socrates was always reducing his hearers to a humiliating consciousness of ignorance, and never gave straightforward practical advice. Undoubtedly there was a constructive side to his dialectic; for 'if, having been thus convinced of ignorance, the respondent did not shrink from a new effort, Socrates was ready to aid him by further questions of a suggestive sort. Consistent thinking with a view to consistent action being the end of the enquiry, Socrates would direct the respondent's attention to instances analogous to that in hand, and so lead him to frame for himself a generalisation from which the passions and the prejudices of the moment were, as far as might be, excluded. In this constructive process, though the element of surprise was no longer necessary, the interrogative form was studiously preserved, because it secured at each step the conscious and responsible assent of the learner[2].' Such constructive teaching Euthydemus, after leaving the great Cross-examiner utterly crestfallen, returned to receive:—*Many of those who were reduced to this condition by Socrates refused to approach him any more. These he looked upon as dullards. But Euthydemus understood that, if he was to become worthy of account, he must*

[1] Notably I. iv. 1, quoted above.
[2] Jackson, *l.c.*, p. 236.

associate as much as possible with Socrates. So from that time forward, except for some necessity, he never left him; and in certain points he imitated him in his pursuits. Socrates, seeing him so disposed, disturbed him as little as possible, and in the simplest and plainest way taught him everything which he thought necessary to know and important to practise[1].

Aristotle[2] tells us that there are two things which may rightly be attributed to Socrates:—(1) Inductive arguments (*οἱ ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι*) and (2) General definitions (*τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου*)[3]. The following passage (IV. vi. 15) refers to the Inductive method—i.e. an argument from the known to the unknown through a generalisation expressed or implied:—*Whenever Socrates was conducting a discussion, he went step by step through points of general agreement, considering that here lay real security in argument. And so he was more successful in winning the assent of his hearers than any one I know. He said that Homer assigned to Odysseus the character of a safe orator as being capable of leading discussions through commonly accepted opinions.* Good examples of Socratic Induction (crude perhaps in the eyes of a modern logician) will be found in the third chapter of Book II.

With regard to the important subject of Socratic Definitions Xenophon says (I. i. 16):—*Socrates was incessantly discussing human affairs, for example: What is piety, what impiety? What is the beautiful, what the ugly? What is the just, what the unjust? What is soberness, what madness? What is courage, what cowardice? What is a state, what a statesman? What is a ruler of men? –and other similar questions. Men who had knowledge of these subjects he considered* καλοὶ κἀγαθοί;

[1] *Mem.* IV. ii. 40.

[2] *Metaphysics*, M. 4.

[3] 'The famous dialectic, by which he brought ignorance home to his interlocutors, at once exhibited the scientific need of exact definitions of general notions, and suggested that these definitions were to be attained by a careful comparison of particulars. Thus we can understand how, in Aristotle's view, the main service of Socrates to philosophy consisted in *introducing induction and definitions*. This description, however, is both too technical for the naive character of the Socratic dialectic, and does not adequately represent its destructive effects'—SIDGWICK, *History of Ethics*, p. 23.

those ignorant of them he thought might justly be called slaves. Again, he writes (IV. v. 12—vi. 1):—*Thus it is, Socrates said, that men become best, happiest, and most capable of discussion* (διαλέγεσθαι δυνατωτάτους)—*the term 'discussion' being derived from people coming together and deliberating in common by 'picking out things according to their kinds*[1].' *A man must therefore prepare himself as carefully as possible for this pursuit, and give it his earnest attention; for thus men are made best, fittest to command, and most potent in dialectic* (διαλεκτικωτάτους). *And now I will endeavour to describe how Socrates made his associates more potent in dialectic. He held that those who knew what each thing was* (τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων) *would be able to communicate this knowledge to others, adding that it was no matter for surprise that those who had not this knowledge should stumble themselves and cause others to stumble also. Hence he was never weary of enquiring with the help of his associates what each thing was* (*i.e. asking for definitions*). *It would be a serious labour to go through all his definitions; I will only give sufficient examples to illustrate his method of enquiry.* The first of these passages illustrates the bearing of Socrates' dialectic on Ethical questions. 'Moral error,' says Dr Jackson[2], 'Socrates conceived, is largely due to the misapplication of general terms, which, once affixed to a person or to an act, possibly in a moment of passion or prejudice, too often stand in the way of sober and careful reflection. By requiring a definition and the reference to it of the act or person in question, he sought to secure in the individual at any rate consistency of thought, and, in so far, consistency of action. Accordingly he spent his life in seeking and helping others to seek the definition of the various words by which the moral quality of actions is described, valuing the results thus obtained, not as contributions to knowledge, but as means to right action in the multifarious relations of life.'

[1] Socrates' explanation of διαλέγεσθαι by διαλέγειν κατὰ γένη cannot be regarded as serious; it is a characteristic piece of humour.

[2] *l.c.*, p. 237.

(C) The Ethics of Socrates.

As we have seen, Socrates brought his dialectic—his method of question and answer—to bear on 'human affairs.' This is abundantly illustrated in the *Memorabilia*, where 'we encounter a motley array of materials,—investigations into the essence of virtue, the duties of man, disputes with sophists, advice of the most varied kind given to friends and acquaintances, conversations with generals as to the responsibilities of their office, with artificers and tradesmen as to their arts. Nothing is too small to call for a thorough and methodical examination. Socrates looked upon the life and pursuits of man as the real object of his enquiries and other things only in as far as they affected the conditions and problems of human life. Hence his philosophy, which in point of scientific form was a criticism of what *is* (διαλεκτική), became in its actual application a science of human actions (ἠθική)[1].'

The fundamental ethical doctrine of Socrates is thus stated by Diogenes Laertius:—*ἓν μόνον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι—τὴν ἐπιστήμην, καὶ ἓν μόνον κακόν—τὴν ἀμαθίαν* (ii. 31). It is important to observe that the word *φρόνησις* 'practical wisdom'—the only knowledge which Socrates recognised—should strictly have been substituted for *ἐπιστήμη* 'knowledge.' Thus Aristotle speaks of 'the Socratic doctrine *οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως*[2].' 'Knowledge' in the strict sense of the word Socrates held to be unattainable; the pre-eminent wisdom which the Delphic oracle attributed to him he held to lie in a unique consciousness of ignorance. 'Himself blessed with a will so powerful that it moved almost without friction, he fell into the error of ignoring its operations, and was thus led to regard knowledge as the sole condition of well-doing. Where there is knowledge—that is to say practical wisdom (*φρόνησις*), right action, he conceived,

[1] Zeller, *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, p. 133.

[2] *Eth. Eudem.* vii. 13.

follows of itself; for no one knowingly prefers what is evil; and if there are cases in which men seem to act against knowledge, the inference to be drawn is, not that knowledge and wrong-doing are compatible, but that in the cases in question the supposed knowledge was after all ignorance. Virtue then is knowledge, knowledge at once of end and of means irresistibly realising itself in act. Whence it follows that the several virtues which are commonly distinguished are essentially one. *Piety*, *justice*, *courage*, and *temperance* are the names which *wisdom* bears in different spheres of action. To be pious is to know what is due to the gods; to be just is to know what is due to men; to be courageous is to know what is to be feared and what is not; to be temperate is to know how to use what is good and avoid what is evil[1].' This will explain Xenophon's statement that Socrates drew no distinction between σοφία and σωφροσύνη (III. ix. 4).

For the proper understanding of Socrates' ethical views it is essential to notice that 'if the necessity for firmness of purpose, as well as fulness of insight, was not adequately recognised in the Socratic doctrine, the former quality was all the more conspicuously manifested in his life[2].' Personal firmness was necessary in order to carry out such practical convictions as had been attained[3]. Accordingly, we find that Xenophon is fully alive to the importance of considering Socrates' teaching and character together. *By such words*, he says, *and conduct answering to his words, did Socrates mould the minds of his associates, making them both more pious and more virtuous.* Again, he eulogises him as a model of self-control, as above all others patient of winter's cold and summer's heat and toil of every kind,—by his wonderful example implanting in many a passion for virtue and a hope that by careful management of themselves they too would become beautiful and good (I. ii. 1—3).

[1] Jackson, *l.c.*, p. 237.
[2] Sidgwick, *History of Ethics*, p. 27.
[3] Similarly Socrates' disciple Antisthenes, the founder of Cynicism, held αὐτάρκη τὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος (*Diogenes Laertius*, vi. 11).

When defending his master against the charge of responsibility for the misdeeds of Alcibiades and Critias, Xenophon urges that Socrates showed himself to his associates as a beautiful and good being, reasoning with them most beautifully about virtue and other human concerns. For, as long as these two were companions of Socrates, they continued sober-minded, not surely from fear of punishment at his hands, but because they were for the time convinced that such conduct was best (I. ii. 18).

Whatever was 'beautiful and good' Socrates held that he must necessarily do. But of 'the good' and 'the beautiful' in the abstract he could give no account; all he would say was that he knew of no good 'which was not good for something in particular'; hence in particular cases he was always ready to prove that the good is also useful and that the beautiful is also profitable[1]. He was what we should now call a utilitarian. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὠφέλιμον is his text,—a text abundantly illustrated in the *Memorabilia*, e.g. IV. vi. 8:—*Come now, Euthydemus, ought we to search for the good in this way?—In what way?—Do you think that the same thing is equally useful to all?—No, I do not—You hold that a thing which is useful to one is sometimes*

[1] 'The knowledge of Good at which Socrates aims is misconceived if we think of it as knowledge of Virtue as distinct from Interest. The force of his argument depends upon an inseparable union of the conceptions of Virtue and Interest in the single notion of Good. This union Socrates did not, of course, invent; he found it, as the Sophists did, in the common thought of his age; but it was the primary moral function of his dialectic to draw out and drive home its practical consequences. The kernel of the positive moral teaching which Xenophon attributes to him is his profound conviction of the reality and essential harmony of the different constituents of human good, as commonly recognised; especially his earnest belief in the eminent value for the individual of those *goods of the soul* which—then as now—were more praised than sought by practical men generally. From this conviction, maintained along with an unrealised ideal of the knowledge that would solve all practical problems, springs the singular combination of qualities exhibited both by the teaching and the personality of this unique man, as they are presented to us with incomparable impressiveness in many dialogues of Plato. We seem to see self-sacrifice in the garb of self-regard; a lofty spirituality blended with a homely common-sense; a fervid enthusiasm for excellence of character, and an unreserved devotion to the task of producing it in himself and others, half-veiled by a cool mocking irony; a subtle, intense scepticism playing round a simple and resolute acceptance of customary duties, like a lambent flame that has somehow lost its corrosive qualities'—SIDGWICK, *l.c.*, pp. 26, 27.

harmful to another?—Certainly—And would you say that there is anything else good except what is useful?—Not I—It follows then that the useful is good to whomsoever it is useful. Again, in IV. vii. 8 we are told that Socrates bade his associates beware of profitless study, especially in physics; he would only join them in any discussion μεχρὶ τοῦ ὠφελίμου, *up to the limit set by utility.* Falling in with one who had been elected a General, he examined the question, What is the virtue of a good leader? *Stripping off all other qualities*, says Xenophon, *Socrates left only the capacity to make happy those whom he leads* (III. ii. 4). Speaking (in IV. i. 2) of the signs by which Socrates detected 'good natures,' Xenophon mentions especially a passion for those studies which tend to good management of household or state; *such persons, he held, need only be educated to become not only happy themselves and happy managers of their households, but also capable of making others—whether individuals or states—happy also.*

Occasionally, even in Xenophon, a higher note is struck[1]. Especially is this the case in the conversations with the sophist Antiphon, who thus addresses Socrates:—

Why, Socrates, I always thought it was expected of students of philosophy to grow in happiness daily; but you seem to have reaped other fruits from your philosophy. At any rate, you exist—I do not say live—in a style such as no man serving under a master would put up with. Your meat and your drink are of the cheapest sort, and as to clothes, you cling to one wretched cloak which serves you for winter and summer alike; and so you go the whole year round without shoes to your feet or a shirt to your back. Then again, you are not for taking or making money, the mere seeking of which is a pleasure, even as the possession of it adds to the sweetness and independence of existence. I do not know whether you follow the common rule of teachers, who try to fashion their pupils in imitation of themselves, and propose to mould the characters of your companions; but if you do, you ought to dub yourself professor of the art of wretchedness.

[1] 'In the mouth of Socrates other utterances are met with, leading us beyond this superficial ground of moral duties, by placing the essential advantage of virtue, the purpose which it serves and because of which it is good and beautiful, in its influence on the intellectual life of man'—ZELLER, *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, p. 151.

In the course of his reply Socrates speaks as follows:—

You apparently will not have it that I, who am ever training myself to endure this, that, and the other things which may befall the body, can brave all hardships more easily than yourself for instance, who perhaps are not so practised. And to escape slavery to the belly or to sleep or lechery can you suggest more effective means than the possession of some more powerful attraction, some counter-charm which shall gladden not only in the using, but by the hope enkindled of its lasting usefulness? And yet this you do know: joy is not to him who feels he is doing well in nothing; it belongs to one who is persuaded that things are progressing with him, be it tillage or the working of a vessel, or any of the thousand and one things on which a man may chance to be employed. To him it is given to rejoice as he reflects, *I am doing well.* But is the pleasure derived from all these put together half as joyous as the consciousness of becoming better oneself, of acquiring better and better friends? That, for my part, is the belief I continue to cherish... You, Antiphon, would seem to suggest that happiness consists in luxury and extravagance; I hold a different creed. To have no wants at all is, to my mind, an attribute of Godhead; to have as few wants as possible the nearest approach to Godhead; and as that which is divine is mightiest, so that is next mightiest which comes closest to the divine.

In another interview with the sophist, Socrates concludes with these words:—

So it is with wisdom; he who sells it for money to the first bidder we name a sophist, as though one should say a man who prostitutes his wisdom. But if the same man, discerning the noble nature of another, shall teach that other every good thing, and make him his friend, of such an one we say he does that which it is the duty of every good citizen of gentle soul to do. In accordance with this theory, I too, Antiphon, having my tastes, even as another finds pleasure in his horse and his hounds, and another in his fighting cocks, so I too take my pleasure in good friends; and if I have any good thing myself, I teach it them or I commend them to others by whom I think they will be helped forwards in the path of virtue. The treasures also of the wise of old, written and bequeathed in their books, I unfold and peruse in common with my friends. If our eyes light upon any good thing, we

cull it eagerly, and regard it as great gain if we may but grow in friendship with one another[1].

But, as a rule, the treatment of ethical questions in the *Memorabilia* is thoroughly conventional. 'In the dialogues of Xenophon,' says Zeller[2], 'Socrates almost always bases his moral precepts on the motive of utility. We should aim at abstinence, because the abstinent man has a more pleasant life than the licentious; we should inure ourselves to hardships, because the hardy man is more healthy, and because he can more easily avoid dangers, and gain honour and glory; we should be modest, because boasting does harm and brings disgrace. We should be on good terms with our relatives, because it is absurd to use for harm what has been given us for our good; we should try to secure good friends, since a good friend is the most useful possession. We should obey the laws, since obedience is productive of the greatest good to ourselves and to the State; and we should abstain from wrong, since wrong is always punished in the end. We should live virtuously, because virtue carries off the greatest rewards both from God and man. Unless Xenophon is misleading on essential points, we must allow that Socrates was in earnest in explaining the good as the useful.'

[1] *Mem.* I. vi. (Dakyns' Translation).
[2] *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, p. 150.

ΞΕΝΟΦΩΝΤΟΣ ΑΠΟΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΜΑΤΑ.

B.

I.

Socrates and Aristippus.

Socrates dwells on the importance of self-control, especially for one destined to rule.

Ἐδόκει δέ μοι καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων προτρέπειν τοὺς 1
συνόντας ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν βρωτοῦ καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ
λαγνείας καὶ ὕπνου καὶ ῥίγους καὶ θάλπους καὶ πόνου.
γνοὺς δέ τινα τῶν συνόντων ἀκολαστοτέρως ἔχοντα
πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀρίστιππε, εἰ δέοι
σε παιδεύειν παραλαβόντα δύο τῶν νέων, τὸν μὲν
ὅπως ἱκανὸς ἔσται ἄρχειν, τὸν δ' ὅπως μηδ' ἀντιποιή-
σεται ἀρχῆς, πῶς ἂν ἑκάτερον παιδεύοις; βούλει
σκοπῶμεν ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν
στοιχείων; καὶ ὁ Ἀρίστιππος ἔφη· Δοκεῖ γοῦν μοι
ἡ τροφὴ ἀρχὴ εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ζῴη γ' ἄν τις, εἰ μὴ
τρέφοιτο. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι σίτου ἅπτεσθαι, 2
ὅταν ὥρα ἥκῃ, ἀμφοτέροις εἰκὸς παραγίγνεσθαι; Εἰκὸς

γάρ, ἔφη. Τὸ οὖν προαιρεῖσθαι τὸ κατεπεῖγον μᾶλλον πράττειν ἢ τῇ γαστρὶ χαρίζεσθαι πότερον ἂν αὐτῶν ἐθίζοιμεν; Τὸν εἰς τὸ ἄρχειν, ἔφη, νὴ Δία παιδευόμενον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἄπρακτα γίγνηται παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ἀρχήν. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ ὅταν πιεῖν βούλωνται, τὸ δύνασθαι διψῶντα ἀνέχεσθαι τῷ αὐτῷ προσθετέον;
3 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ ὕπνου ἐγκρατῆ εἶναι, ὥστε δύνασθαι καὶ ὀψὲ κοιμηθῆναι καὶ πρῳ ἀναστῆναι καὶ ἀγρυπνῆσαι, εἴ τι δέοι, ποτέρῳ ἂν προσθείημεν; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, τῷ αὐτῷ. Τί δέ; τὸ μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς πόνους, ἀλλ' ἐθελοντὴν ὑπομένειν ποτέρῳ ἂν προσθείημεν; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, τῷ ἄρχειν παιδευομένῳ. Τί δέ; τὸ μαθεῖν, εἴ τι ἐπιτήδειόν ἐστι μάθημα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν τῶν ἀντιπάλων, ποτέρῳ ἂν προσθεῖναι μᾶλλον πρέποι; Πολὺ νὴ Δί', ἔφη, τῷ ἄρχειν παιδευομένῳ· καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἄνευ τῶν
4 τοιούτων μαθημάτων. Οὐκοῦν ὁ οὕτω πεπαιδευμένος ἧττον ἂν δοκεῖ σοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀντιπάλων ἢ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα ἁλίσκεσθαι; τούτων γὰρ δήπου τὰ μὲν γαστρὶ δελεαζόμενα, καὶ μάλα ἔνια δυσωπούμενα, ὅμως τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἀγόμενα πρὸς τὸ δέλεαρ ἁλίσκεται, τὰ δὲ ποτῷ ἐνεδρεύεται. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλα, οἷον οἵ τε ὄρτυγες καὶ οἱ πέρδικες πρὸς τὴν τῆς θηλείας φωνὴν φερόμενοι καὶ ἐξιστάμενοι τοῦ τὰ δεινὰ ἀναλογίζεσθαι, τοῖς θηράτροις ἐμπίπτουσι;
5 συνέφη καὶ ταῦτα. Οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι αἰσχρὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ ταὐτὰ πάσχειν τοῖς ἀφρονεστάτοις τῶν
6 θηρίων; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ εἶναι μὲν τὰς ἀναγκαιοτάτας πλείστας πράξεις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ, οἷον τάς τε πολεμικὰς καὶ τὰς γεωργικὰς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ τὰς ἐλαχίστας, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς

ἀγυμνάστως ἔχειν πρός τε ψύχη καὶ θάλπη οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πολλὴ ἀμέλεια εἶναι; συνέφη καὶ τοῦτο. Οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι τὸν μέλλοντα ἄρχειν ἀσκεῖν δεῖν καὶ ταῦτα εὐπετῶς φέρειν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Aristippus cannot endure the burden of rule; he wants a life of ease and pleasure.

Οὐκοῦν εἰ τοὺς ἐγκρατεῖς τούτων ἁπάντων εἰς τοὺς 7
ἀρχικοὺς τάττομεν, τοὺς ἀδυνάτους ταῦτα ποιεῖν εἰς τοὺς μηδ' ἀντιποιησομένους τοῦ ἄρχειν τάξομεν; συνέφη καὶ τοῦτο. Τί οὖν; ἐπειδὴ καὶ τούτων ἑκατέρου τοῦ φύλου τὴν τάξιν οἶσθα, ἤδη ποτ' ἐπεσκέψω εἰς ποτέραν τῶν τάξεων τούτων σαυτὸν δικαίως ἂν τάττοις;
Ἔγωγ', ἔφη ὁ Ἀρίστιππος· καὶ οὐδαμῶς γε τάττω 8
ἐμαυτὸν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄρχειν βουλομένων τάξιν. καὶ γὰρ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ἄφρονος ἀνθρώπου εἶναι τό, μεγάλου ἔργου ὄντος τοῦ ἑαυτῷ τὰ δέοντα παρασκευάζειν, μὴ ἀρκεῖν τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ προσαναθέσθαι τὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις ὧν δέονται πορίζειν. καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν πολλὰ ὧν βούλεται ἐλλείπειν, τῆς δὲ πόλεως προεστῶτα, ἐὰν μὴ πάντα ὅσα ἡ πόλις βούλεται καταπράττῃ, τούτου δίκην
ὑπέχειν, τοῦτο πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀφροσύνη ἐστί; καὶ γὰρ 9
ἀξιοῦσιν αἱ πόλεις τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τοῖς οἰκέταις χρῆσθαι. ἐγώ τε γὰρ ἀξιῶ τοὺς θεράποντας ἐμοὶ μὲν ἄφθονα τὰ ἐπιτήδεια παρασκευάζειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ μηδενὸς τούτων ἅπτεσθαι, αἵ τε πόλεις οἴονται χρῆναι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἑαυταῖς μὲν ὡς πλεῖστα ἀγαθὰ πορίζειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ πάντων τούτων ἀπέχεσθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν τοὺς μὲν βουλομένους πολλὰ πράγματα ἔχειν αὐτούς τε καὶ ἄλλοις παρέχειν οὕτως ἂν παιδεύσας

εἰς τοὺς ἀρχικοὺς καταστήσαιμι· ἐμαυτόν γε μέντοι τάττω εἰς τοὺς βουλομένους ᾗ ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἥδιστα βιοτεύειν.

Who lead the pleasanter life—the rulers or the ruled? Aristippus would himself prefer a middle position between rule and slavery.

10 καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Βούλει οὖν καὶ τοῦτο σκεψώμεθα, πότεροι ἥδιον ζῶσιν, οἱ ἄρχοντες ἢ οἱ ἀρχόμενοι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν τῶν ἐθνῶν ὧν ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἐν μὲν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ Πέρσαι μὲν ἄρχουσιν, ἄρχονται δὲ Σύροι καὶ Φρύγες καὶ Λυδοί· ἐν δὲ τῇ Εὐρώπῃ Σκύθαι μὲν ἄρχουσι, Μαιῶται δὲ ἄρχονται· ἐν δὲ τῇ Λιβύῃ Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν ἄρχουσι, Λίβυες δὲ ἄρχονται. τούτων οὖν ποτέρους ἥδιον οἴει ζῆν; ἢ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἐν οἷς καὶ αὐτὸς εἶ, πότεροί σοι δοκοῦσιν

11 ἥδιον, οἱ κρατοῦντες ἢ οἱ κρατούμενοι, ζῆν; Ἀλλ᾽ ἐγώ τοι, ἔφη ὁ Ἀρίστιππος, οὐδὲ εἰς τὴν δουλείαν ἐμαυτὸν τάττω, ἀλλ᾽ εἶναί τίς μοι δοκεῖ μέση τούτων ὁδός, ἣν πειρῶμαι βαδίζειν, οὔτε δι᾽ ἀρχῆς οὔτε διὰ δουλείας, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἐλευθερίας, ἥπερ μάλιστα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν

12 ἄγει. Ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μέν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ οὔτε δι᾽ ἀρχῆς οὔτε διὰ δουλείας ἡ ὁδὸς αὕτη φέρει, οὕτω μηδὲ δι᾽ ἀνθρώπων, ἴσως ἄν τι λέγοις· εἰ μέντοι ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὢν μήτε ἄρχειν ἀξιώσεις μήτε ἄρχεσθαι μηδὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἑκὼν θεραπεύσεις, οἶμαί σε ὁρᾶν ὡς ἐπίστανται οἱ κρείττονες τοὺς ἥττονας καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ

13 κλαίοντας καθιστάντες δούλοις χρῆσθαι. ἢ λανθάνουσί σε οἱ ἄλλων σπειράντων καὶ φυτευσάντων τόν τε σῖτον τέμνοντες καὶ δενδροκοποῦντες καὶ πάντα τρόπον πολιορκοῦντες τοὺς ἥττονας καὶ μὴ θέλοντας θερα-

πεύειν, ἕως ἂν πείσωσιν ἑλέσθαι δουλεύειν ἀντὶ τοῦ πολεμεῖν τοῖς κρείττοσι; καὶ ἰδίᾳ αὖ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ δυνατοὶ τοὺς ἀνάνδρους καὶ ἀδυνάτους οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι καταδουλωσάμενοι καρποῦνται;

Socrates shows the danger of Aristippus's desire for independence.

'Αλλ' ἐγώ τοι, ἔφη, ἵνα μὴ πάσχω ταῦτα, οὐδ' εἰς πολιτείαν ἐμαυτὸν κατακλείω, ἀλλὰ ξένος πανταχοῦ
εἰμι. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Τοῦτο μέντοι ἤδη λέγεις 14
δεινὸν πάλαισμα. τοὺς γὰρ ξένους, ἐξ οὗ ὅ τε Σίνις καὶ ὁ Σκείρων καὶ ὁ Προκρούστης ἀπέθανον, οὐδεὶς ἔτι ἀδικεῖ. ἀλλὰ νῦν οἱ μὲν πολιτευόμενοι ἐν ταῖς πατρίσι καὶ νόμους τίθενται, ἵνα μὴ ἀδικῶνται, καὶ φίλους πρὸς τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις καλουμένοις ἄλλους κτῶνται βοηθούς, καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐρύματα περιβάλλονται, καὶ ὅπλα κτῶνται οἷς ἀμύνονται τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἄλλους ἔξωθεν συμμάχους κατασκευάζονται, καὶ οἱ μὲν
ταῦτα πάντα κεκτημένοι ὅμως ἀδικοῦνται· σὺ δὲ οὐδὲν 15
μὲν τούτων ἔχων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁδοῖς, ἔνθα πλεῖστοι ἀδικοῦνται, πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβων, εἰς ὁποίαν δ' ἂν πόλιν ἀφίκῃ, τῶν πολιτῶν πάντων ἥττων ὢν καὶ τοιοῦτος οἵοις μάλιστα ἐπιτίθενται οἱ βουλόμενοι ἀδικεῖν, ὅμως διὰ τὸ ξένος εἶναι οὐκ ἂν οἴει ἀδικηθῆναι; ἢ διότι αἱ πόλεις σοι κηρύττουσιν ἀσφάλειαν καὶ προσιόντι καὶ ἀπιόντι, θαρρεῖς; ἢ διότι καὶ δοῦλος ἂν οἴει τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος μηδενὶ δεσπότῃ λυσιτελεῖν; τίς γὰρ ἂν ἐθέλοι ἄνθρωπον ἐν οἰκίᾳ ἔχειν πονεῖν μὲν μηδὲν
ἐθέλοντα, τῇ δὲ πολυτελεστάτῃ διαίτῃ χαίροντα; σκε- 16
ψώμεθα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, πῶς οἱ δεσπόται τοῖς τοιούτοις

οἰκέταις χρῶνται. ἆρα οὐ τὴν μὲν λαγνείαν αὐτῶν τῷ λιμῷ σωφρονίζουσι; κλέπτειν δὲ κωλύουσιν ἀποκλείοντες ὅθεν ἄν τι λαβεῖν ᾖ; τοῦ δὲ δραπετεύειν δεσμοῖς ἀπείργουσι; τὴν ἀργίαν δὲ πληγαῖς ἐξαναγκάζουσιν; ἢ σὺ πῶς ποιεῖς, ὅταν τῶν οἰκετῶν τινα τοιοῦτον ὄντα καταμανθάνῃς;

Aristippus holds that the burden of a ruler's life is intolerable. Socrates tells him that he is mistaken.

17 Κολάζω, ἔφη, πᾶσι κακοῖς, ἕως ἂν δουλεύειν ἀναγκάσω. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ εἰς τὴν βασιλικὴν τέχνην παιδευόμενοι, ἣν δοκεῖς μοι σὺ νομίζειν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι, τί διαφέρουσι τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κακοπαθούντων, εἴ γε πεινήσουσι καὶ διψήσουσι καὶ ῥιγώσουσι καὶ ἀγρυπνήσουσι καὶ τἄλλα πάντα μοχθήσουσιν ἑκόντες; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι διαφέρει τὸ αὐτὸ δέρμα ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἢ ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα πολιορκεῖσθαι, ἄλλο γε ἢ ἀφροσύνη πρόσεστι τῷ θέλοντι τὰ
18 λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν. Τί δέ, ὦ Ἀρίστιππε; ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῶν τοιούτων διαφέρειν τὰ ἑκούσια τῶν ἀκουσίων, ᾗ ὁ μὲν ἑκὼν πεινῶν φάγοι ἂν ὁπότε βούλοιτο καὶ ὁ ἑκὼν διψῶν πίοι καὶ τἄλλα ὡσαύτως, τῷ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ταῦτα πάσχοντι οὐκ ἔξεστιν ὁπόταν βούληται παύεσθαι; ἔπειτα ὁ μὲν ἑκουσίως ταλαιπωρῶν ἐπ' ἀγαθῇ ἐλπίδι πονῶν εὐφραίνεται, οἷον οἱ τὰ θηρία
19 θηρῶντες ἐλπίδι τοῦ λήψεσθαι ἡδέως μοχθοῦσι· καὶ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ἆθλα τῶν πόνων μικροῦ τινος ἄξιά ἐστι, τοὺς δὲ πονοῦντας, ἵνα φίλους ἀγαθοὺς κτήσωνται, ἢ ὅπως ἐχθροὺς χειρώσονται, ἢ ἵνα δυνατοὶ γενόμενοι

καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ τὸν ἑαυτῶν οἶκον καλῶς οἰκῶσι καὶ τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιῶσι καὶ τὴν πατρίδα εὐεργετῶσι, πῶς οὐκ οἴεσθαι χρὴ τούτους καὶ πονεῖν ἡδέως εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ζῆν εὐφραινομένους, ἀγαμένους μὲν ἑαυτούς, ἐπαινουμένους δὲ καὶ ζηλουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων; ἔτι δὲ αἱ μὲν ῥᾳδιουργίαι καὶ 20
ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἡδοναὶ οὔτε σώματι εὐεξίαν ἱκαναί εἰσιν ἐνεργάζεσθαι, ὥς φασιν οἱ γυμνασταί, οὔτε ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμην ἀξιόλογον οὐδεμίαν ἐμποιοῦσιν, αἱ δὲ διὰ καρτερίας ἐπιμέλειαι τῶν καλῶν τε κἀγαθῶν ἔργων ἐξικνεῖσθαι ποιοῦσιν, ὥς φασιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες. λέγει δέ που καὶ Ἡσίοδος·

Τὴν μὲν γὰρ κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἑλέσθαι
ῥηιδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει.
τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν
ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν
καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται,
ῥηιδίη δὴ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπή περ ἐοῦσα.

μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ἐν τῷδε·

Τῶν πόνων πωλοῦσιν ἡμῖν πάντα τἀγάθ' οἱ θεοί.

καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ τόπῳ φησίν·

Ὦ πονηρέ, μὴ τὰ μαλακὰ μῶσο, μὴ τὰ σκλήρ' ἔχῃς.

Socrates tells the story of the "Choice of Heracles."

καὶ Πρόδικος δὲ ὁ σοφὸς ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι τῷ 21
περὶ Ἡρακλέους, ὅπερ δὴ καὶ πλείστοις ἐπιδείκνυται, ὡσαύτως περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀποφαίνεται, ὧδέ πως λέγων, ὅσα ἐγὼ μέμνημαι. φησὶ γὰρ Ἡρακλέα, ἐπεὶ ἐκ παίδων εἰς ἥβην ὡρμᾶτο, ἐν ᾗ οἱ νέοι ἤδη αὐτοκράτορες

γιγνόμενοι δηλοῦσιν εἴτε τὴν δι' ἀρετῆς ὁδὸν τρέψονται
ἐπὶ τὸν βίον εἴτε τὴν διὰ κακίας, ἐξελθόντα εἰς ἡσυχίαν
22 καθῆσθαι ἀποροῦντα ποτέραν τῶν ὁδῶν τράπηται· καὶ
φανῆναι αὐτῷ δύο γυναῖκας προσιέναι μεγάλας, τὴν
μὲν ἑτέραν εὐπρεπῆ τε ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐλευθέριον φύσει,
κεκοσμημένην τὸ μὲν χρῶμα καθαριότητι, τὰ δὲ ὄμματα
αἰδοῖ, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα σωφροσύνῃ, ἐσθῆτι δὲ λευκῇ, τὴν
δ' ἑτέραν τεθρυμμένην μὲν εἰς πολυσαρκίαν τε καὶ
ἁπαλότητα, κεκαλλωπισμένην δὲ τὸ μὲν χρῶμα ὥστε
λευκοτέραν τε καὶ ἐρυθροτέραν τοῦ ὄντος δοκεῖν φαίνε-
σθαι, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθοτέραν τῆς φύσεως
εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ὄμματα ἔχειν ἀναπεπταμένα, ἐσθῆτα δὲ
ἐξ ἧς ἂν μάλιστα ἡ ὥρα διαλάμποι· κατασκοπεῖσθαι
δὲ θαμὰ ἑαυτήν, ἐπισκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος αὐτὴν
θεᾶται, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῆς σκιὰν ἀπο-
βλέπειν.
23 ὡς δ' ἐγένοντο πλησιαίτερον τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, τὴν
μὲν πρόσθεν ῥηθεῖσαν ἰέναι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, τὴν δ'
ἑτέραν φθάσαι βουλομένην προσδραμεῖν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ
καὶ εἰπεῖν· Ὁρῶ σε, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἀποροῦντα ποίαν ὁδὸν
ἐπὶ τὸν βίον τράπῃ. ἐὰν οὖν ἐμὲ φίλην ποιησάμενος,
τὴν ἡδίστην τε καὶ ῥᾴστην ὁδὸν ἄξω σε, καὶ τῶν μὲν
τερπνῶν οὐδενὸς ἄγευστος ἔσει, τῶν δὲ χαλεπῶν ἄπειρος
24 διαβιώσει. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐ πολέμων οὐδὲ πραγ-
μάτων φροντιεῖς, ἀλλὰ σκοπούμενος διέσει τί ἂν
κεχαρισμένον ἢ σιτίον ἢ ποτὸν εὕροις, ἢ τί ἂν ἰδὼν
ἢ ἀκούσας τερφθείης, ἢ τίνων ὀσφραινόμενος ἢ ἁπτό-
μενος, καὶ πῶς ἂν μαλακώτατα καθεύδοις, καὶ πῶς ἂν
25 ἀπονώτατα τούτων πάντων τυγχάνοις. ἐὰν δέ ποτε
γένηταί τις ὑποψία σπάνεως ἀφ' ὧν ἔσται ταῦτα, οὐ
φόβος μή σε ἀγάγω ἐπὶ τὸ πονοῦντα καὶ ταλαιπωροῦντα

τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ ταῦτα πορίζεσθαι· ἀλλ' οἷς ἂν οἱ ἄλλοι ἐργάζωνται, τούτοις σὺ χρήσει, οὐδενὸς ἀπεχόμενος ὅθεν ἂν δυνατὸν ᾖ τι κερδᾶναι. πανταχόθεν γὰρ ὠφελεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐμοὶ συνοῦσιν ἐξουσίαν ἐγὼ παρέχω.
καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἀκούσας ταῦτα, Ὦ γύναι, ἔφη, ὄνομα 26
δέ σοι τί ἐστιν; ἡ δέ, Οἱ μὲν ἐμοὶ φίλοι, ἔφη, καλοῦσί με Εὐδαιμονίαν, οἱ δὲ μισοῦντές με ὑποκοριζόμενοι ὀνομάζουσι Κακίαν.

καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἡ ἑτέρα γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα εἶπε· 27
Καὶ ἐγὼ ἥκω πρὸς σέ, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, εἰδυῖα τοὺς γεννήσαντάς σε καὶ τὴν φύσιν τὴν σὴν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ καταμαθοῦσα· ἐξ ὧν ἐλπίζω, εἰ τὴν πρὸς ἐμὲ ὁδὸν τράποιο, σφόδρ' ἄν σε τῶν καλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν ἀγαθὸν ἐργάτην γενέσθαι καὶ ἐμὲ ἔτι πολὺ ἐντιμοτέραν καὶ ἐπ' ἀγαθοῖς διαπρεπεστέραν φανῆναι. οὐκ ἐξαπατήσω δέ σε προοιμίοις ἡδονῆς, ἀλλ' ᾗπερ οἱ θεοὶ διέθεσαν τὰ
ὄντα διηγήσομαι μετ' ἀληθείας. τῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἀγαθῶν 28
καὶ καλῶν οὐδὲν ἄνευ πόνου καὶ ἐπιμελείας οἱ θεοὶ διδόασιν ἀνθρώποις· ἀλλ' εἴτε τοὺς θεοὺς ἵλεως εἶναί σοι βούλει, θεραπευτέον τοὺς θεούς, εἴτε ὑπὸ φίλων ἐθέλεις ἀγαπᾶσθαι, τοὺς φίλους εὐεργετητέον, εἴτε ὑπό τινος πόλεως ἐπιθυμεῖς τιμᾶσθαι, τὴν πόλιν ὠφελητέον, εἴτε ὑπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πάσης ἀξιοῖς ἐπ' ἀρετῇ θαυμάζεσθαι, τὴν Ἑλλάδα πειρατέον εὖ ποιεῖν, εἴτε γῆν βούλει σοι καρποὺς ἀφθόνους φέρειν, τὴν γῆν θεραπευτέον, εἴτε ἀπὸ βοσκημάτων οἴει δεῖν πλουτίζεσθαι, τῶν βοσκημάτων ἐπιμελητέον, εἴτε διὰ πολέμου ὁρμᾷς αὔξεσθαι καὶ βούλει δύνασθαι τούς τε φίλους ἐλευθεροῦν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς χειροῦσθαι, τὰς πολεμικὰς τέχνας αὐτάς τε παρὰ τῶν ἐπισταμένων μαθητέον καὶ ὅπως αὐταῖς δεῖ χρῆσθαι ἀσκητέον· εἰ δὲ καὶ τῷ σώματι

βούλει δυνατὸς εἶναι, τῇ γνώμῃ ὑπηρετεῖν ἐθιστέον τὸ σῶμα καὶ γυμναστέον σὺν πόνοις καὶ ἱδρῶτι.

29 καὶ ἡ Κακία ὑπολαβοῦσα εἶπεν, ὥς φησι Πρόδικος, Ἐννοεῖς, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ὡς χαλεπὴν καὶ μακρὰν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὰς εὐφροσύνας ἡ γυνή σοι αὕτη διηγεῖται; ἐγὼ δὲ ῥᾳδίαν καὶ βραχεῖαν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἄξω σε.

30 καὶ ἡ Ἀρετὴ εἶπεν· Ὦ τλῆμον, τί δὲ σὺ ἀγαθὸν ἔχεις; ἢ τί ἡδὺ οἶσθα μηδὲν τούτων ἕνεκα πράττειν ἐθέλουσα; ἥτις οὐδὲ τὴν τῶν ἡδέων ἐπιθυμίαν ἀναμένεις, ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἐπιθυμῆσαι πάντων ἐμπίμπλασαι, πρὶν μὲν πεινῆν ἐσθίουσα, πρὶν δὲ διψῆν πίνουσα, ἵνα μὲν ἡδέως φάγῃς, ὀψοποιίας μηχανωμένη, ἵνα δὲ ἡδέως πίῃς, οἴνους τε πολυτελεῖς παρασκευάζει καὶ τοῦ θέρους χιόνα περιθέουσα ζητεῖς, ἵνα δὲ καθυπνώσῃς ἡδέως, οὐ μόνον τὰς στρωμνὰς μαλακάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς κλίνας καὶ τὰ ὑπόβαθρα ταῖς κλίναις παρασκευάζει· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ πονεῖν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν ὅ τι ποιῇς ὕπνου
31 ἐπιθυμεῖς. ἀθάνατος δὲ οὖσα ἐκ θεῶν μὲν ἀπέρριψαι, ὑπὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθῶν ἀτιμάζει· τοῦ δὲ πάντων ἡδίστου ἀκούσματος, ἐπαίνου σεαυτῆς, ἀνήκοος εἶ, καὶ τοῦ πάντων ἡδίστου θεάματος ἀθέατος· οὐδὲν γὰρ πώποτε σεαυτῆς ἔργον καλὸν τεθέασαι. τίς δ' ἄν σοι λεγούσῃ τι πιστεύσειε; τίς δ' ἂν δεομένῃ τινὸς ἐπαρκέσειεν; ἢ τίς ἂν εὖ φρονῶν τοῦ σοῦ θιάσου τολμήσειεν εἶναι; οἳ νέοι μὲν ὄντες τοῖς σώμασιν ἀδύνατοί εἰσι, πρεσβύτεροι δὲ γενόμενοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀνόητοι, ἀπόνως μὲν λιπαροὶ διὰ νεότητος τρεφόμενοι, ἐπιπόνως δὲ αὐχμηροὶ διὰ γήρως περῶντες, τοῖς μὲν πεπραγμένοις αἰσχυνόμενοι, τοῖς δὲ πραττομένοις βαρυνόμενοι, τὰ μὲν ἡδέα ἐν τῇ νεότητι διαδραμόντες, τὰ

δὲ χαλεπὰ εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀποθέμενοι. ἐγὼ δὲ σύνειμι 32 μὲν θεοῖς, σύνειμι δὲ ἀνθρώποις τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς· ἔργον δὲ καλὸν οὔτε θεῖον οὔτ' ἀνθρώπειον χωρὶς ἐμοῦ γίγνεται. τιμῶμαι δὲ μάλιστα πάντων καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρὰ ἀνθρώποις οἷς προσήκει, ἀγαπητὴ μὲν συνεργὸς τεχνίταις, πιστὴ δὲ φύλαξ οἴκων δεσπόταις, εὐμενὴς δὲ παραστάτις οἰκέταις, ἀγαθὴ δὲ συλλήπτρια τῶν ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόνων, βεβαία δὲ τῶν ἐν πολέμῳ σύμμαχος ἔργων, ἀρίστη δὲ φιλίας κοινωνός. ἔστι δὲ τοῖς μὲν 33 ἐμοῖς φίλοις ἡδεῖα μὲν καὶ ἀπράγμων σίτων καὶ ποτῶν ἀπόλαυσις· ἀνέχονται γὰρ ἕως ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσιν αὐτῶν. ὕπνος δ' αὐτοῖς πάρεστιν ἡδίων ἢ τοῖς ἀμόχθοις, καὶ οὔτε ἀπολείποντες αὐτὸν ἄχθονται οὔτε διὰ τοῦτον μεθιᾶσι τὰ δέοντα πράττειν. καὶ οἱ μὲν νέοι τοῖς τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐπαίνοις χαίρουσιν, οἱ δὲ γεραίτεροι ταῖς τῶν νέων τιμαῖς ἀγάλλονται. καὶ ἡδέως μὲν τῶν παλαιῶν πράξεων μέμνηνται, εὖ δὲ τὰς παρούσας ἥδονται πράττοντες, δι' ἐμὲ φίλοι μὲν θεοῖς ὄντες, ἀγαπητοὶ δὲ φίλοις, τίμιοι δὲ πατρίσιν. ὅταν δ' ἔλθῃ τὸ πεπρωμένον τέλος, οὐ μετὰ λήθης ἄτιμοι κεῖνται, ἀλλὰ μετὰ μνήμης τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ὑμνούμενοι θάλλουσι. τοιαῦτά σοι, ὦ παῖ τοκέων ἀγαθῶν Ἡράκλεις, ἔξεστι διαπονησαμένῳ τὴν μακαριστοτάτην εὐδαιμονίαν κεκτῆσθαι.

οὕτω πως διώκει Πρόδικος τὴν ὑπ' Ἀρετῆς Ἡρα- 34 κλέους παίδευσιν· ἐκόσμησε μέντοι τὰς γνώμας ἔτι μεγαλειοτέροις ῥήμασιν ἢ ἐγὼ νῦν. σοὶ δ' οὖν ἄξιον, ὦ Ἀρίστιππε, τούτων ἐνθυμουμένῳ πειρᾶσθαί τι καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον τοῦ βίου φροντίζειν.

II.

Socrates and his son Lamprocles.

Socrates enforces the duty of filial gratitude.

1 Αἰσθόμενος δέ ποτε Λαμπροκλέα τὸν πρεσβύτατον
υἱὸν αὑτοῦ πρὸς τὴν μητέρα χαλεπαίνοντα, Εἰπέ μοι,
ἔφη, ὦ παῖ, οἶσθά τινας ἀνθρώπους ἀχαρίστους καλου-
μένους; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη ὁ νεανίσκος. Καταμεμάθηκας
οὖν τοὺς τί ποιοῦντας τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ἀποκαλοῦσιν;
Ἔγωγ᾽, ἔφη· τοὺς γὰρ εὖ παθόντας, ὅταν δυνάμενοι
χάριν ἀποδοῦναι μὴ ἀποδῶσιν, ἀχαρίστους καλοῦσιν.
Οὐκοῦν δοκοῦσί σοι ἐν τοῖς ἀδίκοις καταλογίζεσθαι
2 τοὺς ἀχαρίστους; Ἔμοιγε, ἔφη. Ἤδη δέ ποτ᾽ ἐσκέψω
εἰ ἄρα, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι τοὺς μὲν φίλους
ἄδικον εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους δίκαιον, οὕτω καὶ
τὸ ἀχαριστεῖν πρὸς μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἄδικόν ἐστι, πρὸς
δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους δίκαιον; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη· καὶ δοκεῖ
μοι, ὑφ᾽ οὗ ἄν τις εὖ παθὼν εἴτε φίλου εἴτε πολεμίου
3 μὴ πειρᾶται χάριν ἀποδιδόναι, ἄδικος εἶναι. Οὐκοῦν,
εἴ γ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει τοῦτο, εἰλικρινής τις ἂν εἴη ἀδικία ἡ
ἀχαριστία; συνωμολόγει. Οὐκοῦν ὅσῳ ἄν τις μείζω
ἀγαθὰ παθὼν μὴ ἀποδιδῷ χάριν, τοσούτῳ ἀδικώτερος
ἂν εἴη; συνέφη καὶ τοῦτο. Τίνας οὖν, ἔφη, ὑπὸ τίνων
εὕροιμεν ἂν μείζω εὐεργετημένους ἢ παῖδας ὑπὸ γονέων;
οὓς οἱ γονεῖς ἐκ μὲν οὐκ ὄντων ἐποίησαν εἶναι, τοσαῦτα
δὲ καλὰ ἰδεῖν καὶ τοσούτων ἀγαθῶν μετασχεῖν ὅσα οἱ
θεοὶ παρέχουσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἃ δὴ καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν
δοκεῖ παντὸς ἄξια εἶναι, ὥστε πάντες τὸ καταλιπεῖν

αὐτὰ πάντων μάλιστα φεύγομεν, καὶ αἱ πόλεις ἐπὶ τοῖς μεγίστοις ἀδικήμασι ζημίαν θάνατον πεποιήκασιν ὡς οὐκ ἂν μείζονος κακοῦ φόβῳ τὴν ἀδικίαν παύσοντες.

A mother's special claim to gratitude.

καὶ μὴν φανεροὶ ἐσμὲν σκοπούμενοι ἐξ ὁποίων ἂν 4
γυναικῶν βέλτιστα ἡμῖν τέκνα γένοιτο. καὶ ὁ μέν γε 5
ἀνὴρ τήν τε συντεκνοποιήσουσαν ἑαυτῷ τρέφει καὶ τοῖς
μέλλουσιν ἔσεσθαι παισὶ προπαρασκευάζει πάντα ὅσα
ἂν οἴηται συνοίσειν αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὸν βίον, καὶ ταῦτα
ὡς ἂν δύνηται πλεῖστα. ἡ δὲ γυνὴ ὑποδεξαμένη τε
φέρει τὸ φορτίον τοῦτο βαρυνομένη τε καὶ κινδυνεύουσα
περὶ τοῦ βίου καὶ μεταδιδοῦσα τῆς τροφῆς ᾗ καὶ
αὐτὴ τρέφεται· καὶ σὺν πολλῷ πόνῳ διενεγκοῦσα καὶ
τεκοῦσα τρέφει τε καὶ ἐπιμελεῖται οὔτε προπεπονθυῖα
οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν οὔτε γιγνῶσκον τὸ βρέφος ὑφ' ὅτου εὖ
πάσχει οὐδὲ σημαίνειν δυνάμενον ὅτου δεῖται· ἀλλ'
αὐτὴ στοχαζομένη τά τε συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ κεχαρι-
σμένα πειρᾶται ἐκπληροῦν, καὶ τρέφει πολὺν χρόνον καὶ
ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς ὑπομένουσα πονεῖν, οὐκ εἰδυῖα τίνα
τούτων χάριν ἀπολήψεται. καὶ οὐκ ἀρκεῖ θρέψαι 6
μόνον, ἀλλὰ καί, ἐπειδὰν δόξωσιν ἱκανοὶ εἶναι οἱ παῖδες
μανθάνειν τι, ἃ μὲν ἂν αὐτοὶ ἔχωσιν οἱ γονεῖς ἀγαθὰ
πρὸς τὸν βίον, διδάσκουσιν, ἃ δ' ἂν οἴωνται ἄλλον
ἱκανώτερον εἶναι διδάξαι, πέμπουσι πρὸς τοῦτον δαπα-
νῶντες, καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται πάντα ποιοῦντες ὅπως οἱ
παῖδες αὐτοῖς γένωνται ὡς δυνατὸν βέλτιστοι.

Lamprocles is unconvinced. Socrates reasons with him gently.

7 πρὸς ταῦτα ὁ νεανίσκος εἶπεν· Ἀλλά τοι εἰ καὶ
πάντα ταῦτα πεποίηκε καὶ ἄλλα τούτων πολλαπλάσια,
οὐδεὶς ἂν δύναιτο αὐτῆς ἀνασχέσθαι τὴν χαλεπότητα.
καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Πότερα δέ, ἔφη, οἴει θηρίου ἀγριότητα
δυσφορωτέραν εἶναι ἢ μητρός; Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἔφη,
μητρὸς τῆς γε τοιαύτης. Ἤδη πώποτε οὖν ἢ δακοῦσα
κακόν τί σοι ἔδωκεν ἢ λακτίσασα, οἷα ὑπὸ θηρίων
8 ἤδη πολλοὶ ἔπαθον; Ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία, ἔφη, λέγει ἃ οὐκ
ἄν τις ἐπὶ τῷ βίῳ παντὶ βούλοιτο ἀκοῦσαι. Σὺ δὲ
πόσα, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οἴει ταύτῃ καὶ τῇ φωνῇ καὶ
τοῖς ἔργοις ἐκ παιδίου δυσκολαίνων καὶ ἡμέρας καὶ
νυκτὸς πράγματα παρασχεῖν, πόσα δὲ λυπῆσαι κάμνων;
Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδεπώποτε αὐτήν, ἔφη, οὔτ᾽ εἶπα οὔτ᾽ ἐποίησα
9 οὐδὲν ἐφ᾽ ᾧ ᾐσχύνθη. Τί δ᾽; οἴει, ἔφη, χαλεπώτερον
εἶναί σοι ἀκούειν ὧν αὕτη λέγει ἢ τοῖς ὑποκριταῖς,
ὅταν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἀλλήλους τὰ ἔσχατα λέγωσιν;
Ἀλλ᾽, οἶμαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ οἴονται τῶν λεγόντων οὔτε
τὸν ἐλέγχοντα ἐλέγχειν ἵνα ζημιώσῃ οὔτε τὸν ἀπει-
λοῦντα ἀπειλεῖν ἵνα κακόν τι ποιήσῃ, ῥᾳδίως φέρουσι.
Σὺ δ᾽ εὖ εἰδώς, ὅτι ἃ λέγει σοι ἡ μήτηρ οὐ μόνον
οὐδὲν κακὸν νοοῦσα λέγει, ἀλλὰ καὶ βουλομένη σοι
ἀγαθὰ εἶναι ὅσα οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ, χαλεπαίνεις; ἢ νομίζεις
κακόνουν τὴν μητέρα σοι εἶναι; Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη· τοῦτό
10 γε οὐκ οἶμαι. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, σὺ
ταύτην, εὔνουν τέ σοι οὖσαν καὶ ἐπιμελομένην ὡς
μάλιστα δύναται κάμνοντος ὅπως ὑγιάνῃς τε καὶ ὅπως
τῶν ἐπιτηδείων μηδενὸς ἐνδεὴς ἔσει, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις

πολλὰ τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχομένην ἀγαθὰ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ εὐχὰς ἀποδιδοῦσαν, χαλεπὴν εἶναι φής; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, εἰ τοιαύτην μὴ δύνασαι φέρειν μητέρα, τἀγαθά σε οὐ δύνασθαι φέρειν. εἰπὲ δέ μοι, ἔφη, πότερον ἄλλον 11
τινὰ οἴει δεῖν θεραπεύειν; ἢ παρεσκεύασαι μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπων πειρᾶσθαι ἀρέσκειν μηδὲ πείθεσθαι μήτε στρατηγῷ μήτε ἄλλῳ ἄρχοντι; Ναὶ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε, ἔφη.

Socrates again appeals to the feeling of gratitude due to a mother.

Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ τῷ γείτονι βούλει 12
σὺ ἀρέσκειν, ἵνα σοι καὶ πῦρ ἐναύῃ, ὅταν τούτου δέῃ, καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τέ σοι γίγνηται συλλήπτωρ καί, ἄν τι σφαλλόμενος τύχῃς, εὐνοϊκῶς ἐγγύθεν βοηθῇ σοι; Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Τί δέ; συνοδοιπόρον ἢ σύμπλουν, ἢ εἴ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἐντυγχάνοις, οὐδὲν ἄν σοι διαφέροι φίλον ἢ ἐχθρὸν γενέσθαι, ἢ καὶ τῆς παρὰ τούτων εὐνοίας οἴει δεῖν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι; Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Εἶτα τούτων μὲν ἐπιμελεῖ- 13
σθαι παρεσκεύασαι, τὴν δὲ μητέρα τὴν πάντων μάλιστά σε φιλοῦσαν οὐκ οἴει δεῖν θεραπεύειν; οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι καὶ ἡ πόλις ἄλλης μὲν ἀχαριστίας οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιμελεῖται οὐδὲ δικάζει, ἀλλὰ περιορᾷ τοὺς εὖ πεπονθότας χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντας, ἐὰν δέ τις γονέας μὴ θεραπεύῃ, τούτῳ δίκην τε ἐπιτίθησι καὶ ἀποδοκιμάζουσα οὐκ ἐᾷ ἄρχειν τοῦτον, ὡς οὔτε ἂν τὰ ἱερὰ εὐσεβῶς θυόμενα ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως τούτου θύοντος οὔτε ἄλλο καλῶς καὶ δικαίως οὐδὲν ἂν τούτου πράξαντος; καὶ νὴ Δία ἐάν τις τῶν γονέων τελευτησάντων τοὺς τάφους μὴ κοσμῇ, καὶ τοῦτο ἐξετάζει ἡ πόλις ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀρχόν-

14 των δοκιμασίαις. σὺ οὖν, ὦ παῖ, ἐὰν σωφρονῇς, τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς παραιτήσει συγγνώμονάς σοι εἶναι, εἴ τι παρημέληκας τῆς μητρός, μή σε καὶ οὗτοι νομίσαντες ἀχάριστον εἶναι οὐκ ἐθελήσωσιν εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους φυλάξει μή σε αἰσθόμενοι τῶν γονέων ἀμελοῦντα πάντες ἀτιμάσωσιν, εἶτα ἐν ἐρημίᾳ φίλων ἀναφανῇς. εἰ γάρ σε ὑπολάβοιεν πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς ἀχάριστον εἶναι, οὐδεὶς ἂν νομίσειεν εὖ σε ποιήσας χάριν ἀπολήψεσθαι.

III.

Socrates and Chaerecrates.

Socrates begins a homily on brotherly love.

1 Χαιρεφῶντα δέ ποτε καὶ Χαιρεκράτη, ἀδελφὼ μὲν ὄντε ἀλλήλοιν, ἑαυτῷ δὲ γνωρίμω, αἰσθόμενος διαφερομένω, ἰδὼν τὸν Χαιρεκράτη, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Χαιρέκρατες, οὐ δήπου καὶ σὺ εἶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων οἳ χρησιμώτερον νομίζουσι χρήματα ἢ ἀδελφούς; καὶ ταῦτα τῶν μὲν ἀφρόνων ὄντων, τοῦ δὲ φρονίμου, καὶ τῶν μὲν βοηθείας δεομένων, τοῦ δὲ βοηθεῖν δυναμένου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τῶν μὲν πλειόνων
2 ὑπαρχόντων, τοῦ δὲ ἑνός. θαυμαστὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, εἴ τις τοὺς μὲν ἀδελφοὺς ζημίαν ἡγεῖται, ὅτι οὐ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀδελφῶν κέκτηται, τοὺς δὲ πολίτας οὐχ ἡγεῖται ζημίαν, ὅτι οὐ καὶ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν ἔχει· ἀλλ' ἐνταῦθα μὲν δύνανται λογίζεσθαι ὅτι κρεῖττον σὺν πολλοῖς οἰκοῦντα ἀσφαλῶς τἀρκοῦντα ἔχειν ἢ μόνον διαιτώμενον

τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπικινδύνως πάντα κεκτῆσθαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦσι. καὶ οἰκέτας μὲν 3
οἱ δυνάμενοι ὠνοῦνται, ἵνα συνεργοὺς ἔχωσι, καὶ φίλους κτῶνται, ὡς βοηθῶν δεόμενοι, τῶν δ᾽ ἀδελφῶν ἀμελοῦσιν, ὥσπερ ἐκ πολιτῶν μὲν γιγνομένους φίλους, ἐξ ἀδελφῶν δὲ οὐ γιγνομένους. καὶ μὴν πρὸς φιλίαν μέγα μὲν 4
ὑπάρχει τὸ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν φῦναι, μέγα δὲ τὸ ὁμοῦ τραφῆναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις πόθος τις ἐγγίγνεται τῶν συντρόφων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τιμῶσί τε μᾶλλον τοὺς συναδέλφους ὄντας τῶν ἀναδέλφων καὶ ἧττον τούτοις ἐπιτίθενται.

Chaerecrates defends himself.

καὶ ὁ Χαιρεκράτης εἶπεν· Ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, 5
μὴ μέγα εἴη τὸ διάφορον, ἴσως ἂν δέοι φέρειν τὸν ἀδελφὸν καὶ μὴ μικρῶν ἕνεκα φεύγειν· ἀγαθὸν γάρ, ὥσπερ καὶ σὺ λέγεις, ἀδελφὸς ὢν οἷον δεῖ· ὁπότε μέντοι παντὸς ἐνδέοι καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐναντιώτατον εἴη, τί ἂν τις ἐπιχειροίη τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις; καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· 6
Πότερα δέ, ὦ Χαιρέκρατες, οὐδενὶ ἀρέσαι δύναται Χαιρεφῶν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ σοί, ἢ ἔστιν οἷς καὶ πάνυ ἀρέσκει; Διὰ τοῦτο γάρ τοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἐμοὶ μισεῖν αὐτόν, ὅτι ἄλλοις μὲν ἀρέσκειν δύναται, ἐμοὶ δὲ ὅπου ἂν παρῇ πανταχοῦ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ζημία μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφέλειά ἐστιν. Ἆρ᾽ οὖν, ἔφη 7
ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ ἵππος τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι μέν, ἐγχειροῦντι δὲ χρῆσθαι ζημία ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ ἀδελφός, ὅταν τις αὐτῷ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος ἐγχειρῇ χρῆσθαι, ζημία ἐστί; Πῶς δ᾽ ἂν ἐγώ, ἔφη ὁ Χαιρεκράτης, ἀνεπιστήμων εἴην 8
ἀδελφῷ χρῆσθαι, ἐπιστάμενός γε καὶ εὖ λέγειν τὸν εὖ λέγοντα καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν εὖ ποιοῦντα; τὸν μέντοι καὶ

λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ πειρώμενον ἐμὲ ἀνιᾶν οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην
9 οὔτ' εὖ λέγειν οὔτ' εὖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πειράσομαι. καὶ
ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Θαυμαστά γε λέγεις, ὦ Χαιρέκρατες,
εἰ κύνα μέν, εἴ σοι ἦν ἐπὶ προβάτοις ἐπιτήδειος ὢν
καὶ τοὺς μὲν ποιμένας ἠσπάζετο, σοὶ δὲ προσιόντι
ἐχαλέπαινεν, ἀμελήσας ἂν τοῦ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπειρῶ εὖ
ποιήσας πραΰνειν αὐτόν, τὸν δὲ ἀδελφὸν φῂς μὲν μέγα
ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ὄντα πρὸς σὲ οἷον δεῖ, ἐπίστασθαι δὲ
ὁμολογῶν καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ εὖ λέγειν οὐκ ἐπιχειρεῖς
μηχανᾶσθαι ὅπως σοι ὡς βέλτιστος ᾖ.

Socrates explains to Chaerecrates how he can win over his brother.

10 καὶ ὁ Χαιρεκράτης, Δέδοικα, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ
οὐκ ἔχω ἐγὼ τοσαύτην σοφίαν ὥστε Χαιρεφῶντα
ποιῆσαι πρὸς ἐμὲ οἷον δεῖ. Καὶ μὴν οὐδέν γε ποικίλον,
ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐδὲ καινὸν δεῖ ἐπ' αὐτόν, ὡς ἐμοὶ
δοκεῖ, μηχανᾶσθαι, οἷς δὲ καὶ σὺ ἐπίστασαι αὐτὸς
οἴομαι ἂν αὐτὸν ἁλόντα περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαί σε.
11 Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις, ἔφη, λέγων, εἴ τι ᾔσθησαί με φίλτρον
ἐπιστάμενον ὃ ἐγὼ εἰδὼς λέληθα ἐμαυτόν. Λέγε δή
μοι, ἔφη, εἴ τινα τῶν γνωρίμων βούλοιο κατεργάσασθαι,
ὁπότε θύοι, καλεῖν σε ἐπὶ δεῖπνον, τί ἂν ποιοίης;
Δῆλον ὅτι κατάρχοιμ' ἂν τοῦ αὐτός, ὅτε θύοιμι, καλεῖν
12 ἐκεῖνον. Εἰ δὲ βούλοιο τῶν φίλων τινὰ προτρέψασθαι,
ὁπότε ἀποδημοίης, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σῶν, τί ἂν ποιοίης;
Δῆλον ὅτι πρότερος ἂν ἐγχειροίην ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν
13 ἐκείνου, ὁπότε ἀποδημοίη. Εἰ δὲ βούλοιο ξένον ποιῆσαι
ὑποδέχεσθαι σεαυτόν, ὁπότε ἔλθοις εἰς τὴν ἐκείνου, τί
ἂν ποιοίης; Δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τοῦτον πρότερος ὑποδεχοί-

μην ἄν, ὁπότε ἔλθοι Ἀθήναζε. καὶ εἴ γε βουλοίμην αὐτὸν προθυμεῖσθαι διαπράττειν μοι ἐφ' ἃ ἥκοιμι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο δέοι ἂν πρότερον αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ ποιεῖν. Πάντ' ἄρα σύ γε τὰ ἐν ἀνθρώποις φίλτρα 14 ἐπιστάμενος πάλαι ἀπεκρύπτου. ἢ ὀκνεῖς, ἔφη, ἄρξαι, μὴ αἰσχρὸς φανῇς, ἐὰν πρότερος τὸν ἀδελφὸν εὖ ποιῇς; καὶ μὴν πλείστου γε δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ ἐπαίνου ἄξιος εἶναι, ὃς ἂν φθάνῃ τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους κακῶς ποιῶν τοὺς δὲ φίλους εὐεργετῶν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐδόκει μοι Χαιρεφῶν ἡγεμονικώτερος εἶναι σοῦ πρὸς τὴν φιλίαν ταύτην, ἐκεῖνον ἂν ἐπειρώμην πείθειν πρότερον ἐγχειρεῖν τῷ σὲ φίλον ποιεῖσθαι· νῦν δέ μοι σὺ δοκεῖς ἡγούμενος μᾶλλον ἂν ἐξεργάσασθαι τοῦτο. καὶ ὁ Χαιρεκράτης 15 εἶπεν· Ἄτοπα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὐδαμῶς πρὸς σοῦ, ὅς γε κελεύεις ἐμὲ νεώτερον ὄντα καθηγεῖσθαι. καίτοι τούτου γε παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις τἀναντία νομίζεται, τὸν πρεσβύτερον ἡγεῖσθαι παντὸς καὶ λόγου καὶ ἔργου. Πῶς; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης· οὐ γὰρ καὶ ὁδοῦ 16 παραχωρῆσαι τὸν νεώτερον πρεσβυτέρῳ συντυγχάνοντι πανταχοῦ νομίζεται καὶ καθήμενον ὑπαναστῆναι καὶ κοίτῃ μαλακῇ τιμῆσαι καὶ λόγῳ ὑπεῖξαι; ὠγαθέ, μὴ ὄκνει, ἔφη, ἀλλ' ἐγχείρει τὸν ἄνδρα καταπραΰνειν, καὶ πάνυ ταχύ σοι ὑπακούσεται· οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὡς φιλότιμός ἐστι καὶ ἐλευθέριος; τὰ μὲν γὰρ πονηρὰ ἀνθρώπια οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως μᾶλλον ἕλοις ἢ εἰ δοίης τι, τοὺς δὲ καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ἀνθρώπους προσφιλῶς χρώμενος μάλιστ' ἂν κατεργάσαιο.

Socrates urges that the experiment is certainly worth trying. He dwells on the value of union.

17 καὶ ὁ Χαιρεκράτης εἶπεν· Ἐὰν οὖν ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ποιοῦντος ἐκεῖνος μηδὲν βελτίων γίγνηται; Τί γὰρ ἄλλο, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἢ κινδυνεύσεις ἐπιδεῖξαι σὺ μὲν χρηστός τε καὶ φιλάδελφος εἶναι, ἐκεῖνος δὲ φαῦλός τε καὶ οὐκ ἄξιος εὐεργεσίας; ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν οἶμαι τούτων ἔσεσθαι· νομίζω γὰρ αὐτόν, ἐπειδὰν αἴσθηταί σε προκαλούμενον ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον, πάνυ φιλονεικήσειν ὅπως περιγένηταί σου καὶ λόγῳ καὶ
18 ἔργῳ εὖ ποιῶν. νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὕτως, ἔφη, διάκεισθον, ὥσπερ εἰ τὼ χεῖρε, ἃς ὁ θεὸς ἐπὶ τῷ συλλαμβάνειν ἀλλήλοιν ἐποίησεν, ἀφεμένω τούτου τράποιντο πρὸς τὸ διακωλύειν ἀλλήλω, ἢ εἰ τὼ πόδε θείᾳ μοίρᾳ πεποιημένω πρὸς τὸ συνεργεῖν ἀλλήλοιν, ἀμελήσαντε τούτου ἐμ-
19 ποδίζοιεν ἀλλήλω. οὐκ ἂν πολλὴ ἀμαθία εἴη καὶ κακοδαιμονία τοῖς ἐπ᾽ ὠφελείᾳ πεποιημένοις ἐπὶ βλάβῃ χρῆσθαι; καὶ μὴν ἀδελφώ γε, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησεν ἐπὶ μείζονι ὠφελείᾳ ἀλλήλοιν ἢ χεῖρέ τε καὶ πόδε καὶ ὀφθαλμὼ καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα ἀδελφὰ ἔφυσεν ἀνθρώποις. χεῖρες μὲν γάρ, εἰ δέοι αὐτὰς τὰ πλέον ὀργυιᾶς διέχοντα ἅμα ποιῆσαι, οὐκ ἂν δύναιντο· πόδες
20 δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἐπὶ τὰ ὀργυιὰν διέχοντα ἔλθοιεν ἅμα· ὀφθαλμοὶ δὲ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐξικνεῖσθαι οὐδ᾽ ἂν τῶν ἔτι ἐγγυτέρω ὄντων τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἅμα καὶ τὰ ὄπισθεν ἰδεῖν δύναιντο· ἀδελφὼ δὲ φίλω ὄντε καὶ πολὺ διεστῶτε πράττετον ἅμα καὶ ἐπ᾽ ὠφελείᾳ ἀλλήλοιν.

IV.

Socrates on friendship.

The world's estimate of friends.

Ἤκουσα δέ ποτε αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ φίλων διαλεγο- 1
μένου ἐξ ὧν ἔμοιγε ἐδόκει μάλιστ᾽ ἄν τις ὠφελεῖσθαι
πρὸς φίλων κτῆσίν τε καὶ χρείαν. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ δὴ
πολλῶν ἔφη ἀκούειν, ὡς πάντων κτημάτων κράτιστον
ἂν εἴη φίλος σαφὴς καὶ ἀγαθός· ἐπιμελομένους δὲ
παντὸς μᾶλλον ὁρᾶν ἔφη τοὺς πολλοὺς ἢ φίλων κτή-
σεως. καὶ γὰρ οἰκίας καὶ ἀγροὺς καὶ ἀνδράποδα καὶ 2
βοσκήματα καὶ σκεύη κτωμένους τε ἐπιμελῶς ὁρᾶν
ἔφη καὶ τὰ ὄντα σῴζειν πειρωμένους, φίλον δέ, ὃ
μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φασιν, ὁρᾶν ἔφη τοὺς πολλοὺς
οὔτε ὅπως κτήσωνται φροντίζοντας οὔτε ὅπως οἱ ὄντες
αὐτοῖς σῴζωνται. ἀλλὰ καὶ καμνόντων φίλων τε καὶ 3
οἰκετῶν ὁρᾶν τινας ἔφη τοῖς μὲν οἰκέταις καὶ ἰατροὺς
εἰσάγοντας καὶ τἄλλα τὰ πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἐπιμελῶς παρα-
σκευάζοντας, τῶν δὲ φίλων ὀλιγωροῦντας, ἀποθανόντων
τε ἀμφοτέρων ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς οἰκέταις ἀχθομένους τε καὶ
ζημίαν ἡγουμένους, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς φίλοις οὐδὲν οἰομένους
ἐλαττοῦσθαι, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων κτημάτων οὐδὲν ἐῶντας
ἀθεράπευτον οὐδ᾽ ἀνεπίσκεπτον, τῶν δὲ φίλων ἐπιμελείας
δεομένων ἀμελοῦντας. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ὁρᾶν ἔφη 4
τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν μὲν ἄλλων κτημάτων καὶ πάνυ
πολλῶν αὐτοῖς ὄντων τὸ πλῆθος εἰδότας, τῶν δὲ φίλων
ὀλίγων ὄντων οὐ μόνον τὸ πλῆθος ἀγνοοῦντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ
τοῖς πυνθανομένοις τοῦτο καταλέγειν ἐγχειρήσαντας,
οὓς ἐν τοῖς φίλοις ἔθεσαν, πάλιν τούτους ἀνατίθεσθαι·
τοσοῦτον αὐτοὺς τῶν φίλων φροντίζειν.

The value of a good friend.

5 καίτοι πρὸς ποῖον κτῆμα τῶν ἄλλων παραβαλλό-
μενος φίλος ἀγαθὸς οὐκ ἂν πολλῷ κρείττων φανείη;
ποῖος γὰρ ἵππος ἢ ποῖον ζεῦγος οὕτω χρήσιμον ὥσπερ
ὁ χρηστὸς φίλος; ποῖον δὲ ἀνδράποδον οὕτως εὔνουν
καὶ παραμόνιμον; ἢ ποῖον ἄλλο κτῆμα οὕτω πάγχρη-
6 στον; ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς φίλος ἑαυτὸν τάττει πρὸς πᾶν τὸ
ἐλλεῖπον τῷ φίλῳ καὶ τῆς τῶν ἰδίων κατασκευῆς καὶ
τῶν κοινῶν πράξεων· καί, ἐάν τέ τινα εὖ ποιῆσαι δέῃ,
συνεπισχύει, ἐάν τέ τις φόβος ταράττῃ, συμβοηθεῖ τὰ
μὲν συναναλίσκων, τὰ δὲ συμπράττων, καὶ τὰ μὲν
συμπείθων, τὰ δὲ βιαζόμενος, καὶ εὖ μὲν πράττοντας
πλεῖστα εὐφραίνων, σφαλλομένους δὲ πλεῖστα ἐπαν-
7 ορθῶν. ἃ δὲ αἵ τε χεῖρες ἑκάστῳ ὑπηρετοῦσι καὶ οἱ
ὀφθαλμοὶ προορῶσι καὶ τὰ ὦτα προακούουσι καὶ οἱ
πόδες διανύτουσι, τούτων φίλος εὐεργετῶν οὐδενὸς
λείπεται· πολλάκις ἃ πρὸ αὑτοῦ τις ἢ οὐκ ἐξειργάσατο
ἢ οὐκ εἶδεν ἢ οὐκ ἤκουσεν ἢ οὐ διήνυσε, ταῦθ᾿ ὁ φίλος
πρὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐξήρκεσεν. ἀλλ᾿ ὅμως ἔνιοι δένδρα
μὲν πειρῶνται θεραπεύειν τοῦ καρποῦ ἕνεκεν, τοῦ δὲ
παμφορωτάτου κτήματος, ὃ καλεῖται φίλος, ἀργῶς καὶ
ἀνειμένως οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐπιμέλονται.

V.

Socrates and Antisthenes.

Is there any standard by which the worth of a friend may be determined?

Ἤκουσα δέ ποτε καὶ ἄλλον αὐτοῦ λόγον, ὃς ἐδόκει 1
μοι προτρέπειν τὸν ἀκούοντα ἐξετάζειν ἑαυτὸν ὁπόσου τοῖς φίλοις ἄξιος εἴη. ἰδὼν γάρ τινα τῶν συνόντων ἀμελοῦντα φίλου πενίᾳ πιεζομένου, ἤρετο Ἀντισθένη ἐναντίον τοῦ ἀμελοῦντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν· Ἆρ', ἔφη, ὦ Ἀντίσθενες, εἰσί τινες ἀξίαι φίλων, ὥσπερ 2
οἰκετῶν; τῶν γὰρ οἰκετῶν ὁ μέν που δυοῖν μναῖν ἄξιός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ ἡμιμναίου, ὁ δὲ πέντε μνῶν, ὁ δὲ καὶ δέκα. Νικίας δὲ ὁ Νικηράτου λέγεται ἐπιστάτην εἰς τἀργύρεια πρίασθαι ταλάντου. σκοποῦμαι δὴ τοῦτο, ἔφη, εἰ ἄρα, ὥσπερ τῶν οἰκετῶν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φίλων εἰσὶν ἀξίαι. Ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Ἀντισθένης· ἐγὼ γοῦν βουλοίμην 3
ἂν τὸν μέν τινα φίλον μοι εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ δύο μνᾶς, τὸν δ' οὐδ' ἂν ἡμιμναίου προτιμησαίμην, τὸν δὲ καὶ πρὸ δέκα μνῶν ἑλοίμην ἄν, τὸν δὲ πάντων χρημάτων καὶ πόνων πριαίμην ἂν φίλον μοι εἶναι. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ 4
Σωκράτης, εἴ γε ταῦτα τοιαῦτά ἐστι, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι ἐξετάζειν τινὰ ἑαυτόν, πόσου ἄρα τυγχάνει τοῖς φίλοις ἄξιος ὤν, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι ὡς πλείστου ἄξιος εἶναι, ἵνα ἧττον αὐτὸν οἱ φίλοι προδιδῶσιν. ἐγὼ γάρ τοι, ἔφη, πολλάκις ἀκούω τοῦ μὲν ὅτι προύδωκεν αὐτὸν φίλος ἀνήρ, τοῦ δ' ὅτι μνᾶν ἀνθ' ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον εἵλετο ἀνήρ, ὃν ᾤετο φίλον εἶναι, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, 5
σκοπῶ μή, ὥσπερ ὅταν τις οἰκέτην πονηρὸν πωλῇ καὶ

ἀποδῶται τοῦ εὑρόντος, οὕτω καὶ τὸν πονηρὸν φίλον, ὅταν ἐξῇ τὸ πλέον τῆς ἀξίας λαβεῖν, ἐπαγωγὸν ἢ ἀποδίδοσθαι· τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς οὔτε οἰκέτας πάνυ τι πωλουμένους ὁρῶ οὔτε φίλους προδιδομένους.

VI.

Socrates and Critobulus.

The choice of friends.

1 Ἐδόκει δέ μοι καὶ εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν φίλους ὁποίους ἄξιον κτᾶσθαι φρενοῦν τοιάδε λέγων· Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, εἰ δεοίμεθα φίλου ἀγαθοῦ, πῶς ἂν ἐπιχειροίημεν σκοπεῖν; ἆρα πρῶτον μὲν ζητητέον ὅστις ἄρχει γαστρός τε καὶ φιλοποσίας καὶ λαγνείας καὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἀργίας; ὁ γὰρ ὑπὸ τούτων κρατούμενος οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ δύναιτ' ἂν οὔτε φίλῳ τὰ δέοντα πράττειν. Μὰ Δί' οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοῦ μὲν ὑπὸ τούτων ἀρχομένου ἀφεκτέον δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι; Πάνυ
2 μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί γάρ; ἔφη, ὅστις δαπανηρὸς ὢν μὴ αὐτάρκης ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τῶν πλησίον δεῖται, καὶ λαμβάνων μὲν μὴ δύναται ἀποδιδόναι, μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ τὸν μὴ διδόντα μισεῖ, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι καὶ οὗτος χαλεπὸς φίλος εἶναι; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἀφεκτέον καὶ
3 τούτου; Ἀφεκτέον μέντοι, ἔφη. Τί γάρ; ὅστις χρηματίζεσθαι μὲν δύναται, πολλῶν δὲ χρημάτων ἐπιθυμεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δυσσύμβολός ἐστι, καὶ λαμβάνων μὲν ἥδεται, ἀποδιδόναι δὲ οὐ βούλεται; Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ,

ἔφη, οὗτος ἔτι πονηρότερος ἐκείνου εἶναι. Τί δ'; ὅστις 4
διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι μηδὲ πρὸς ἓν ἄλλο σχολὴν ποιεῖται ἢ ὁπόθεν αὐτός τι κερδανεῖ; Ἀφεκτέον καὶ τούτου, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ· ἀνωφελὴς γὰρ ἂν εἴη τῷ χρωμένῳ. Τί δέ; ὅστις στασιώδης τέ ἐστι καὶ θέλων πολλοὺς τοῖς φίλοις ἐχθροὺς παρέχειν; Φευκτέον νὴ Δία καὶ τοῦτον. Εἰ δέ τις τούτων μὲν τῶν κακῶν μηδὲν ἔχοι, εὖ δὲ πάσχων ἀνέχεται, μηδὲν φροντίζων τοῦ ἀντευεργετεῖν; Ἀνωφελὴς ἂν εἴη καὶ οὗτος. ἀλλὰ ποῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρήσομεν φίλον ποιεῖσθαι;
Οἶμαι μέν, ὃς τἀναντία τούτων ἐγκρατὴς μὲν ᾖ τῶν 5
διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν, εὔοικος δὲ καὶ εὐσύμβολος ὢν τυγχάνῃ καὶ φιλόνεικος πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐλλείπεσθαι εὖ ποιῶν τοὺς εὐεργετοῦντας αὐτόν, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖν τοῖς
χρωμένοις. Πῶς οὖν ἂν ταῦτα δοκιμάσαιμεν, ὦ Σώ- 6
κρατες, πρὸ τοῦ χρῆσθαι; Τοὺς μὲν ἀνδριαντοποιούς, ἔφη, δοκιμάζομεν οὐ τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν τεκμαιρόμενοι, ἀλλ' ὃν ἂν ὁρῶμεν τοὺς πρόσθεν ἀνδριάντας καλῶς εἰργασμένον, τούτῳ πιστεύομεν καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς εὖ
ποιήσειν. Καὶ ἄνδρα δὴ λέγεις, ἔφη, ὃς ἂν τοὺς φίλους 7
τοὺς πρόσθεν εὖ ποιῶν φαίνηται, δῆλον εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ὕστερον εὐεργετήσοντα; Καὶ γὰρ ἵπποις, ἔφη, ὃν ἂν ὁρῶ τοῖς πρόσθεν καλῶς χρώμενον, τοῦτον κἂν ἄλλοις οἶμαι καλῶς χρῆσθαι.

The method of procedure.

Εἶεν, ἔφη· ὃς δ' ἂν ἡμῖν ἄξιος φιλίας δοκῇ εἶναι, 8
πῶς χρὴ φίλον τοῦτον ποιεῖσθαι; Πρῶτον μέν, ἔφη, τὰ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἐπισκεπτέον, εἰ συμβουλεύουσιν αὐτὸν φίλον ποιεῖσθαι. Τί οὖν; ἔφη, ὃν ἂν ἡμῖν τε δοκῇ καὶ οἱ θεοὶ μὴ ἐναντιῶνται, ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ὅπως οὗτος

9 θηρατέος; Μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐ κατὰ πόδας ὥσπερ ὁ λαγῶς
οὐδ' ἀπάτῃ ὥσπερ αἱ ὄρνιθες οὐδὲ βίᾳ ὥσπερ οἱ κάπροι.
ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον ἑλεῖν ἐργῶδες· χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ δή-
σαντα κατέχειν ὥσπερ δοῦλον· ἐχθροὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον
10 ἢ φίλοι γίγνονται ταῦτα πάσχοντες. Φίλοι δὲ πῶς;
ἔφη. Εἶναι μέν τινάς φασιν ἐπῳδάς, ἃς οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι
ἐπᾴδοντες οἷς ἂν βούλωνται φίλους αὐτοὺς ποιοῦνται·
εἶναι δὲ καὶ φίλτρα, οἷς οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι πρὸς οὓς ἂν
11 βούλωνται χρώμενοι φιλοῦνται ὑπ' αὐτῶν. Πόθεν οὖν,
ἔφη, ταῦτα μάθοιμεν ἄν; Ἃ μὲν αἱ Σειρῆνες ἐπῇδον τῷ
Ὀδυσσεῖ ἤκουσας Ὁμήρου, ὧν ἐστιν ἀρχὴ τοιάδε τις·

Δεῦρ' ἄγε δή, πολύαιν' Ὀδυσεῦ, μέγα κῦδος Ἀχαιῶν.

Ταύτην οὖν, ἔφη, τὴν ἐπῳδήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τοῖς
ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις αἱ Σειρῆνες ἐπᾴδουσαι κατεῖχον,
12 ὥστε μὴ ἀπιέναι ἀπ' αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐπᾳσθέντας; Οὔκ·
ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐπ' ἀρετῇ φιλοτιμουμένοις οὕτως ἐπῇδον.
Σχεδόν τι λέγεις τοιαῦτα χρῆναι ἑκάστῳ ἐπᾴδειν οἷα
μὴ νομιεῖ ἀκούων τὸν ἐπαινοῦντα καταγελῶντα λέγειν·
οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἐχθίων τ' ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀπελαύνοι τοὺς
ἀνθρώπους ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ τὸν εἰδότα ὅτι μικρός τε
καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ ἀσθενής ἐστιν ἐπαινοίη λέγων ὅτι
καλός τε καὶ μέγας καὶ ἰσχυρός ἐστιν. ἄλλας δέ τινας
13 οἶσθα ἐπῳδάς; Οὔκ· ἀλλ' ἤκουσα μὲν ὅτι Περικλῆς
πολλὰς ἐπίσταιτο, ἃς ἐπᾴδων τῇ πόλει ἐποίει αὐτὴν
φιλεῖν αὐτόν. Θεμιστοκλῆς δὲ πῶς ἐποίησε τὴν πόλιν
φιλεῖν αὐτόν; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἐπᾴδων, ἀλλὰ περιάψας τι
ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ.

Various difficulties.

Δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς, εἰ μέλλομεν 14
ἀγαθόν τινα κτήσασθαι φίλον, αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς ἀγαθοὺς
δεῖ γενέσθαι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν. Σὺ δ' ᾤου, ἔφη
ὁ Σωκράτης, οἷόν τ' εἶναι καὶ πονηρὸν ὄντα χρηστοὺς
φίλους κτήσασθαι; Ἑώρων γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, 15
ῥήτοράς τε φαύλους ἀγαθοῖς δημηγόροις φίλους ὄντας,
καὶ στρατηγεῖν οὐχ ἱκανοὺς πάνυ στρατηγικοῖς ἀνδρά-
σιν ἑταίρους. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, καί, περὶ οὗ διαλεγόμεθα, 16
οἶσθά τινας οἳ ἀνωφελεῖς ὄντες ὠφελίμους δύνανται
φίλους ποιεῖσθαι; Μὰ Δί' οὐ δῆτ', ἔφη· ἀλλ' εἰ
ἀδύνατόν ἐστι πονηρὸν ὄντα καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς φίλους
κτήσασθαι, ἐκεῖνο ἤδη μέλει μοι, εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸν καλὸν
κἀγαθὸν γενόμενον ἐξ ἑτοίμου τοῖς καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς
φίλον εἶναι. Ὃ ταράττει σε, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, ὅτι πολ- 17
λάκις ἄνδρας καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας καὶ τῶν αἰσχρῶν
ἀπεχομένους ὁρᾷς ἀντὶ τοῦ φίλους εἶναι στασιάζοντας
ἀλλήλοις καὶ χαλεπώτερον χρωμένους τῶν μηδενὸς
ἀξίων ἀνθρώπων. Καὶ οὐ μόνον γ', ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, 18
οἱ ἰδιῶται τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις αἱ τῶν
τε καλῶν μάλιστα ἐπιμελόμεναι καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ ἥκιστα
προσιέμεναι πολλάκις πολεμικῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλας.
ἃ λογιζόμενος πάνυ ἀθύμως ἔχω πρὸς τὴν τῶν φίλων 19
κτῆσιν· οὔτε γὰρ τοὺς πονηροὺς ὁρῶ φίλους ἀλλήλοις
δυναμένους εἶναι—πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἢ ἀχάριστοι ἢ ἀμελεῖς
ἢ πλεονέκται ἢ ἄπιστοι ἢ ἀκρατεῖς ἄνθρωποι δύναιντο
φίλοι γενέσθαι; οἱ μὲν οὖν πονηροὶ πάντως ἔμοιγε
δοκοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις ἐχθροὶ μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοι πεφυκέναι.
ἀλλὰ μήν, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, οὐδ' ἂν τοῖς χρηστοῖς οἱ 20

πονηροί ποτε συναρμόσειαν εἰς φιλίαν· πῶς γὰρ οἱ τὰ πονηρὰ ποιοῦντες τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα μισοῦσι φίλοι γένοιντ' ἄν; εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ οἱ ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντες στασιάζουσί τε περὶ τοῦ πρωτεύειν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ φθονοῦντες ἑαυτοῖς μισοῦσιν ἀλλήλους, τίνες ἔτι φίλοι ἔσονται καὶ ἐν τίσιν ἀνθρώποις εὔνοια καὶ πίστις ἔσται;

Friendship is natural to man and has a subtle power.

21 Ἀλλ' ἔχει μέν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ποικίλως πως ταῦτα, ὦ Κριτόβουλε. φύσει γὰρ ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰ μὲν φιλικά· δέονταί τε γὰρ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἐλεοῦσι καὶ συνεργοῦντες ὠφελοῦσι καὶ τοῦτο συνιέντες χάριν ἔχουσιν ἀλλήλοις· τὰ δὲ πολεμικά· τά τε γὰρ αὐτὰ καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα νομίζοντες ὑπὲρ τούτων μάχονται καὶ διχογνωμονοῦντες ἐναντιοῦνται. πολεμικὸν δὲ καὶ ἔρις καὶ ὀργή· καὶ δυσμενὲς μὲν ὁ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἔρως,
22 μισητὸν δὲ ὁ φθόνος. ἀλλ' ὅμως διὰ τούτων πάντων ἡ φιλία διαδυομένη συνάπτει τοὺς καλούς τε κἀγαθούς. διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν αἱροῦνται μὲν ἄνευ πόνου τὰ μέτρια κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ διὰ πολέμου πάντων κυριεύειν, καὶ δύνανται πεινῶντες καὶ διψῶντες ἀλύπως σίτου καὶ ποτοῦ κοινωνεῖν, ὥστε μὴ λυπεῖν οὓς μὴ προσήκει·
23 δύνανται δὲ καὶ χρημάτων οὐ μόνον τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἀπεχόμενοι νομίμως κοινωνεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαρκεῖν ἀλλήλοις· δύνανται δὲ καὶ τὴν ἔριν οὐ μόνον ἀλύπως, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφερόντως ἀλλήλοις διατίθεσθαι καὶ τὴν ὀργὴν κωλύειν εἰς τὸ μεταμελησόμενον προϊέναι. τὸν δὲ φθόνον παντάπασιν ἀφαιροῦσι, τὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἀγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις οἰκεῖα παρέχοντες, τὰ δὲ τῶν φίλων ἑαυτῶν νομίζοντες.

Friendship in political life.

πῶς οὖν οὐκ εἰκὸς τοὺς καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς καὶ τῶν 24
πολιτικῶν τιμῶν μὴ μόνον ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελί-
μους ἀλλήλοις κοινωνοὺς εἶναι; οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦντες
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τιμᾶσθαί τε καὶ ἄρχειν, ἵνα ἐξουσίαν
ἔχωσι χρήματά τε κλέπτειν καὶ ἀνθρώπους βιάζεσθαι
καὶ ἡδυπαθεῖν, ἄδικοί τε καὶ πονηροὶ ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἀδύ-
νατοι ἄλλῳ συναρμόσαι. εἰ δέ τις ἐν πόλει τιμᾶσθαι 25
βουλόμενος, ὅπως αὐτός τε μὴ ἀδικῆται καὶ τοῖς φίλοις
τὰ δίκαια βοηθεῖν δύνηται, καὶ ἄρξας ἀγαθόν τι ποιεῖν
τὴν πατρίδα πειρᾶται, διὰ τί ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄλλῳ τοιούτῳ
οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο συναρμόσαι; πότερον τοὺς φίλους
ὠφελεῖν μετὰ τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν ἧττον δυνήσεται;
ἢ τὴν πόλιν εὐεργετεῖν ἀδυνατώτερος ἔσται καλοὺς
κἀγαθοὺς ἔχων συνεργούς; ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς 26
ἀγῶσι δῆλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι, εἰ ἐξῆν τοῖς κρατίστοις συνθε-
μένους ἐπὶ τοὺς χείρους ἰέναι, πάντας ἂν τοὺς ἀγῶνας
οὗτοι ἐνίκων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἆθλα οὗτοι ἐλάμβανον.
ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐκεῖ μὲν οὐκ ἐῶσι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς
πολιτικοῖς, ἐν οἷς οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ κρατιστεύουσιν,
οὐδεὶς κωλύει μεθ' οὗ ἄν τις βούληται τὴν πόλιν
εὐεργετεῖν, πῶς οὐ λυσιτελεῖ τοὺς βελτίστους φίλους
κτησάμενον πολιτεύεσθαι, τούτοις κοινωνοῖς καὶ συνερ-
γοῖς τῶν πράξεων μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνταγωνισταῖς χρώμενον;
ἀλλὰ μὴν κἀκεῖνο δῆλον, ὅτι κἂν πολεμῇ τίς τινι, 27
συμμάχων δεήσεται, καὶ τούτων πλειόνων ἐὰν καλοῖς
κἀγαθοῖς ἀντιτάττηται. καὶ μὴν οἱ συμμαχεῖν ἐθέ-
λοντες εὖ ποιητέοι, ἵν' ἐθέλωσι προθυμεῖσθαι. πολὺ
δὲ κρεῖττον τοὺς βελτίστους ἐλάττονας εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ

τοὺς χείρονας πλείονας ὄντας· οἱ γὰρ πονηροὶ πολὺ πλειόνων εὐεργεσιῶν ἢ οἱ χρηστοὶ δέονται.

Socrates is an adept in the art of catching men.

28 ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν, ἔφη, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, πειρῶ ἀγαθὸς γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τοιοῦτος γενόμενος θηρᾶν ἐπιχείρει τοὺς καλούς τε κἀγαθούς. ἴσως δ' ἄν τί σοι κἀγὼ συλλαβεῖν εἰς τὴν τῶν καλῶν τε κἀγαθῶν θήραν ἔχοιμι διὰ τὸ ἐρωτικὸς εἶναι· δεινῶς γάρ, ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσω ἀνθρώπων, ὅλος ὥρμημαι ἐπὶ τὸ φιλῶν τε αὐτοὺς ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ ποθῶν ἀντιποθεῖσθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν συνεῖναι
29 καὶ ἀντεπιθυμεῖσθαι τῆς συνουσίας. ὁρῶ δὲ καὶ σοὶ τούτων δεῆσον, ὅταν ἐπιθυμήσῃς φιλίαν πρός τινας ποιεῖσθαι. μὴ οὖν ἀποκρύπτου με οἷς ἂν βούλῃ φίλος γενέσθαι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ ἀρέσαι τῷ ἀρέσκοντί μοι οὐκ ἀπείρως οἶμαι ἔχειν πρὸς θήραν ἀνθρώπων.

The surest method of gaining friends.

30 καὶ ὁ Κριτόβουλος ἔφη· Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων ἐγὼ τῶν μαθημάτων πάλαι ἐπιθυμῶ......θαρρῶν
33 δίδασκε τῶν φίλων τὰ θηρατικά. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Ὅταν οὖν, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, φίλος τινὶ βούλῃ γενέσθαι, ἐάσεις με κατειπεῖν σου πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι ἄγασαί τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖς φίλος αὐτοῦ εἶναι; Κατηγόρει, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος· οὐδένα γὰρ οἶδα μισοῦντα τοὺς
34 ἐπαινοῦντας. Ἐὰν δέ σου προσκατηγορήσω, ἔφη, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἄγασθαι αὐτοῦ καὶ εὐνοϊκῶς ἔχεις πρὸς αὐτόν, ἆρα μὴ διαβάλλεσθαι δόξεις ὑπ' ἐμοῦ; Ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι, ἔφη, ἐγγίγνεται εὔνοια πρὸς οὓς ἂν ὑπολάβω
35 εὐνοϊκῶς ἔχειν πρὸς ἐμέ. Ταῦτα μὲν δή, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης,

ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν περὶ σοῦ πρὸς οὓς ἂν βούλῃ φίλους ποιήσασθαι. ἐὰν δέ μοι ἔτι ἐξουσίαν δῷς λέγειν περὶ σοῦ ὅτι ἐπιμελής τε τῶν φίλων εἶ καὶ οὐδενὶ οὕτω χαίρεις ὡς φίλοις ἀγαθοῖς, καὶ ἐπί τε τοῖς καλοῖς ἔργοις τῶν φίλων ἀγάλλει οὐχ ἧττον ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τῶν φίλων χαίρεις οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ, ὅπως τε ταῦτα γίγνηται τοῖς φίλοις οὐκ ἀποκάμνεις μηχανώμενος, καὶ ὅτι ἔγνωκας ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι νικᾶν τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιοῦντα, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, πάνυ ἂν οἶμαί σοι ἐπιτήδειον εἶναί με σύνθηρον τῶν ἀγαθῶν φίλων. Τί οὖν, ἔφη ὁ 36
Κριτόβουλος, ἐμοὶ τοῦτο λέγεις, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐπὶ σοὶ ὂν ὅ τι ἂν βούλῃ περὶ ἐμοῦ λέγειν; Μὰ Δί' οὔχ, ὥς ποτε ἐγὼ Ἀσπασίας ἤκουσα· ἔφη γὰρ τὰς ἀγαθὰς προμνηστρίδας μετὰ μὲν ἀληθείας τἀγαθὰ διαγγελλούσας δεινὰς εἶναι συνάγειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς κηδείαν, ψευδομένας δ' οὐκ ἐθέλειν ἐπαινεῖν· τοὺς γὰρ ἐξαπατηθέντας ἅμα μισεῖν ἀλλήλους τε καὶ τὴν προμνησαμένην. ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ πεισθεὶς ὀρθῶς ἔχειν ἡγοῦμαι οὐκ ἐξεῖναί μοι περὶ σοῦ λέγειν ἐπαινοῦντι οὐδὲν ὅ τι ἂν μὴ ἀληθεύω.

Be what you desire to be thought.

Σὺ μὲν ἄρα, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, τοιοῦτός μοι φίλος 37
εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἷος, ἂν μέν τι αὐτὸς ἔχω ἐπιτήδειον εἰς τὸ φίλους κτήσασθαι, συλλαμβάνειν μοι· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις πλάσας τι εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ὠφελείᾳ. Πότερα δ' ἄν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, δοκῶ σοι μᾶλλον ὠφελεῖν σε τὰ ψευδῆ ἐπαινῶν ἢ πείθων πειρᾶσθαί σε ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα γενέσθαι; εἰ δὲ μὴ φανερὸν 38
οὕτω σοι, ἐκ τῶνδε σκέψαι· εἰ γάρ σε βουλόμενος

φίλον ποιῆσαι ναυκλήρῳ ψευδόμενος ἐπαινοίην, φάσκων ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυβερνήτην, ὁ δέ μοι πεισθεὶς ἐπιτρέψειέ σοι τὴν ναῦν μὴ ἐπισταμένῳ κυβερνᾶν, ἔχεις τινὰ ἐλπίδα μὴ ἂν σαυτόν τε καὶ τὴν ναῦν ἀπολέσαι; ἢ εἴ σοι πείσαιμι κοινῇ τὴν πόλιν ψευδόμενος ὡς ἂν στρατηγικῷ τε καὶ δικαστικῷ καὶ πολιτικῷ ἑαυτὴν ἐπιτρέψαι, τί ἂν οἴει σεαυτὸν καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὑπὸ σοῦ παθεῖν; ἢ εἴ τινας ἰδίᾳ τῶν πολιτῶν πείσαιμι ψευδόμενος ὡς ὄντι οἰκονομικῷ τε καὶ ἐπιμελεῖ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἐπιτρέψαι, ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν πεῖραν διδοὺς ἅμα τε βλαβερὸς
39 εἴης καὶ καταγέλαστος φαίνοιο; ἀλλὰ συντομωτάτη τε καὶ ἀσφαλεστάτη καὶ καλλίστη ὁδός, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, ὅ τι ἂν βούλῃ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, τοῦτο καὶ γενέσθαι ἀγαθὸν πειρᾶσθαι. ὅσαι δ' ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρεταὶ λέγονται, σκοπούμενος εὑρήσεις πάσας μαθήσει τε καὶ μελέτῃ αὐξανομένας. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, οἶμαι δεῖν ἡμᾶς ποιεῖν οὕτως. εἰ δὲ σύ πως ἄλλως γιγνώσκεις, δίδασκε. καὶ ὁ Κριτόβουλος, Ἀλλ' αἰσχυνοίμην ἄν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀντιλέγων τούτοις· οὔτε γὰρ καλὰ οὔτε ἀληθῆ λέγοιμ' ἄν.

VII.

Socrates and Aristarchus.

The troubles of Aristarchus with his poor female relations.

1 Καὶ μὴν τὰς ἀπορίας γε τῶν φίλων τὰς μὲν δι' ἄγνοιαν ἐπειρᾶτο γνώμῃ ἀκεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ δι' ἔνδειαν διδάσκων κατὰ δύναμιν ἀλλήλοις ἐπαρκεῖν. ἐρῶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἃ σύνοιδα αὐτῷ. Ἀρίσταρχον γάρ ποτε

ὁρῶν σκυθρωπῶς ἔχοντα, Ἔοικας, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀρίσταρχε, βαρέως φέρειν τι. χρὴ δὲ τοῦ βάρους μεταδιδόναι τοῖς φίλοις· ἴσως γὰρ ἄν τί σε καὶ ἡμεῖς κουφίσαιμεν.
καὶ ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος, Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν 2
πολλῇ γέ εἰμι ἀπορίᾳ. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐστασίασεν ἡ πόλις, πολλῶν φυγόντων εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ, συνεληλύθασιν ὡς ἐμὲ καταλελειμμέναι ἀδελφαί τε καὶ ἀδελφιδαῖ καὶ ἀνεψιαὶ τοσαῦται ὥστ᾽ εἶναι ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τέτταρας καὶ δέκα τοὺς ἐλευθέρους. λαμβάνομεν δὲ οὔτε ἐκ τῆς γῆς οὐδὲν (οἱ γὰρ ἐναντίοι κρατοῦσιν αὐτῆς) οὔτ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκιῶν (ὀλιγανθρωπία γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἄστει γέγονε). τὰ ἔπιπλα δὲ οὐδεὶς ὠνεῖται. οὐδὲ δανείσασθαι οὐδαμόθεν ἔστιν ἀργύριον· ἀλλὰ πρότερον ἄν τίς μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ ζητῶν εὑρεῖν ἢ δανειζόμενος λαβεῖν. χαλεπὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀπολλυμένους, ἀδύνατον δὲ τοσούτους τρέφειν ἐν τοιούτοις πράγμασιν. ἀκούσας οὖν ταῦτα ὁ Σωκράτης, 3
Τί ποτέ ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὅ τι Κεράμων μὲν πολλοὺς τρέφων οὐ μόνον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τούτοις τὰ ἐπιτήδεια δύναται παρέχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περιποιεῖται τοσαῦτα ὥστε καὶ πλουτεῖν, σὺ δὲ πολλοὺς τρέφων δέδοικας μὴ δι᾽ ἔνδειαν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἅπαντες ἀπόλησθε; Ὅτι νὴ Δί᾽, ἔφη, ὁ μὲν δούλους τρέφει, ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἐλευθέρους. Καὶ πότερον, 4
ἔφη, τοὺς παρὰ σοὶ ἐλευθέρους οἴει βελτίους εἶναι ἢ τοὺς παρὰ Κεράμωνι δούλους; Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἔφη, τοὺς παρ᾽ ἐμοὶ ἐλευθέρους. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, αἰσχρὸν τὸν μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν πονηροτέρων εὐπορεῖν, σὲ δὲ πολλῷ βελτίους ἔχοντα ἐν ἀπορίᾳ εἶναι; Νὴ Δί᾽, ἔφη, ὁ μὲν γὰρ τεχνίτας τρέφει, ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἐλευθερίως πεπαιδευμένους.
Ἆρ᾽ οὖν, ἔφη, τεχνῖταί εἰσιν οἱ χρήσιμόν τι ποιεῖν 5
ἐπιστάμενοι; Μάλιστά γ᾽, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν χρήσιμά γ᾽

ἄλφιτα; Σφόδρα γε. Τί δ' ἄρτοι; Οὐδὲν ἧττον. Τί γάρ, ἔφη, ἱμάτιά τε ἀνδρεῖα καὶ γυναικεῖα καὶ χιτωνίσκοι καὶ χλαμύδες καὶ ἐξωμίδες; Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη, καὶ πάντα ταῦτα χρήσιμα. Ἔπειτα, ἔφη, οἱ παρὰ σοὶ τούτων οὐδὲν ἐπίστανται ποιεῖν; Πάντα μὲν οὖν, ὡς
6 ἐγᾦμαι. Εἶτ' οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἀφ' ἑνὸς μὲν τούτων, ἀλφιτοποιίας, Ναυσικύδης οὐ μόνον ἑαυτόν τε καὶ τοὺς οἰκέτας τρέφει, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τούτοις καὶ ὗς πολλὰς καὶ βοῦς, καὶ περιποιεῖται τοσαῦτα ὥστε καὶ τῇ πόλει πολλάκις λειτουργεῖν, ἀπὸ δὲ ἀρτοποιίας Κύρηβος τήν τε οἰκίαν πᾶσαν διατρέφει καὶ ζῇ δαψιλῶς, Δημέας δ' ὁ Κολλυτεὺς ἀπὸ χλαμυδουργίας, Μένων δ' ἀπὸ χλανιδοποιίας, Μεγαρέων δ' οἱ πλεῖστοι ἀπὸ ἐξωμιδοποιίας διατρέφονται; Νὴ Δί', ἔφη, οὗτοι μὲν γὰρ ὠνούμενοι βαρβάρους ἀνθρώπους ἔχουσιν, ὥστ' ἀναγκάζειν ἐργάζεσθαι ἃ καλῶς ἔχει, ἐγὼ δ' ἐλευθέρους τε καὶ συγγενεῖς.

The advantages of honest toil.

7 Ἔπειτ', ἔφη, ὅτι ἐλεύθεροί τ' εἰσὶ καὶ συγγενεῖς σοι, οἴει χρῆναι αὐτοὺς μηδὲν ἄλλο ποιεῖν ἢ ἐσθίειν καὶ καθεύδειν; πότερον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐλευθέρων τοὺς οὕτω ζῶντας ἄμεινον διάγοντας ὁρᾷς καὶ μᾶλλον εὐδαιμονίζεις ἢ τούς, ἃ ἐπίστανται χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον, τούτων ἐπιμελομένους; ἢ τὴν μὲν ἀργίαν καὶ τὴν ἀμέλειαν αἰσθάνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρός τε τὸ μαθεῖν, ἃ προσήκει ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ πρὸς τὸ μνημονεύειν ἃ ἂν μάθωσι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν τε καὶ ἰσχύειν τοῖς σώμασι καὶ πρὸς τὸ κτήσασθαί τε καὶ σῴζειν τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον ὠφέλιμα ὄντα, τὴν δ' ἐργασίαν
8 καὶ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν οὐδὲν χρήσιμα; ἔμαθον δέ, ἃ φὴς

αὐτὰς ἐπίστασθαι, πότερον ὡς οὔτε χρήσιμα ὄντα πρὸς τὸν βίον οὔτε ποιήσουσαι αὐτῶν οὐδέν, ἢ τοὐναντίον ὡς καὶ ἐπιμελησόμεναι τούτων καὶ ὠφελησόμεναι ἀπ' αὐτῶν; ποτέρως γὰρ ἂν μᾶλλον ἄνθρωποι σωφρονοῖεν, ἀργοῦντες ἢ τῶν χρησίμων ἐπιμελόμενοι; ποτέρως δ' ἂν δικαιότεροι εἶεν, εἰ ἐργάζοιντο ἢ εἰ ἀργοῦντες βουλεύοιντο περὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων; ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν μέν, 9
ὡς ἐγῷμαι, οὔτε σὺ ἐκείνας φιλεῖς οὔτ' ἐκεῖναι σέ, σὺ μὲν ἡγούμενος αὐτὰς ἐπιζημίους εἶναι σεαυτῷ, ἐκεῖναι δὲ σὲ ὁρῶσαι ἀχθόμενον ἐφ' ἑαυταῖς. ἐκ δὲ τούτων κίνδυνος μείζω τε ἀπέχθειαν γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὴν προγεγονυῖαν χάριν μειοῦσθαι. ἐὰν δὲ προστατήσῃς ὅπως ἐνεργοὶ ὦσι, σὺ μὲν ἐκείνας φιλήσεις, ὁρῶν ὠφελίμους σεαυτῷ οὔσας, ἐκεῖναι δὲ σὲ ἀγαπήσουσιν, αἰσθόμεναι χαίροντα αὐταῖς, τῶν δὲ προγεγονυιῶν εὐεργεσιῶν ἥδιον μεμνημένοι τὴν ἀπ' ἐκείνων χάριν αὐξήσετε, καὶ ἐκ τούτων φιλικώτερόν τε καὶ οἰκειότερον ἀλλήλοις ἕξετε. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν αἰσχρόν τι ἔμελλον ἐργάσασθαι, 10
θάνατον ἀντ' αὐτοῦ προαιρετέον ἦν· νῦν δὲ ἃ μὲν δοκεῖ κάλλιστα καὶ πρεπωδέστατα γυναικὶ εἶναι ἐπίστανται, ὡς ἔοικε. πάντες δὲ ἃ ἐπίστανται ῥᾷστά τε καὶ τάχιστα καὶ κάλλιστα καὶ ἥδιστα ἐργάζονται. μὴ οὖν ὄκνει, ἔφη, ταῦτα εἰσηγεῖσθαι αὐταῖς ἃ σοί τε λυσιτελήσει κἀκείναις· καί, ὡς εἰκός, ἡδέως ὑπακούσονται.
Ἀλλὰ νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος, οὕτω μοι 11
δοκεῖς καλῶς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥστε πρόσθεν μὲν οὐ προσιέμην δανείσασθαι, εἰδὼς ὅτι ἀναλώσας ὃ ἂν λάβω οὐχ ἕξω ἀποδοῦναι, νῦν δέ μοι δοκῶ εἰς ἔργων ἀφορμὴν ὑπομενεῖν αὐτὸ ποιῆσαι.

Aristarchus takes the advice of Socrates.

12 ἐκ τούτων δὲ ἐπορίσθη μὲν ἀφορμή, ἐωνήθη δὲ ἔρια. καὶ ἐργαζόμεναι μὲν ἠρίστων, ἐργασάμεναι δὲ ἐδείπνουν, ἱλαραὶ δὲ ἀντὶ σκυθρωπῶν ἦσαν· καὶ ἀντὶ ὑφορωμένων ἑαυτοὺς ἡδέως ἀλλήλους ἑώρων, καὶ αἱ μὲν ὡς κηδεμόνα ἐφίλουν, ὁ δὲ ὡς ὠφελίμους ἠγάπα. τέλος δὲ ἐλθὼν πρὸς τὸν Σωκράτη χαίρων διηγεῖτο ταῦτά τε καὶ ὅτι αἰτιῶνται αὐτὸν μόνον τῶν ἐν τῇ
13 οἰκίᾳ ἀργὸν ἐσθίειν. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Εἶτα οὐ λέγεις αὐταῖς τὸν τοῦ κυνὸς λόγον; φασὶ γάρ, ὅτε φωνήεντα ἦν τὰ ζῷα, τὴν οἶν πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην εἰπεῖν· Θαυμαστὸν ποιεῖς, ὃς ἡμῖν μὲν ταῖς καὶ ἔριά σοι καὶ ἄρνας καὶ τυρὸν παρεχούσαις οὐδὲν δίδως ὅ τι ἂν μὴ ἐκ τῆς γῆς λάβωμεν, τῷ δὲ κυνί, ὃς οὐδὲν τοιοῦτόν σοι παρέχει, μεταδίδως οὗπερ αὐτὸς ἔχεις
14 σίτου. τὸν κύνα οὖν ἀκούσαντα εἰπεῖν· Ναὶ μὰ Δί'· ἐγὼ γάρ εἰμι ὁ καὶ ὑμᾶς αὐτὰς σῴζων ὥστε μήτε ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων κλέπτεσθαι μήτε ὑπὸ λύκων ἁρπάζεσθαι· ἐπεὶ ὑμεῖς γε, εἰ μὴ ἐγὼ προφυλάττοιμι ὑμᾶς, οὐδ' ἂν νέμεσθαι δύναισθε φοβούμεναι μὴ ἀπόλησθε. οὕτω δὴ λέγεται καὶ τὰ πρόβατα συγχωρῆσαι τὸν κύνα προτιμᾶσθαι. καὶ σὺ οὖν ἐκείναις λέγε ὅτι ἀντὶ κυνὸς εἶ φύλαξ καὶ ἐπιμελητής, καὶ διὰ σὲ οὐδ' ὑφ' ἑνὸς ἀδικούμεναι ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ ἡδέως ἐργαζόμεναι ζῶσιν.

VIII.

Socrates and Eutherus.

Socrates advises Eutherus to avoid false pride and to adapt his work to his age.

Ἄλλον δέ ποτε ἀρχαῖον ἑταῖρον διὰ χρόνου ἰδών, 1
Πόθεν, ἔφη, Εὔθηρε, φαίνει; Ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν κατάλυσιν τοῦ πολέμου, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῆς ἀποδημίας, νυνὶ μέντοι αὐτόθεν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἀφῃρέθημεν τὰ ἐν τῇ ὑπερορίᾳ κτήματα, ἐν δὲ τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὁ πατήρ μοι οὐδὲν κατέλιπεν, ἀναγκάζομαι νῦν ἐπιδημήσας τῷ σώματι ἐργαζόμενος τὰ ἐπιτήδεια πορίζεσθαι. δοκεῖ δέ μοι τοῦτο κρεῖττον εἶναι ἢ δέεσθαί τινος ἀνθρώπων, ἄλλως τε καὶ μηδὲν ἔχοντα ἐφ᾽ ὅτῳ ἂν δανειζοίμην.
Καὶ πόσον χρόνον οἴει σοι, ἔφη, τὸ σῶμα ἱκανὸν εἶναι 2
μισθοῦ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐργάζεσθαι; Μὰ τὸν Δί᾽, ἔφη, οὐ πολὺν χρόνον. Καὶ μήν, ἔφη, ὅταν γε πρεσβύτερος γένῃ, δῆλον ὅτι δαπάνης μὲν δεήσει, μισθὸν δὲ οὐδείς
σοι θελήσει τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔργων διδόναι. Ἀληθῆ 3
λέγεις, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, κρεῖττόν ἐστιν αὐτόθεν τοῖς τοιούτοις τῶν ἔργων ἐπιτίθεσθαι, ἃ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ γενομένῳ ἐπαρκέσει, καὶ προσελθόντα τῳ τῶν πλείονα χρήματα κεκτημένων, τῷ δεομένῳ τοῦ συνεπιμελησομένου, ἔργων τε ἐπιστατοῦντα καὶ συγκομίζοντα καρποὺς καὶ συμφυλάττοντα τὴν οὐσίαν, ὠφελοῦντα
ἀντωφελεῖσθαι. Χαλεπῶς ἄν, ἔφη, ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, 4
δουλείαν ὑπομείναιμι. Καὶ μὴν οἵ γε ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προστατεύοντες καὶ τῶν δημοσίων ἐπιμελούμενοι οὐ δουλοπρεπέστεροι ἕνεκα τούτου, ἀλλ᾽ ἐλευθεριώτεροι

5 νομίζονται. Ὅλως, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ὑπαίτιον εἶναί τινι οὐ πάνυ προσίεμαι. Καὶ μήν, ἔφη, Εὔθηρε, οὐ πάνυ γε ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν εὑρεῖν ἔργον ἐφ᾽ ᾧ οὐκ ἄν τις αἰτίαν ἔχοι. χαλεπὸν γὰρ οὕτω τι ποιῆσαι ὥστε μηδὲν ἁμαρτεῖν, χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ ἀναμαρτήτως τι ποιήσαντα μὴ ἀγνώμονι κριτῇ περιτυχεῖν· ἐπεὶ καὶ οἷς νῦν ἐργάζεσθαι φῂς θαυμάζω εἰ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν ἀνέγκλητον
6 διαγίγνεσθαι. χρὴ οὖν πειρᾶσθαι τοὺς φιλαιτίους φεύγειν καὶ τοὺς εὐγνώμονας διώκειν, καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ὅσα μὲν δύνασαι ποιεῖν ὑπομένειν, ὅσα δὲ μὴ δύνασαι φυλάττεσθαι, ὅ τι δ᾽ ἂν πράττῃς, τούτου ὡς κάλλιστα καὶ προθυμότατα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. οὕτω γὰρ ἥκιστ᾽ ἂν μέν σε οἶμαι ἐν αἰτίᾳ εἶναι, μάλιστα δὲ τῇ ἀπορίᾳ βοήθειαν εὑρεῖν, ῥᾷστα δὲ καὶ ἀκινδυνότατα ζῆν καὶ εἰς τὸ γῆρας διαρκέστατα.

IX.

Socrates and Crito.

Socrates advises Crito to secure some one to protect him from extortion.

1 Οἶδα δέ ποτε αὐτὸν καὶ Κρίτωνος ἀκούσαντα, ὡς χαλεπὸν ὁ βίος Ἀθήνησιν εἴη ἀνδρὶ βουλομένῳ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν. Νῦν γάρ, ἔφη, ἐμέ τινες εἰς δίκας ἄγουσιν, οὐχ ὅτι ἀδικοῦνται ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι νομίζουσιν ἥδιον ἂν με ἀργύριον τελέσαι ἢ πράγματα
2 ἔχειν. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, κύνας δὲ τρέφεις, ἵνα σοι τοὺς λύκους ἀπὸ τῶν προ-

βάτων ἀπερύκωσι; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη· μᾶλλον γάρ μοι λυσιτελεῖ τρέφειν ἢ μή. Οὐκ ἂν οὖν θρέψαις καὶ ἄνδρα, ὅστις ἐθέλοι τε καὶ δύναιτο σοῦ ἀπερύκειν τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας ἀδικεῖν σε; Ἡδέως γ' ἄν, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ φοβοίμην ὅπως μὴ ἐπ' αὐτόν με τράποιτο. Τί δ'; 3
ἔφη, οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅτι πολλῷ ἥδιόν ἐστι χαριζόμενον οἵῳ σοὶ ἀνδρὶ ἢ ἀπεχθόμενον ὠφελεῖσθαι; εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι εἰσὶν ἐνθάδε τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρῶν οἳ πάνυ ἂν φιλοτιμηθεῖεν φίλῳ σοι χρῆσθαι.

In accordance with this advice Crito employs Archedemus.

καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀνευρίσκουσιν Ἀρχέδημον, πάνυ 4
μὲν ἱκανὸν εἰπεῖν τε καὶ πρᾶξαι, πένητα δέ· οὐ γὰρ ἦν οἷος ἀπὸ παντὸς κερδαίνειν, ἀλλὰ φιλόχρηστός τε καὶ ἔφη ῥᾷστον εἶναι ἀπὸ τῶν συκοφαντῶν λαμβάνειν. τούτῳ οὖν ὁ Κρίτων, ὁπότε συγκομίζοι ἢ σῖτον ἢ ἔλαιον ἢ οἶνον ἢ ἔρια ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν ἐν ἀγρῷ γιγνομένων χρησίμων πρὸς τὸν βίον, ἀφελὼν ἂν ἔδωκε. καὶ ὁπότε θύοι, ἐκάλει, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἐπεμελεῖτο. νομίσας δὲ ὁ Ἀρχέδημος ἀποστροφήν οἱ τὸν 5
Κρίτωνος οἶκον μάλα περιεῖπεν αὐτόν. καὶ εὐθύς του τῶν συκοφαντούντων τὸν Κρίτωνα ἀνευρίσκει πολλὰ μὲν ἀδικήματα, πολλοὺς δ' ἐχθρούς· καὶ προσεκαλέσατο εἰς δίκην δημοσίαν, ἐν ᾗ αὐτὸν ἔδει κριθῆναι ὅ τι δεῖ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτῖσαι. ὁ δὲ συνειδὼς αὑτῷ πολλὰ 6
καὶ πονηρὰ πάντ' ἐποίει ὥστε ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ Ἀρχεδήμου. ὁ δὲ Ἀρχέδημος οὐκ ἀπηλλάττετο, ἕως τόν τε Κρίτωνα ἀφῆκε καὶ αὐτῷ χρήματα ἔδωκεν. ἐπεὶ 7
δὲ τοῦτό τε καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ὁ Ἀρχέδημος διεπράξατο, ἤδη τότε, ὥσπερ ὅταν νομεὺς ἀγαθὸν κύνα ἔχῃ, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι νομεῖς βούλονται πλησίον αὐτοῦ τὰς ἀγέλας

ἱστάναι, ἵνα τοῦ κυνὸς ἀπολαύωσιν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ Κρίτωνος πολλοὶ τῶν φίλων ἐδέοντο καὶ σφίσι παρ-
8 έχειν φύλακα τὸν Ἀρχέδημον. ὁ δὲ Ἀρχέδημος τῷ Κρίτωνι ἡδέως ἐχαρίζετο, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι μόνος ὁ Κρίτων ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ ἦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ φίλοι αὐτοῦ. εἰ δέ τις αὐτῷ τούτων οἷς ἀπήχθετο ὀνειδίζοι ὡς ὑπὸ Κρίτωνος ὠφελούμενος κολακεύοι αὐτόν, Πότερον οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Ἀρχέδημος, αἰσχρόν ἐστιν εὐεργετούμενον ὑπὸ χρηστῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀντευεργετοῦντα τοὺς μὲν τοιούτους φίλους ποιεῖσθαι, τοῖς δὲ πονηροῖς διαφέρεσθαι, ἢ τοὺς μὲν καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ἀδικεῖν πειρώμενον ἐχθροὺς ποιεῖσθαι, τοῖς δὲ πονηροῖς συνεργοῦντα πειρᾶσθαι φίλους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ χρῆσθαι τούτοις ἀντ᾽ ἐκείνων; ἐκ δὲ τούτου εἷς τε τῶν Κρίτωνος φίλων Ἀρχέδημος ἦν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων Κρίτωνος φίλων ἐτιμᾶτο.

X.

Socrates and Diodorus.

A trusty friend is worth any number of slaves.

1 Οἶδα δὲ καὶ Διοδώρῳ αὐτὸν ἑταίρῳ ὄντι τοιάδε διαλεχθέντα· Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Διόδωρε, ἄν τίς σοι
2 τῶν οἰκετῶν ἀποδρᾷ, ἐπιμελεῖ ὅπως ἀνασώσῃ; Καὶ ἄλλους γε νὴ Δί᾽, ἔφη, παρακαλῶ, σῶστρα τούτου ἀνακηρύττων. Τί γάρ; ἔφη, ἐάν τίς σοι κάμνῃ τῶν οἰκετῶν, τούτου ἐπιμελεῖ καὶ παρακαλεῖς ἰατρούς, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθάνῃ; Σφόδρα γ᾽, ἔφη. Εἰ δέ τίς σοι τῶν γνωρίμων, ἔφη, πολὺ τῶν οἰκετῶν χρησιμώτερος ὢν

κινδυνεύοι δι᾽ ἔνδειαν ἀπολέσθαι, οὐκ οἴει σοι ἄξιον
εἶναι ἐπιμεληθῆναι ὅπως διασωθῇ; καὶ μὴν οἶσθά γε 3
ὅτι οὐκ ἀγνώμων ἐστὶν Ἑρμογένης, αἰσχύνοιτο δ᾽ ἄν,
εἰ ὠφελούμενος ὑπὸ σοῦ μὴ ἀντωφελοίη σε. καίτοι
τὸ ὑπηρέτην ἑκόντα τε καὶ εὔνουν καὶ παραμόνιμον
καὶ τὸ κελευόμενον ἱκανὸν ποιεῖν ἔχειν καὶ μὴ μόνον
τὸ κελευόμενον ἱκανὸν ὄντα ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δυνάμενον
καὶ ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ χρήσιμον εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν καὶ προ-
βουλεύεσθαι πολλῶν οἰκετῶν οἶμαι ἀντάξιον εἶναι. οἱ 4
μέντοι ἀγαθοὶ οἰκονόμοι, ὅταν τὸ πολλοῦ ἄξιον μικροῦ
ἐξῇ πρίασθαι, τότε φασὶ δεῖν ὠνεῖσθαι. νῦν δὲ
διὰ τὰ πράγματα εὐωνοτάτους ἔστι φίλους ἀγαθοὺς
κτήσασθαι. καὶ ὁ Διόδωρος, Ἀλλὰ καλῶς γε, ἔφη, 5
λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ κέλευσον ἐλθεῖν ὡς ἐμὲ τὸν
Ἑρμογένη. Μὰ Δί᾽, ἔφη, οὐκ ἔγωγε· νομίζω γὰρ
οὔτε σοὶ κάλλιον εἶναι τὸ καλέσαι ἐκεῖνον τοῦ αὐτὸν
ἐλθεῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνον οὔτ᾽ ἐκείνῳ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τὸ
πραχθῆναι ταῦτα ἢ σοί. οὕτω δὴ ὁ Διόδωρος ᾤχετο 6
πρὸς τὸν Ἑρμογένη, καὶ οὐ πολὺ τελέσας ἐκτήσατο
φίλον, ὃς ἔργον εἶχε σκοπεῖν ὅ τι ἂν ἢ λέγων ἢ πράτ-
των ὠφελοίη τε καὶ εὐφραίνοι Διόδωρον.

NOTES.

I.

1. καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων, 'also by conversations like the following.' At the end of the First Book Xenophon has been showing how Socrates deterred his associates from quackery and the false conceit of knowledge. By the conversation with Aristippus he wishes to show that his master had in view their moral advantage as well.

τοιαῦτα generally refers to what goes before, *τοιάδε* to what follows; but this distinction is not strictly observed.

ἐγκράτειαν—πόνου, 'mastery over food, drink, lust, etc.' If *ἐγκράτειαν* is taken in its literal sense of 'mastery' not 'self-restraint,' the difficulty, which some have found in its connexion with *ῥίγους καὶ θάλπους καὶ πόνου*, disappears. This difficulty probably led to the insertion in the MSS. of *πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν* after *ἐγκράτειαν*. Cf. *Hellenica* VII. iii. 3 *οὗ* (*λιμένος*) *ἐγκρατής*, Soph. *Phil.* 75 *τόξων ἐγκρατής* 'master of his bow,' and below § 3 *ὕπνου ἐγκρατῆ*, § 7 *ἐγκρατεῖς τούτων*.

ἀκολαστοτέρως—τοιαῦτα, 'giving himself more licence (than was meet) in such respects.' For this idiomatic use of *ἔχω* with an adverb cf. § 6 *ἀγυμνάστως ἔχειν*.

Ἀρίστιππε. 'Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic branch of the Socratic school, had been brought to Athens by a call from Socrates, whose extraordinary personal influence had unusual attractions for him. From Cyrene, his luxurious home, which at that time was at the height of its wealth and power, he had brought habits far removed from the abstemiousness of Socrates. It is no cause for wonder that this talented young man met his teacher with a considerable amount of independence.... He followed the Sophists by passing a great portion of his life in various places without any fixed abode. Subsequently he appears to have returned to his native city.

'Aristippus considers only enjoyment an end in itself, and only

pleasure an unconditional good, regarding every thing else as desirable only in so far as it is a means to enjoyment.... His leading thought is comprised in the adage that life offers most to him who, without ever denying himself a pleasure, at every moment continues master of himself and his surroundings. He is a proficient in the rare art of contentment and moderation, while the pleasing kindness and cheerful brightness of his manners attract far more than the superficial and effeminate character of his moral views repel. Nor are these traits purely personal; they lie in the very nature of his system, requiring as it does that life should be directed by prudence'—ZELLER, *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, p. 337 sqq.

εἰ δέοι—ἀρχῆς, 'if two boys were given into your charge and you had to educate them, the one to be made capable to bear rule, the other with a view to his not even making a claim to command.'

βούλει σκοπῶμεν, 'do you want us to consider the matter?' Cf. § 10 *βούλει σκεψώμεθα*. The Latin *vis maneamus?* is an exact parallel.

τῆς τροφῆς, 'food,' not training generally.

ἀπὸ τῶν στοιχείων, 'beginning with the *ABC* of the subject.' *στοιχεῖα* is used (i) for the letters of the alphabet (as set in rows—*στοῖχοι*), *elementa litterarum*, (ii) for the physical elements, (iii) for rudimentary instruction.

ἀρχή, 'a first principle.' Aristippus is playing on words; cf. *ἄρχειν, ἀρχῆς, ἀρξάμενοι* above.

2. **οὐκοῦν—παραγίγνεσθαι**, 'Are we then to expect that a wish to touch food will present itself to both children at meal times?'

ὅταν ὥρα ἥκῃ, 'whenever the time (for feeding) arrives.'

εἰκὸς γάρ, 'Yes, we may so expect.'

τὸ οὖν—ἐθίζοιμεν, 'Which of the two then should we habituate to do of his own free choice the pressing business of the moment in preference to gratifying his appetite?'

ὅπως μὴ—ἀρχήν, 'to prevent (i.e. as we should say 'if we want to prevent') state affairs being neglected under his rule.' For *παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ἀρχήν* 'during the time of his rule' cf. Herod. vii. 46 *παρὰ τὴν ζόην* 'during our life.' Others interpret 'because of his rule'; cf. the vulgar English 'along of,' and Demosth. p. 43 *παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ῥώμην ηὔξηται*.

τὸ δύνασθαι—προσθετέον, 'must we assign to the same boy the power of holding out against thirst?'

3. **καὶ τοῦτο—τῷ αὐτῷ.** Supply *προσθετέον*,—'this too we must assign to the same boy.'

τί δέ; 'Again'; cf. the similar use of *Quid?*, which is frequent in Cicero's speeches.

τῷ ἄρχειν παιδευομένῳ, lit. 'to him who is being educated *for ruling*.' Note that the Greek infinitive is in its origin the dative of a verbal noun; cf. notes on vi. 36, ix. 4.

εἴ τι—ἐστι μάθημα, idiomatic. Translate:—'whatever lesson is necessary for the overcoming of opponents.'

πολὺ νὴ Δί'. Supply *ἂν πρέποι* from the previous sentence.

καὶ γὰρ—ὄφελος, 'for there will be no advantage *even* (*καί*) in his other capacities.'

4. καὶ μάλα ἔνια δυσωπούμενα, 'even though they—some of them—are very shy.' Mark (i) the concessive use of the participle, and (ii) the *partitive apposition*, as it is called, *ἔνια* being added as an afterthought by way of correction; there is an excellent parallel in *Anabasis* V. v. 11 *ἀκούομεν ὑμᾶς παρεληλυθότας ἐνίους σκηνοῦν ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις.*

δυσωπούμενα, lit. 'being put out of countenance' (*δυσ-* and *ὤψ*). Plutarch has *δυσωπεῖν τὴν ὄψιν* 'to dazzle.'

οἷον, 'for instance'; cf. § 6.

πρὸς τὴν—φωνήν, 'at the cry of the hen-bird.'

ἐξιστάμενοι τοῦ—ἀναλογίζεσθαι, 'losing the faculty of calculating dangers'; cf. I. iii. 12 *τὰ φαλάγγια—τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐξίστησι* 'spiders drive people out of their wits.'

5. ταὐτὰ—τοῖς ἀφρονεστάτοις, 'to be affected in the same way as the silliest animals.' For the case of *τοῖς ἀφρονεστάτοις* compare the dative after *ὁμοῖος* and similar words.

6. τὸ δὲ—ἀμέλεια εἶναι. The *μέν* and *δέ* clauses in this sentence require careful handling. Translate:—'Do not you think it great neglect that, whereas the majority of our indispensable pursuits are conducted in the open air—for instance war, agriculture, and more than half the others—yet the majority of men are untrained to face extremes of cold and heat?'

7. τοὺς ἐγκρατεῖς τούτων ἁπάντων, 'those who have mastery over all these things,' i.e. 'those who exercise self-control in all these respects'; see note on § 1.

εἰς τοὺς ἀρχικοὺς τάττομεν, 'we rank in the category of those fit to rule'; cf. § 8 *τάττω εἰς τὴν τάξιν*, § 11 *οὐδὲ εἰς τὴν δουλείαν ἐμαυτὸν τάττω.*

ἑκατέρου—οἶσθα, 'you know the appropriate position for each class of these,' i.e. the temperate fit to rule, the intemperate not.

ἤδη ποτ' ἐπεσκέψω, 'have you ever ere now enquired?' The

aorist with ἤδη is best rendered by the English perfect; cf. Soph. *Ajax* 1142 ἤδη ποτ' εἶδον 'I have seen ere now.' Cf. ii. 2, 7.

8. **καὶ γὰρ πάνυ—πορίζειν**, 'For really it seems to me to be the mark of an utter fool—considering what a serious task it is to provide for one's own needs—not to be satisfied with this, but besides (προσ-) to take upon oneself the additional (καί) duty of ministering to the wants of the rest of the community.'

τό—μὴ ἀρκεῖν τοῦτο, lit. 'that this should not suffice him.' After this there is a change of subject. If fully expressed, the words would run thus:—τοῦτο μὴ ἀρκεῖν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν προσαναθέσθαι.

καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν—ἀφροσύνη ἐστί, a difficult passage, with a change of subject exactly similar to that in the previous sentence. Translate:—'And that a man, while sacrificing many of his own wishes, should become the head of the state, and then, if he fail to carry out every detail of the state's desires, should be liable to prosecution for this, that surely is utter foolishness.'

ὧν βούλεται. The ὧν is an example of relative attraction, i.e. it stands for ἐκείνων ἅ. Such attractions are frequent in this book, e.g. i. 10, 25, iii. 10, iv. 2, vi. 9, ix. 3.

ἐλλείπειν, here, as usually, intransitive, lit. 'to fail'; cf. Soph. *Ant.* 584 ἄτας οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει 'there is no failure of the curse.' So in our passage:—'that for himself many of his wishes should fail.'

9. **ἄφθονα**, predicative, 'in abundance.'

αὐτοὺς δὲ—ἀπέχεσθαι, 'while they expect the rulers themselves to keep their hands off all such things.'

ἐγὼ οὖν—καταστήσαιμι. 'For my part then I should educate in this way, and place in the category of men qualified to rule, those who want to have much trouble themselves and to cause the same to others.' Cf. *Hellenica* IV. v. 19 πράγματα εἶχόν τε καὶ παρεῖχον τοῖς ἐν τῷ ἄστει, V. i. 29 πράγματα ἔχοντες καὶ παρέχοντες περὶ τὴν Κόρινθον.

ᾗ ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἥδιστα βιοτεύειν. Aristippus is here hardly fair to himself; for, as Zeller says (*Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, p. 363), 'it would be doing Aristippus a great injustice to consider him an ordinary pleasure-seeker. Enjoy he will; but at the same time he will be above enjoyment. He possesses not only the skill of adapting himself to circumstances; but he possesses also calmness of mind and freedom of spirit, which can forego pleasure without a pang, bear loss with composure, be content with what it has, and feel happy in any position. His maxim is to enjoy the present, leaving care either to the future or the past, and under all circumstances to keep cheerful. Come

what may, there is a bright side to things, and he knows how to wear the beggar's rags and the robe of state with equal grace. Pleasure he loves, but he can dispense therewith. He is lavish of riches because he cannot cling to them; if necessary, he can do without them and is readily consoled for their loss. To him no possession appears more valuable than contentment, no disease worse than avarice. He lives an easy life; but he is not on that account afraid of exertion. Freedom he esteems above all things, and hence will neither rule nor be ruled, nor belong to any community, being unwilling to forfeit freedom at any price.'

10. βούλει—σκεψώμεθα. Cf. § 1 *βούλει σκοπῶμεν;*

τῶν ἐθνῶν—ὧν, *relative attraction* again; see § 8.

Μαιῶται. The Maeotians lived on the shores of the *Palus Maeotis*, now called the sea of Azov (Herod. iv. 123).

Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν ἄρχουσι. Carthage is an excellent type of a ruling city. 'The name of Carthage bespoke her as the New City; and the New City she was in truth, as opening an altogether new state of things. It was this youngest and greatest of Phoenician cities which, alone of barbarian states, devised forms of political life which Aristotle and Polybius did not scorn to study.... Even beyond Sparta and Athens and Rome, *Carthage was emphatically the ruling city*. None was so thoroughly the mistress standing apart from her subjects. We see her not only ruling over dependent commonwealths of her own race, not only sending forth colonies of her own race as outposts of her power, but holding, here under her dominion, here under her influence, nations of utter strangers, whom she knew how to use to her own ends, and to make them shed their blood to advance her greatness. In her own day, through the ages of her being and her power, Carthage had no parallel. Her likeness comes again when the merchant city on the Venetian islands rules at once on the mainland of Italy and over cities, islands, peninsulas, and kingdoms, scattered over every shore of the Eastern Mediterranean'—FREEMAN, *History of Sicily*, vol. i. p. 228.

11. ἀλλ' ἐγώ τοι—τάττω, 'But for my part, you must know (*τοι*), I do not rank myself in the category of slavery either.' The force of *οὐδέ* here is this:—'I am *just as far from* ranking myself....'

μέση τούτων ὁδός. Grote has some useful remarks on Socrates' treatment of the *via media* of Aristippus:—'Though Socrates is made to declare this middle course impossible, yet it is substantially the same as what the Platonic Socrates in the *Gorgias* aspires to,—moreover the same as what the real Socrates at Athens both pursued as far as he

could, and declared to be the only course consistent with his security.... The argument of Socrates that no middle way is possible, far from refuting Aristippus, is founded upon an incorrect assumption. Had it been correct, neither literature nor philosophy could have been developed' (*Plato and the other Companions of Socrates*, vol. iii. p. 537).

ἣν—βαδίζειν. The ἣν is a cognate accusative; cf. § 21 and § 29.

12. οὕτω μηδὲ δι' ἀνθρώπων. Supply *φέροι* from *φέρει* in the previous clause. The meaning is:—'If you with your doctrine of a *via media* could get rid of human beings, as you do of rule and slavery, there might be something in what you say. As it is, you must adapt yourself to your environment.'

ἄν τι λέγοις. Cf. Soph. *O. T.* 1475 *λέγω τι;* 'Am I right?' answered by *λέγεις* 'Yes, you are.' Arist. *Equites* 333 *οὐδὲν λέγει* 'he talks nonsense.'

εἰ μέντοι—δούλοις χρῆσθαι. 'If, however, living as you do amongst human beings, you are going to claim immunity from ruling and being ruled, and do not mean even to pay court to rulers if you can help it (*ἑκών*), you see, I imagine, that the stronger know how to victimize the weaker both in public and in private life and to treat them as slaves.'

εἰ ἀξιώσεις—θεραπεύσεις. 'The future indicative with *εἰ* is especially common when the condition contains a strong appeal to the feelings or a threat or warning'—GOODWIN, *Moods and Tenses*, § 447.

κλαίοντας καθιστάντες, lit. 'bringing them to tears,' i.e. 'putting them on the stool of repentance'; cf. *Cyropaedeia* II. ii. 14 *νόμοι πολίτας διὰ τοῦ κλαίοντας καθίζειν εἰς δικαιοσύνην προτρέπονται*, Eur. *Androm.* 635 *ὅς κλαίοντά σε—καταστήσει.*

13. ἢ λανθάνουσι—κρείττοσι. 'Or are you not aware that sometimes, when one people has sown and planted, others step in and cut their corn and fell their fruit-trees, and lay siege in every way to the weaker side who will not pay court to them, till at last they persuade them to choose slavery in preference to war with their betters?'

πάντα τρόπον, an adverbial accusative; cf. § 23, vi. 5, vii. 1, 8. Many nouns expressing the attribute of an action are used in this way; and some words which we call adverbs are in their origin accusatives of nouns, e.g. *λίαν* 'exceedingly,' *ἅδην* 'enough.'

ἀλλ' ἐγώ τοι—οὐδ' εἰς πολιτείαν. Cf. § 11.

ξένος πανταχοῦ εἰμι, an anticipation of the cosmopolitan ideas of the Stoics. 'Quite in keeping with this homeless life is the language used by Aristippus that to him it was of no moment to die in his country; for from every country the way to Hades was the same'—ZELLER.

14. τοῦτο—δεινὸν πάλαισμα, ironical. Mr Dakyns says :—'This *is* a marvellous wrestling feat,' 'a masterly fall, my prince of wrestlers!'

ἤδη λέγεις. Mark the force of *ἤδη*, 'when you get as far as this.'

Σίνις, a robber who haunted the Isthmus of Corinth. He was surnamed *Πιτυοκάμπτης* 'the pine-bender,' because he killed his victims by making them catch hold of pine-trees, which he had bent down, and then suddenly let go. His career was ended by the youthful giant-killer Theseus, who 'hoisted him on his own petard.' His name is from the Greek word *σίνις* 'ravager,' 'destroyer.'

Σκείρων. Sciron was another brigand. He lived among the rocks on the coast by the boundary between Attica and Megara, and ordered the travellers whom he had robbed to wash his feet. When they were so engaged he kicked them into the sea, where a giant turtle devoured their bodies. Sciron too was eventually slain by Theseus.

Προκρούστης. Procrustes, also called Polypemon and Damastes, was the most ingenious of this infamous trio. He used to lay his victims on a bed; if they were too small for it, 'he used to rack them out' (*προέκρουεν*, whence his name) to the required length; if too big, he lopped their limbs to make them fit. He lived in Attica, and was another victim of the 'Jack' of ancient Greece. The 'Procrustes bed' is even now proverbial; and we speak of 'Procrustean' treatment, methods, etc., i.e. based on a determination to make things fit in with some preconceived cast-iron system.

οὐδεὶς ἔτι ἀδικεῖ, ironical, 'no one, of course, outrages strangers any more.'

νόμους τίθενται, 'make laws for themselves,' of a community, as usual, but not always. Contrast the use of the active *νόμους τίθημι*, which 'denotes simply the legislative act as such; hence it is fitting when the law-giver is supreme or absolute. *τίθεμαι νόμον* further implies the legislator's personal concern in the law; hence it is said of legislative assemblies. But it can be said also of the despot, if his interest is implied'—JEBB on Soph. *Antigone* 8.

ἀναγκαίοις, 'connected by necessary or natural ties'; so *necessarius* is used in Latin.

ἀμύνονται. The future *ἀμυνοῦνται* is a tempting emendation; but it is by no means necessary.

ἄλλους—συμμάχους, 'allies besides.' For this idiom cf. Soph. *Philoct.* 38 *καὶ ταῦτά γ' ἄλλα θάλπεται ῥάκη* 'Yes and here are some rags besides, drying in the sun.'

15. εἰς ὁποίαν—λυσιτελεῖν. The meaning is well brought out by

Mr Dakyns:—'You who, into whatever city you enter, are less than the least of its free members and moreover are just the sort of person whom any one bent on mischief would single out for attack,—yet you, with your foreigner's passport, are to be exempt from injury. So you flatter yourself. And why? Will the state authorities cause proclamation to be made on your behalf: *The person of this man Aristippus is secure; let his going out and his coming in be free from danger*? Is that the ground of your confidence, or do you rather rest secure in the consciousness that you would prove such a slave as no master would care to keep?'

τοιοῦτος οἵοις. Note the change of number,—'such a one as the *class* of people who....'

οὐκ ἂν οἴει. The *ἂν* goes with *ἀδικηθῆναι*, cf. *ἂν οἴει—εἶναι* below.

οἷος—λυσιτελεῖν. 'The infinitive, after *τοιοῦτος οἷος* and *τοσοῦτος ὅσος*, depends on the idea of *ability*, *fitness*, or *sufficiency* which is expressed in these combinations. The antecedent may be omitted, leaving *οἷος* in the sense of *able*, *fit*, *likely*, and *ὅσος* in that of *sufficient*' —GOODWIN, *Moods and Tenses*, § 759. Cf. vi. 37.

ἄνθρωπον, often in a contemptuous sense,—'fellow.'

16. σωφρονίζουσι, 'sober down,' 'chasten.' This verb generally takes an accusative of the person; but sometimes, as here, the object is the particular passion or extravagance in question.

ἀποκλείοντες—ᾗ, 'shutting them out from any place where it is possible to take anything.' Xenophon very often uses *ἔστι* in the sense of 'it is possible.'

17. πᾶσι κακοῖς, 'all kinds of plagues'; cf. Homer *Od.* ix. 19 *πᾶσι δόλοισι* 'by all kinds of wiles.'

ἀλλὰ γάρ, 'Ah, but then' (*γάρ* is for *γ' ἄρ* 'yes, then,' 'ah, then'). There is no need to suppose an ellipse, as some do.

εἴ γε πεινήσουσι, 'if, that is, they are to suffer hunger.' This use of the future indicative with *εἰ* must be carefully distinguished from that explained in the note on § 12. 'Even the future indicative with *εἰ* may be used in a present condition, if it expresses merely a present intention or necessity that something shall be done hereafter; as when *εἰ τοῦτο ποιήσει* means *if he is* (*now*) *about to do this*, and not (as it does in an ordinary future condition) *if he shall do this* (*hereafter*)'—GOODWIN, § 407, where he quotes our passage.

οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι διαφέρει—ἄλλο γε ἤ, 'I do not know what difference it makes...other at least than that...,' *ἄλλο* agreeing with *ὅ τι*. The whole sentence may be translated thus:—'For my part I cannot understand

what difference it makes—if it is the same skin that is beaten—whether the punishment is voluntary or involuntary, or generally—if it is the same body that suffers—whether one is bombarded by all kinds of such evils of one's own will or against it, except indeed that the imputation of folly attaches to self-chosen suffering.'

τὸ αὐτὸ δέρμα—τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα, accusatives of respect; cf. § 22.

πολιορκεῖσθαι. For this military metaphor cf. *Hamlet*, iii. 1 *whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune.* Plato has *ὑπὸ τῶν συκοφαντῶν πολιορκούμενοι* 'bombarded by sycophants' (ii *Alcib.* 142 A).

18. τῶν τοιούτων, partitive genitive, 'among such matters'; cf. ii. 9.

ᾗ, 'inasmuch as.'

βούλοιτο. The optative is due to attraction. Except for the proximity of the optative *φάγοι*, we should have had *ὁπόταν βούληται* here, just as we do in the next clause. Cf. iii. 5, 11, ix. 2.

ἐπ' ἀγαθῇ—εὐφραίνεται, 'reposing on (*lit.* on the basis of) a good hope he is cheerful in the face of trouble.'

19. ἵνα—κτήσωνται—ὅπως—χειρώσονται. Xenophon is fond of such varieties of construction; cf. ii. 10.

20. αἱ—ἡδοναί, 'lazy habits combined with the pleasures of the moment.'

γυμνασταί, not 'gymnasts,' but 'athletic trainers.'

αἱ δὲ διὰ καρτερίας—ποιοῦσιν, 'but patient attention to noble and good deeds makes men reach the goal.'

ἐξικνεῖσθαι, probably absolute, *τῶν—ἔργων* being an objective genitive after *ἐπιμέλειαι*. Others take *τῶν—ἔργων* as governed by *ἐξικνεῖσθαι* 'attain to...deeds.'

Ἡσίοδος. 'The Boeotian poet, whose fame nearly equalled that of Homer, was Hesiod of Ascra. His family came from Cyme in Asia. Tradition relates that the poet was killed in Locrian territory at Naupactus, and that dolphins carried the body ashore, which had been thrown into the sea by the murderers. (i) In the *Works and Days* he makes observations upon human life, and relates two legends which since then have become two of the most famous of antiquity, *Pandora's Box* and the *Four Ages of the World*, and gives rules for navigation and agriculture. (ii) The second great poem ascribed to Hesiod is the *Theogony*. (iii) Of less importance is the third poem ascribed to him, the *Shield of Heracles*' (Holm). The passage here quoted by Xenophon is from the *Works and Days*, 287—292.

καὶ ἰλαδόν, 'even in troops,' i.e. in abundance; cf. *Anabasis* I. ii. 16 τεταγμένοι κατ' ἴλας 'drawn up in troops.'

ναίει, subject not ὁδός, but Vice.

προπάροιθεν, '*in front of*, viz. as something to be undergone and overcome before the desired object can be reached'—PALEY *ad loc.*

ἵκηται, subject 'the traveller.'

ῥηιδίη, '*comparatively* easy, as the addition of χαλεπή περ ἐοῦσα shows. The spondaic followed by a dactylic verse seems intentionally to express laborious ascent and easy descent; cf. the well-known lines about the stone of Sisyphus, Homer *Od.* xi. 595–8' (Paley). The subject to ῥηιδίη—πέλει must be ὁδός (though the masculine οἶμος has intervened), not ἀρετή as Kühner says. Perhaps οἶμος is only a part of the larger idea ὁδός.

Ἐπίχαρμος. 'Epicharmus, a Greek comedian, was born in the island of Cos about 540 B.C. When only a child of three months old he came with his father to Megara in Sicily, where he died at the age of 90. It was Epicharmus who gave to the Doric comedy of Sicily its literary form. Thirty-five of his plays, written in the Doric dialect, are known to us by their titles, and a few meagre fragments have survived. They differed from the Attic comedy in having no chorus. The philosophical leanings of Epicharmus are shown in numerous sayings of deep practical wisdom. Plato said that Epicharmus was the prince of comedy, as Homer was of tragedy,—a striking testimony to the perfection of his compositions in their own line'—SEYFFERT.

τῶν—θεοί. The metre of this and the next quotation is trochaic.

τῶν πόνων, 'in return for our toils,' genitive of price; cf. v. 2, 3, 5, viii. 2, x. 4.

καὶ—δέ, 'and also...'; cf. καὶ Πρόδικος δέ below.

μῶσο, Doric imperative of μάομαι 'I desire eagerly.' In another fragment Epicharmus has the Doric 3rd sing. pres. indic. μῶται.

§ 21. **Πρόδικος**. Prodicus was a native of Ceos and contemporary with Socrates. He often came to Athens as an ambassador, and the favour with which his speeches there were received induced him to become a 'teacher of encyclopaedic culture.' 'Xenophon gives a paraphrase of the *Choice of Heracles* as related by Prodicus in his fable called Ὧραι.... He observes that the diction of Prodicus was more ambitious than his paraphrase. The only safe inference appears to be that, however faithful Xenophon may have been to the matter of the fable, he is a witness of no authority for its form'—JEBB, *Attic Orators*, vol. i. p. cxv.

ὁ σοφός. Prodicus was ordinarily known as a Sophist. A modern writer, who is very severe on the Sophists as a class, has called him 'the most innocent' of them all,—faint praise surely for the author of the *Choice of Heracles*! 'We must know,' says another, 'whether Prodicus departed from the general rule of the professional class, by not holding out political power as his prize, before we can pronounce him a useful teacher, because he taught his pupils how they might obtain the bone and nerve of Heracles.' But, as we shall find, Prodicus states emphatically that the good of others and the good opinion of others combined is the prize for which the young Heracles is advised to contend; see § 28.

ὅπερ—ἐπιδείκνυται, 'which he gives as a show discourse to a very large audience'; cf. Plato, *Gorgias*, 447 B *Γοργίας ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῖν* 'will exhibit to you,' 'will give a rhetorical display.' Such a discourse was called *ἐπίδειξις* or *ἐπιδεικτικὸς λόγος*.

ὡσαύτως—ἀποφαίνεται, 'conveys the same lesson,' i.e. as Hesiod and Epicharmus.

ἐκ παίδων, 'from boyhood'; so Demosthenes has *εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων ἐξελθών*. Cf. ii. 8 *ἐκ παιδίου*.

τὴν—ὁδὸν τρέψονται. For the cognate accusative cf. § 23 and § 29.

εἰς ἡσυχίαν, with *ἐξελθόντα*. Cf. Cicero *de offic.* (i. 118), translating this passage, *exisse in solitudinem atque ibi sedentem diu secum multumque dubitasse.* For retreat from the world as a preparation for a great career compare St Paul's sojourn in Arabia (*Galatians* ii. 17) and the celebrated comment of Gibbon on Mohammed's early life:—'Conversation enriches the understanding, but solitude is the school of genius.'

τράπηται, dependent deliberative subjunctive, 'which way he is to turn'; cf. § 23 *τράπῃ*.

22. **ἐλευθέριον φύσει,** 'frank and free by the gift of nature' (Dakyns). Some less well take *φύσει* with the next clause.

χρῶμα—ὄμματα—σχῆμα. For the accusative of respect cf. § 17 *δέρμα—σῶμα*.

σχῆμα, says Lightfoot, 'corresponds exactly in derivation, though but partially in meaning, to the old English *haviour*. In its first sense it denotes the figure, shape, fashion of a thing. Thence it gathers several derived meanings. It gets to signify, like the corresponding Latin *habitus*, sometimes the dress or costume (as Arist. *Equites* 1331 *ἀρχαίῳ σχήματι λαμπρός*), sometimes the attitude or demeanour (as Eur. *Ion* 238 *τρόπων τεκμήριον τὸ σχῆμ' ἔχεις τόδε*). It signifies moreover pomp, display, outward circumstance, and frequently semblance as opposed to

reality.' In our passage the meaning is 'demeanour.' Virtue's demeanour is said to be 'adorned by sobriety' and nothing else; she does not aim at effect.

ἐσθῆτι δὲ λευκῇ. Repeat *κεκοσμημένην* only, not *τὸ σχῆμα* also.

τεθρυμμένην εἰς—ἁπαλότητα, lit. 'enervated into plumpness and softness,' i.e. 'plump and flabby owing to a life of luxury'; cf. IV. ii. 35 *διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον διαθρυπτόμενοι*, Xen. *Sympos.* viii. 8 *μαλακίᾳ θρύπτεσθαι*, Lucian *Charid.* 4 *ἁπαλός τε καὶ τεθρυμμένος.* The reading *τεθρυμμένην* is to be preferred to the vulgate *τεθραμμένην.*

πολυσαρκίαν. Cf. Ezekiel xvi. 26 'The Egyptians great of flesh'—*τοὺς μεγαλοσάρκους* (LXX).

ὥστε—δοκεῖν φαίνεσθαι, *ut candidiorem et rubicundiorem speciem prae se ferre* (*φαίνεσθαι*) *videretur* (*δοκεῖν*)—KÜHNER.

ἀναπεπταμένα, predicative, 'wide open,' 'staring.'

ἡ ὥρα, 'her youthful bloom,' lit. 'springtime.'

κατασκοπεῖσθαι—ἐπισκοπεῖν, 'look down her whole length...cast a glance at others.'

23. τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. Cf. § 13 *πάντα τρόπον.*

ἐὰν—ποιησάμενος, an odd ellipse. We must supply from the previous sentence 'you choose your course of life.'

24. οὐ—φροντιεῖς, 'you will not trouble yourself about war or affairs.' For the objective genitive after *φροντίζω* cf. two instances in § 34 *τούτων ἐνθυμουμένῳ* and *τῶν εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον φροντίζειν.*

διέσει, 'you will continue.' Similarly *διαγίγνομαι, διατελῶ, διάγω* are constructed with a participle.

25. ἐὰν δέ—πορίζεσθαι, 'If ever the suspicion comes upon you that the sources of these pleasures may one day fail, you need not fear that I shall lead you to the necessity of providing new ones by toil and trouble of mind and body.'

σπάνεως ἀφ' ὧν, i.e. *τούτων ἀφ' ὧν.*

οἷς—τούτοις. For the attraction of the relative cf. § 8.

26. ὑποκοριζόμενοι, properly 'talking *small* (*ὑπό*) *as if to a child* (*κόρος* 'boy,' *κόρη* 'girl'),' 'adopting a petting, affectionate tone'; cf. the *little language* of Swift's letters to Stella. So *ὑποκορισμός* is the technical term for the use of diminutives. Cf. Arist. *Plutus* 1011 *νηττάριον ἂν—ὑπεκορίζετο* 'he would call me pettingly his little duck,' Plato *Republ.* 400 E *ἣν ἄνοιαν οὖσαν ὑποκοριζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐήθειαν* 'we call by the pet name of simplicity.' In our passage the use of the word is ironical: 'those who hate me are kind enough to give me the pet name of *Naughtiness*,'—unless indeed the word had already ac-

quired the sense of 'to depreciate,' which it undoubtedly bore sometimes in later Greek; e.g. Epictetus has *ὑποκορίζεται καὶ σκώπτει θάνατον* 'makes light of and jests at death.' The transposition of *ὑποκοριζόμενοι* to the previous clause is a miserable specimen of the critic's art.

27. καὶ ἐγώ, 'I too' as well as *Κακία.*

ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ, 'in the training they have given you.'

ἐπ' ἀγαθοῖς, 'on the ground of doughty deeds'; cf. § 28 *ἐπ' ἀρετῇ θαυμάζεσθαι*, vi. 12 *ἐπ' ἀρετῇ.*

οὐκ ἐξαπατήσω—μετ' ἀληθείας, 'I will not deceive you with overtures in praise of pleasure, but I will discourse of realities, according to the disposition of the gods, in all truth.'

ἡδονῆς, objective genitive; cf. § 20.

28. τὴν Ἑλλάδα πειρατέον εὖ ποιεῖν. Grote makes good use of this passage as against those who take a low view of Prodicus and the Sophists generally; and he adds that 'the very selection of Heracles as an ideal to be followed is of itself a proof that the Sophist did not intend to point out the acquisition of personal pre-eminence, except in so far as it naturally sprang from services rendered, as the grand prize to be contended for by his pupils. For Heracles is, in Greek conception, the type of those who work for others,—one condemned by his destiny to achieve great, difficult, and unrewarded exploits at the bidding of another.'

αὐτάς τε—καὶ ὅπως. The *τε* is not misplaced as some say; for the meaning of the sentence comes to this:—'you must learn the arts of war—*both themselves* (i.e. their theory) and their application.'

εἰ δὲ καὶ—ἱδρῶτι, 'And even if you want to be powerful in body, you must habituate the body to serve the mind and exercise it not without toil and sweat'; cf. Cicero *de offic.* i. 23 *exercendum corpus et ita afficiendum est ut oboedire consilio et rationi possit in exsequendis negotiis et in labore tolerando.* Cf. also a fine passage in Major May's *Field Artillery*, p. 225:—'Weapons and equipment, speaking within limits, do not win victories. These are the fruit of personal effort and exertion, and are chiefly brought about by the influences which raise the mind above the body.... Discipline is the lever we utilize to lift a man thus above himself.'

29. ὁδὸν—διηγεῖται, 'leads along a road to her delights.' For the cognate accusative cf. *ὁδὸν ἄξω σε* below and §§ 21, 29.

30. ἢ τί ἡδὺ—ἐμπίμπλασαι, 'Or what of sweetness do you experience if you will do nothing to secure such things, *you who* (*ἥτις*)

do not even wait for the desire of what is sweet, but, before the desire comes, have full satiety?'

πεινῆν—διψῆν, a Doric contraction, of which a few instances are found in Attic, e.g. *χρῆσθαι*, *ζῆν*, *ψῆν* from *ψάω* 'I rub,' *κνῆν* from *κνάω* 'I scratch.'

ὀψοποιίας μηχανωμένη, 'devising cookery recipes.'

τοῦ θέρους, genitive of time *within which*; cf. ii. 5, 8, also *ἄκρας νυκτός* 'at dead of night,' *τοῦ λοιποῦ* 'for the future.'

χιόνα. Both Greeks and Romans used snow to cool their wine; cf. Martial ix. 22 *et faciant nigras nostra Falerna nives.*

μαλακάς, predicative, 'so as to be soft.'

ὑπόβαθρα, 'rockers' like those of a cradle, as is clear from the parallels quoted by Dindorf.

ὅ τι ποιῇς, dependent deliberative; cf. § 21 *ποτέραν τράπηται.*

31. ἀκούσματος. This word, like *ἀκρόαμα*, would include a recitation, song, or piece of music; cf. Xen. *Hiero* i. 14 *τοῦ μὲν ἡδίστου ἀκροάματος ἐπαίνου οὔποτε σπανίζετε*, Cicero *pro Archia* 32 *Themistoclem dixisse aiunt, cum ex eo quaereretur quod* acroama *aut cuius vocem libentissime audiret: eius a quo sua virtus optime praedicaretur.*

ἢ τίς —τολμήσειεν εἶναι, 'Or what man in his senses would dare to join your company of votaries?'

θιάσου, partitive genitive. The *θίασος* is a procession of votaries of a divinity (especially Dionysus) who wore wreaths and danced and sang; cf. Xen. *Symposium* viii. 1 *θιασῶται τοῦ Ἔρωτος* 'votaries of love,' Virg. *Aen.* vii. 580 *attonitae Baccho nemora avia matres insultant thiasis.*

οἱ νέοι μὲν ὄντες, *constructio ad sensum*, *θίασος* being a noun of multitude; cf. ii. 3, v. 4.

ἀπόνως μὲν—περῶντες, 'In the heyday of life they batten in sleek idleness, and wearily do they drag through an age of wrinkled wretchedness'—DAKYNS.

τοῖς πεπραγμένοις, dative of cause; cf. § 33 *ἐπαίνοις χαίρουσιν.*

τὰ μὲν ἡδέα—ἀποθέμενοι, 'having run through all the sweets of life in their youth and having laid up their hardships for the day of old age.'

32. σύνειμι μὲν—σύνειμι δέ, a trick of style, of which Xenophon is particularly fond; cf. iii. 4.

οἷς προσήκει, 'who are fit for the privilege.' This is more forcible than to supply *παρά*, as Kühner does, i.e. 'among whom it is meet I should be honoured.'

33. ἀπράγμων. Contrast § 30 *περιθέουσα.*

οὔτε ἀπολείποντες—πράττειν, 'they are not grieved at missing sleep, nor for the sake of it do they let slip the doing of their duty.'

κεῖνται, 'they have been laid to rest'; cf. Thuc. ii. 43 *τὸν τάφον—ἐν ᾧ κεῖνται*,—*κεῖμαι* being used as the perfect passive of *τίθημι*. Cf. Plato *Leges* 793 B *νόμων τῶν ἐν γράμμασι τεθέντων τε καὶ κειμένων καὶ τῶν ἔτι τεθησομένων*.

μετὰ μνήμης θάλλουσι, 'their memory celebrated in story is green for evermore.' For *θάλλω* used of persons cf. Soph. *Philoct.* 420 *θάλλοντές εἰσι νῦν ἐν Ἀργείων στρατῷ*. Cf. also Cicero *Tusc.* i. 49 *Harmodius in ore est et Aristogiton, Lacedaemonius Leonidas, Thebanus Epaminondas viget.*

ὑμνούμενοι, not 'hymned,' but 'ever on the lips of men'; cf. Soph. *Ajax* 292 *ἀεὶ δ' ὑμνούμενα* and the Latin *decantare.*

34. **διῴκει**, 'used to arrange.' The middle *διοικεῖσθαι* is used in the same sense of 'arranging the parts of a discourse' by Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The MSS. reading *διώκει* 'pursues' can hardly be right; the tense alone would be a considerable awkwardness, especially as *ἐκόσμησε* follows.

ἐκόσμησε—ῥήμασιν, 'However he had decked out his thoughts in still more grandiose language.'

ἢ ἐγὼ νῦν. Socrates's own version seems to us sufficiently florid, bearing a very close resemblance to the mellifluous style of Isocrates. He may be speaking ironically, and indulging in a certain amount of parody.

σοὶ—φροντίζειν, 'However that may be (*δ' οὖν*), it is worth your while, Aristippus, to take this story to heart and to make some attempt to think of the things which concern the future of your life as well as (*καὶ*) the present.'

τούτων—τῶν εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον. For these genitives after *ἐνθυμεῖσθαι* and *φροντίζειν* cf. § 24 *πραγμάτων φροντιεῖς*.

τι, cognate accusative with *πειρᾶσθαι*.

II.

1. **τὸν πρεσβύτατον υἱόν.** Socrates had two other sons, Sophroniscus and Menexenus, who, according to tradition, were the offspring of another wife named Myrto, a daughter or grand-daughter of Aristides the Just. But Zeller believes that the connexion between Socrates and Myrto belongs altogether to the region of fable, like many of the stories of Greek biography. Probably all three sons were the children of Xanthippe.

τὴν μητέρα. Xanthippe was proverbial for her disagreeable temper; see note on § 7.

τοὺς τί ποιοῦντας. Notice that (i) the stress of the sentence is borne by the participle, as often in Greek (cf. § 2), (ii) the interrogative is attached to the participle; cf. I. iii. 10 *τί ἰδὼν ποιοῦντα τοιαῦτα κατέγνωκας αὐτοῦ;* 'What have you seen him do that you think so badly of him?' Similarly our sentence may be rendered:—'Do you understand what it is they do to earn this evil name?'

ἀποκαλοῦσιν, 'call by a bad name,' as usual; cf. I. vi. 13 *σοφιστὰς ἀποκαλοῦσιν.* For the double accusative after it cf. § 8.

2. ἤδη—ἐσκέψω. For this use of the aorist see note on i. 7.

καὶ δοκεῖ—ἄδικος εἶναι. Here again the participial clause, *ὑφ' οὗ—εὖ παθών,* bears the stress of the sentence. This is a compressed expression for *καὶ δοκεῖ μοι, ἐάν τις ὑφ' ἑτέρου εὖ παθὼν—μὴ πειρᾶται χάριν ἀποδιδόναι, ἄδικος εἶναι.*

3. εἰλικρινής, 'pure,' 'unadulterated,' 'out and out.'

τίνας ὑπὸ τίνων, 'who and by whom...?' For the double interrogative cf. Homer's *τίς πόθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν;* Euripides' *τίνες πόθεν πορεύεσθ';* Horace's *unde quo veni?*

οὓς οἱ γονεῖς—εἶναι, 'For their parents brought them from nothingness into being, and withal to the sight of all the beautiful things and to participation in all the blessings which the gods bestow on men. And these good things are so absolutely precious in our eyes that we all shrink utterly from the thought of leaving them.'

αἱ πόλεις—παύσοντες, *constructio ad sensum,* *παύσοντες* being used as if *οἱ πολῖται* had gone before; cf. i. 31 *θιάσου—οἵ.*

ὡς οὐκ ἂν—παύσοντες, 'under the impression that they could not check iniquity by any stronger deterrent.' There is no need to change *παύσοντες* of all the MSS. to *παύσαντες,* since 'a few cases of the future participle with *ἄν,* representing the future indicative with *ἄν,* are found in Attic writers. They rest on the same authority as those of the future indicative and the future infinitive with *ἄν*:—e.g. Plato *Apology* 30 B *ἀφίετε ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος ἄλλα* (so all MSS.), Demosth. ix. 70 *πάλαι τις ἡδέως ἂν ἴσως ἐρωτήσων κάθηται,* *many a one has long been sitting here who perhaps would be very glad to ask* (so all MSS.)'—GOODWIN, *Moods and Tenses,* § 216.

5. πάντα ὅσα—πλεῖστα, 'all things that he imagines will profit them towards their course of life, and these in the greatest abundance possible.'

ὑποδεξαμένη, used absolutely,—'having conceived.'

καὶ σὺν πολλῷ—ἐκπληροῦν, 'And when with much travail she has endured to the end and brought her off-spring to the birth, she rears and tends the babe, though there is neither the sense of gratitude on her part for any good thing she has received before its birth, nor consciousness on its part of who is treating it so well, nor even power to manifest its wants; but she herself, making guesses at what will do it good and give it pleasure, attempts to satisfy its needs.'

οὔτε γιγνῶσκον τὸ βρέφος. It is a mistake to consider *γιγνῶσκον τὸ βρέφος* an accusative absolute; see note on § 13. *τὸ βρέφος* is accusative after *τρέφει τε καὶ ἐπιμελεῖται*, and *οὔτε—οὔτε* is quite correct, as each *οὔτε* introduces a subordinate addition to the verbal idea.

ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτός, genitive of *time within which*; cf. § 8 and i. 30.

ἀπολήψεται, 'will receive *in return*,' a frequent meaning of *ἀπὸ* in composition, e.g. in this chapter, § 2 *χάριν ἀποδιδόναι*, § 10 *εὐχὰς ἀποδιδοῦσαν*, § 14 *χάριν ἀπολήψεσθαι*.

6. δαπανῶντες, 'at their own expense.'

αὐτοῖς, dative of person concerned,—'may turn out *for them*.'

7. τούτων πολλαπλάσια, 'many times more than this.' The genitive is analogous to that after comparatives.

τὴν χαλεπότητα. Socrates himself would never allow the shrewish nature of Xanthippe to ruffle his philosophic composure. Zeller has some interesting remarks on her reputation:—'The name of Xanthippe is not only proverbial now. Writers of antiquity tell so many little stories and disgraceful traits of her that one almost feels inclined to take up the cudgels in her behalf. What Xenophon and Plato say of her shows that she cannot have been altogether badly disposed. At least she was solicitous about her family, though at the same time she was extremely violent, overbearing, and hard to deal with.'

μητρός is general,—'a mother.'

τῆς γε τοιαύτης, 'anyhow if she is like mine.'

ἤδη—ἔδωκεν. Cf. § 2.

8. ἐπὶ τῷ βίῳ παντί, lit. 'on condition of one's whole life,' i.e. 'at the price of one's whole span of life.' Cf. viii. 1, 5.

σὺ δέ—κάμνων, 'And *you*—how many annoyances do you think you have caused your mother by your naughty peevish cries and actions night and day, ever since you were a babe, and how many sorrows by your ill-health?'

πράγματα παρασχεῖν. See note on i. 9 and cf. ix. 1, x. 4.

εἶπα. This first aorist is very rare in Attic Prose.

αὐτὴν—οὐδέν. For the double accusative cf. § 9 *ἀλλήλους τὰ ἔσχατα λέγωσιν* and § 1 *τοὺς τί ποιοῦντας—τοῦτο ἀποκαλοῦσιν;*

ἐφ' ᾧ ᾐσχύνθη, a rather subtle taunt; for it would take a good deal to make Xanthippe blush.

9. τί δ'—ῥᾳδίως φέρουσι. The meaning is well brought out in Mr Dakyns' version:—'Nay, come now, do you suppose it is harder for you to listen to your mother's speeches than for actor to listen to actor on the tragic stage, when the floodgates of abuse are open?—Yes, for the simple reason that they know it is all talk on their parts. The inquisitor may cross-question, but he will not inflict a fine; the threatener may hurl his menaces, but he will do no mischief. That is why they take it all so easily.'

τῶν λεγόντων, partitive genitive,—'among those who talk'; cf. i. 18.

10. ὑγιάνῃς—ἔσει. Cf. note on i. 19.

εὐχὰς ἀποδιδοῦσαν, *vota reddentem quae diis promisit* (Kühner); cf. note on § 5.

11. ἄρχοντι, 'ruler' in a general sense. Contrast the special use in § 13 *ἄρχειν* and *τῶν ἀρχόντων.*

12. καὶ ἀγαθοῦ—βοηθῇ σοι, 'and that he may prove a ready helper for you in all that is good, and that, if ever you chance to fall on evil days, he may aid you from near at hand with good will.'

οὐδὲν ἂν—γενέσθαι. Our idiom is:—'would it make no difference whether you make him friend or foe?'

13. εἶτα—θεραπεύειν; Notice the *parataxis* (co-ordination) of *μέν* and *δέ* clauses in this and the next sentence. We prefer to subordinate one clause:—'So it comes to this; does it? While you are prepared to give attention to these people, you do not think yourself called upon to pay court to your mother who loves you most of all?'

εἶτα, often used *indignantis.*

ἀποδοκιμάζουσα—τοῦτον, 'rejects him at the scrutiny and forbids him to serve as archon.' A law of Solon said:—*ἐάν τις μὴ τρέφῃ τοὺς γονέας, ἄτιμος ἔστω,* and there was a process called *γραφὴ κακώσεως γονέων* 'a public suit for ill-usage of parents.'

ἀποδοκιμάζουσα. Cf. *ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων δοκιμασίαις* below. 'When any citizen of Athens was either appointed by lot or chosen by suffrage to hold a public office, he was obliged, before entering on its duties, to submit to a *δοκιμασία* or scrutiny into his previous life and conduct, in which any person could object to him as unfit. The examination for the archonship was conducted by the senators or in the courts of the Heliaea' (*Dictionary of Antiquities*).

ὡς—θυόμενα, 'on the ground that the sacrifices would not be piously offered.' 'The participles of personal verbs sometimes stand with their nouns in the accusative absolute, if they are preceded by ὡς or ὥσπερ. The accusative absolute used personally without ὡς or ὥσπερ is very rare. It occurs chiefly with neuter participles which are regularly impersonal: e.g. Xen. *Hellenica* III. ii. 19 δόξαντα δὲ ταῦτα—ἀπῆλθε'—GOODWIN, *Moods and Tenses*, §§ 853, 854.

καὶ τοῦτο ἐξετάζει, 'passes this fact also under review.' ἐξετάζω is the regular word for 'reviewing' an army.

14. τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους—ἀναφανῇς, 'and you will beware of men, lest they see you disregarding your parents and all hold you in dishonour and then you find yourself deserted by friends.'

ἐν ἐρημίᾳ φίλων, lit. 'in a desert devoid of friends'; cf. *Hellenica* III. iv. 21 δι' ἐρημίας πολεμίων πορεύεσθαι, Arist. *Aves* 1484 ἐν τῇ λύχνων ἐρημίᾳ.

III.

1. Χαιρεφῶντα καὶ Χαιρεκράτη. Chaerephon and Chaerecrates were members of the inner circle of the Socratic brotherhood (I. ii. 48). They are mentioned in Plato's *Apology* p. 21 A, where Socrates says:—'You must have known Chaerephon; he was early a friend of mine, and also a friend of yours, for he shared in the exile of the democracy, and returned with you (i.e. under Thrasybulus in 403 B.C.). He was very impetuous in all his doings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him whether there was any one wiser than I was, and the Pythian prophetess answered that there was no man wiser. Chaerephon is dead himself; but his brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth of what I am saying.' In Plato's *Charmides* 153 B Chaerephon's enthusiasm is again alluded to; he is there called μανικός 'a bit of a madman.' From Arist. *Nubes* 501—3 we gather that he was a devoted student; hence he was pale and thin, and Aristophanes speaks of him elsewhere as a 'Child of Night' and 'Chaerephon the Bat.'

οὐ δήπου καὶ σύ, 'Surely you too are not....'

εἶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων. For this partitive genitive cf. i 31 *τοῦ σοῦ θιάσου εἶναι*.

χρησιμώτερον, 'a more useful thing'; cf. vi. 21, vii. 7, ix. 1, Homer *Il.* ii. 204 οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη 'rule by many is not a good thing,' and Virgil *Ecl.* iii. 80 *triste lupus stabulis.*

καὶ ταῦτα—ἑνός, 'and that too though goods are without sense, while a brother is sensible; goods require protection, while a brother is

capable of affording it; and besides, goods are plural and a brother singular.'

καὶ ταῦτα, used frequently without any proper construction, merely as a particle; cf. Arist. *Vespae* 550 *τί γὰρ εὔδαιμον—μᾶλλον νῦν ἐστὶ δικαστοῦ—καὶ ταῦτα γέροντος;*

τοῦ δὲ φρονίμου. Note the change of number after *ἀδελφούς* above. Socrates now specialises with a view to the case of Chaerecrates only.

ἑνός, and therefore more precious.

2. θαυμαστὸν—τοὺς δέ, 'And this too is surprising that, while a man considers his brothers a loss because he has not got their property as well as his own (*καί*), yet....'

ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν—ἀγνοοῦσι, 'but they ignore this same principle in the case of brothers.'

3. ὥσπερ—γιγνομένους φίλους, 'on the ground that friends spring from the ranks of citizens,'—accusative absolute; cf. note on ii. 13 *ὡς—τὰ ἱερὰ—θυόμενα.*

4. καὶ μήν, 'And yet'; cf. § 10, § 14, and § 19, vi. 27, vii. 1.

πρὸς φιλίαν—φῦναι, 'birth from the same parents is a valuable asset making for friendship.'

μέγα μὲν—μέγα δέ. Cf. i. 32.

ὑπάρχει, lit. 'is to start with'; cf. *τὰ ὑπάρχοντα* 'resources.'

5. ἀγαθὸν—τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις, 'A brother, if he is all that he should be, is a blessing. When, however, he falls utterly short of such a character—lit. *it is wanting to him of everything* (*to be such*)—and indeed is the absolute antithesis of it, why should one attempt the impossible...?'

ἐνδέοι—εἴη. These optatives are due to attraction; cf. § 11 and see note on i. 18.

6. ὥσπερ οὐδὲ σοί, 'as he does not please you either,' i.e. 'any more than he does you.'

ἔστιν οἷς, 'to some'; cf. Thuc. i. 6 *ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἔστιν οἷς νῦν.* '*ἔστιν οἵ, ἔστιν αἵ* never occur, but always *εἰσὶν οἵ, εἰσὶν αἵ.* So *est quibus* (Propertius iv. 9. 17), a bold Graecism, would hardly justify the use of *est qui* (plural). Yet some retain in Plautus *Pseudulus* 245 *est conloqui qui volunt*'—SHILLETO.

ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἐμοί, 'I am entitled.'

7. τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι, 'who does not know' how to manage him.

9. εἰ κύνα—βέλτιστος ᾖ. First note the following points about this very complex sentence:—(i) one conditional sentence is wrapped up inside another, (ii) *κύνα μέν* is answered by *τὸν δὲ ἀδελφόν*, (iii) between

these *μέν* and *δέ* clauses another pair of *μέν* and *δέ* clauses is inserted, (iv) the redundant *αὐτόν* is inserted after *πραΰνειν* on account of the distance between *κύνα* and its verb. The meaning is admirably brought out by Mr Dakyns:—'*Your dog*, the serviceable guardian of your flocks, who will fawn and lick the hand of your shepherd, when you come near him can only growl and show his teeth. Well, you take no notice of the dog's ill temper, you try to propitiate him by kindness. But *your brother*? If your brother were what he ought to be, he would be a great blessing to you—that you admit; and, as you further confess, you know the secret of kind acts and words; yet you will not set yourself to apply means to make him your best of friends.'

ἐπὶ προβάτοις, 'over, i.e. in charge of, sheep'; cf. *Cyropaedeia* VI. iii. 33 *τῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς καμήλοις ἀνδρῶν*.

ἀμελήσας ἄν. The *ἄν* goes with *ἐπειρῶ*,—'you would be trying'; cf. *ἂν—ἁλόντα—ποιεῖσθαι* below.

ὄντα πρὸς σέ. For the conditional use of the participle cf. § 10, *ἁλόντα* in the next section, § 20 *καὶ πολὺ διεστῶτε*, and i. 4.

10. καὶ μὴν—ποιεῖσθαί σε, 'And yet you need not, it seems to me, bring any elaborate or novel machinery to bear upon him; if you were simply to catch him by means which even you yourself know well, he would, I believe, hold you in high esteem.'

οἷς, relative attraction for *ἐκείνοις ἅ*. Cf. i. 10.

ἁλόντα. Cf. vi. 28 *τὴν καλῶν τε κἀγαθῶν θήραν*.

11. οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις—ἐμαυτόν, 'You could not be too quick in informing me, if you are aware that all unknown to myself I have knowledge of some love-charm.' Cf. III. xi. 1 *οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιτε ἀκολουθοῦντες*. Cf. also § 14 *φθάνῃ—ποιῶν*.

κατεργάσασθαι, 'to work upon,' 'induce,' with the infinitive; cf. § 13 *ποιῆσαι ὑποδέχεσθαι*.

ὁπότε θύοι—δεῖπνον. Of victims sacrificed to gods of the upper world only certain parts were actually burnt, e.g. some pieces of flesh wrapped in a layer of fat. After the sacrificing priest had taken his perquisite, which was different in different worships, the remainder of the animal might, in the case of a private sacrifice, be taken home by the provider of the sacrifice, to be used for a meal or sent in the form of presents to friends. Festal sacrifices at the public expense were often combined with a public banquet.

ὁπότε θύοι—ὅτε θύοιμι. For these attracted optatives and the similar ones in § 12 and § 13 see note on i. 18 *φάγοι ἂν ὁπότε βούλοιτο*.

καταρχοίμ' ἂν τοῦ καλεῖν. Our idiom is:—'I should begin by inviting.'

13. εἰς τὴν ἐκείνου. Supply *πόλιν*.

καὶ εἴ γε—ποιεῖν, 'Yes, and if I wanted him to be zealous to accomplish for me the objects of my visit, clearly it would be necessary first to perform a similar service for him *myself* (*αὐτόν*).'

14. πάντ' ἄρα—ἀπεκρύπτου, 'So after all (*ἄρα*) you were acquainted with all the love-charms known to men, but you kept your knowledge a secret all the time.' For the participial construction with *ἀπεκρύπτου* cf. § 11 *εἰδὼς λέληθα ἐμαυτόν*.

καὶ μὴν—γε. Cf. § 4 and § 10.

ἡγεμονικώτερος—ταύτην, 'better fitted to take the first step towards this friendship.'

νῦν δέ—τοῦτο, 'But as it is, I believe that, if you take the first step, you will achieve this object better.'

15. ἄτοπα—πρὸς σοῦ, 'A strange statement and by no means in accordance with your character!' Cf. Soph. *Ajax* 581 *οὐ πρὸς ἰατροῦ σοφοῦ* 'it is not characteristic of a wise physician.'

ὅς γε κελεύεις, *quippe qui iubeas.*

16. ὁδοῦ, an ablatival genitive,—literally 'to give way to the younger *from the road*, i.e. by moving out of the road'; cf. Demosth. p. 63 *Φιλίππῳ Ἀμφιπόλεως παρακεχωρήκαμεν.*

λόγῳ ὑπεῖξαι, 'to yield to him in argument.'

ἐλευθέριος, 'frank'; cf. i. 22.

τὰ μὲν γὰρ—κατεργάσαιο, 'He is not a mean and sorry rascal to be caught by a bribe—no better way indeed for such riff-raff. No, gentle natures need a finer treatment. You can best hope to work on them by affection' (Dakyns). But another interpretation is quite possible:—'If you can only catch mean and sorry rascals by giving, much more would you work on finer natures by affection'—obstinacy is useless even with brutes. Cf. the proverb *qui suadet sua det.*

17. ἐὰν οὖν—γίγνηται, 'Suppose then he does not improve?'

τί γὰρ ἄλλο—ἢ κινδυνεύσεις, 'what else (will you do) than run a risk?' Cf. the Latin idiom *nihil aliud quam = nihil aliud facere quam.*

ἐκεῖνος δὲ φαῦλος. Supply *κινδυνεύσει ἐπιδεῖξαι.*

προκαλούμενον, a legal term,—'challenging.'

18. ἐπὶ τῷ συλλαμβάνειν, 'with a view to helping'; cf. § 19 *ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ—ἐπὶ βλάβῃ.*

τὼ χεῖρε—ἀφεμένω—ἀλλήλω. The feminine dual is defective, especially in the nominative and accusative forms; cf. *Cyropaedeia* I. ii.

11 *ἄμφω τούτω τὼ ἡμέρα*, Plato *Phaedrus* 237 D *ἰδέα ἄρχοντε καὶ ἄγοντε οἷν ἑπόμεθα.*

τὼ χεῖρε, ἅς. For the combination of dual and plural cf. I. ii. 33 *καλέσαντες—ἐδεικνύτην.*

19. τἄλλα ὅσα—ἀνθρώποις, 'the rest of the pairs of things which he gave to men at their birth.'

εἰ δέοι—ποιῆσαι, 'if they had to act together more than six feet apart.'

ὀργυιά, properly 'arms-stretch' (*ὀρέγω*).

πόδες δὲ—ἅμα, 'and feet could not reach at one stretch two points even six feet apart.'

20. ὀφθαλμοὶ—δύναιντο, 'And our eyes, which are thought to have a very wide range, could not see at the same time the front and back of objects even still nearer (than six feet).'

ἀδελφὼ—ἀλλήλοιν, 'But two brothers if friendly, though ever so far apart, act in unison and for each other's good.'

καὶ πολὺ διεστῶτε, concessive; cf. § 9.

IV.

1. διαλεγομένου ἐξ ὧν. We must supply an antecedent, e.g. *τοιαῦτα.*

πρὸς—χρείαν, lit. 'towards the acquisition and use of friends'; cf. § 3 *τὰ πρὸς ὑγίειαν.*

2. φίλον ὃ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν. For this attraction of the relative cf. Cic. *Phil.* ii. 54 *Cn. Pompeium, quod imperi populi Romani decus ac lumen fuit.*

οἱ ὄντες αὐτοῖς. Supply *φίλοι.*

3. τοῖς οἰκέταις, dative of person concerned,—'for (rather than 'to') their domestics.'

ἐπὶ—ἡγουμένους, 'grieving over their domestics and counting (their death) a loss.'

4. καὶ πάνυ πολλῶν ὄντων, 'though they had ever so many.' For the concessive use of the participle cf. iii. 20 *καὶ πολὺ διεστῶτε.*

τὸ πλῆθος ἀγνοοῦντας. Cf. Cic. *Laelius* 62 *saepe querebatur* (i.e. *Scipio*) *quod omnibus in rebus homines diligentiores essent; capras et oves quot quisque haberet dicere posse, amicos quot haberet non posse dicere.*

τοῖς πυνθανομένοις—ἐγχειρήσαντας, 'when in answer to enquirers they attempted to give a list of this (number).'

καταλέγειν, 'to enumerate.' Observe that the original meaning of the simple verb λέγειν is 'to count'; cf. the history of the English *tell*, e.g. Milton's *every shepherd tells his tale.*

οὓς—ἀνατίθεσθαι, 'they anon retract the names of some whom they had placed in their list of friends.' The metaphor in *ἀνατίθεσθαι* is taken from some game like draughts, where a player recalls a move; cf. Plato *Hipparchus* 229 E *ὥσπερ πεττεύων ἐθέλω ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀναθέσθαι.*

τοσοῦτον—φροντίζειν, 'so little thought do they bestow on their friends.' For the genitive cf. i. 34.

5. καίτοι—φανείη, 'And yet, compared to what possession of all others, will not a good friend appear much more valuable?'

πάγχρηστον, 'useful for all work'; cf. Arist. *Acharnians* 936 *πάγχρηστον ἄγγος.*

6. ἑαυτὸν τάττει...πράξεων, 'steps into the breach to make up all that is lacking to his friend for the equipment of both private and public enterprises.' For the meaning of *ἐλλείπειν* cf. i. 8, and for the genitive after it cf. § 7 *οὐδενὸς λείπεται.*

συμπράττων, 'by dint of his diplomacy' (Dakyns).

7. ἅ, antecedent *τούτων*,—'all that the hands minister...,—of none of these services does a friend fall short in conferring benefits.'

τὰ ὦτα προακούουσι. Xenophon, like Homer, frequently uses a plural verb with a neuter plural subject. In this sentence a desire for symmetry may account for a departure from the ordinary rule. But it is worth noticing that generally, when a plural verb is used with a neuter plural subject, the subject conveys the notion of distinct units. Thus in Homer a plural verb is used with neuters denoting plural parts of the body, e.g. *πτερά, χείλεα, μέλεα, οὔατα* (cf. *ὦτα* in our passage).

δένδρα, 'fruit-trees,' as usual; cf. i. 13.

V.

1. ἐξετάζειν—εἴη, 'to practise self-examination, asking of how much value he was to his friends.'

'Αντισθένη. 'The founder of the Cynic school, Antisthenes, a native of Athens, appears to have become acquainted with Socrates late in life, but ever afterwards to have clung to him with enthusiastic devotion, imitating his critical reasoning, though not always without an element of captiousness and quibbling. He committed his views to writing in various treatises, the language and style of which are most

highly praised. Among the pupils of Antisthenes, Diogenes of Sinope is alone known to fame, that witty and eccentric individual, whose coarse humour, strength of character, admirable even in its excesses, and fresh and vigorous mind, have made him the most typical figure of ancient Greece.... The Cynics regard happiness and virtue as absolutely identical. Nothing is good but virtue, nothing an evil but vice; what is neither the one nor the other is for man indifferent. The only real thing which belongs to man is mind; everything else is a matter of chance. Intelligence and virtue constitute the only armour from which all the attacks of fortune recoil'—ZELLER, *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, p. 284 sq.

2. ἀξίαι, substantive,—'values'; cf. § 5 *τὸ πλέον τῆς ἀξίας*.

μναῖν. The *μνᾶ* (*mina*) was 'an old Greek weight, and a sum of coined money equal to it, the sixtieth part of a talent, like which it varied in value. The *mina* = 100 *drachmae*. The intrinsic value of the Attic *mina* of silver was £3. 6*s*. 8*d*.'—SEYFFERT.

καὶ δέκα, 'even ten,' 'as much as ten.'

Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου. Nicias the son of Niceratus is the celebrated Athenian statesman and general, who took part in the expedition to Sicily which ended so disastrously in 413 B.C. He was a great capitalist and had a very large holding in the silver mines, which he had on a perpetual lease from the government, paying (i) purchase or entrance money, (ii) one twenty-fourth of the produce. Being of a highly nervous disposition, and engrossed with public cares, Nicias was only too glad to sub-let his holding in the mines, together with his thousand slaves employed there, to Sosias a Thracian (Xen. *de vectigalibus* iv. 14).

ἐπιστάτην, 'an inspector,' to look after his interests at the mines, especially the slaves; for Nicias's tenant had agreed to maintain them, to pay an obol a day for each of them, and ultimately to deliver up the whole number of a thousand. A very confidential slave would be wanted for this difficult duty; hence his high price. Plutarch (*Nicias* iv. i) speaks of the 'dangerous operations' of the mining speculator (*οὐκ ἀκινδύνους τὰς ἐργασίας ἔχοντα*).

εἰς τἀργύρεια, 'for the silver mines.' The preposition *εἰς* is used sometimes to express an object; cf. *Cyropaedeia* VIII. i. 33 *εἰς κάλλος ζῆν* 'to live for show.' The silver mines were in *ἡ Λαυριωτική* 'the district of Laurium,' so called from the best known of a cluster of heights at the south-east extremity of Attica. The rents of the mines formed a very important item in the Athenian revenue.

ταλάντου, 'lit. *balance* and then *the thing weighed*, the Greek term for (i) the highest measure of weight, (ii) the designation of a sum of money consisting of a number of coins originally equal to it in legal weight and value. It was divided into 600 *minae* or 6000 *drachmae*. Among the different talents in use in Greece the most widely spread was the Attic; the intrinsic value of the metal contained in this sum of money was about £200'—SEYFFERT. A talent was a very high price for a slave, seeing that an ordinary mining-slave cost from about 125 to 150 drachmas, according to Boeckh's calculation.

εἰ ἄρα, 'whether after all...'; cf. § 4 *πόσου ἄρα*.

3. ἐγὼ γοῦν, 'I at all events....' *γοῦν* often introduces a special instance of a general statement; cf. Thuc. i. 2, where, after stating general principles about changes of population, he says:—*τὴν γοῦν Ἀττικὴν ᾤκουν οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀεί* 'Attica at any rate (or *for example*) was always inhabited by the same race.'

τὸν μέν τινα, 'such a one.'

χρημάτων καὶ πόνων πριαίμην ἄν. For the genitive of price cf. § 2 *πρίασθαι ταλάντου*, § 5 *ἀποδῶται τοῦ εὑρόντος*, i. 20 *τῶν πόνων πωλοῦσιν*. Translate:—'and for the friendship of another I would give all the money and pains in the world.'

4. προδιδῶσιν, 'desert,' 'throw up,' rather than 'betray.'

ἄξιος εἶναι, *constructio ad sensum*, as if the sentence had run *καλῶς ἂν ἐξετάζοι—καὶ πειρῷτο ἄν....*

5. σκοπῶ μὴ ἐπαγωγὸν ᾖ, 'I investigate my fear lest it be tempting,' i.e. 'I consider whether it be not tempting'; cf. Soph. *Antigone* 1253 *εἰσόμεσθα μή τι—καλύπτει* 'we shall know whether she is not hiding something,' lit. '*we shall know about our fear lest she is hiding something.*'

ἀποδῶται τοῦ εὑρόντος, 'sells him for what he will fetch,' lit. '*for the fetching price*'; cf. Xen. *Oeconomicus* ii. 3 *πόσον ἂν οἴει τὰ σὰ κτήματα εὑρεῖν πωλούμενα;* 'how much do you think your effects would fetch at a sale?' Aeschines *Timarch.* 96 *οὐδὲ τῆς ἀξίας ἕκαστον ἀπεδίδοτο—ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἤδη εὑρίσκοντος ἀπεδίδοτο.* Isaeus lxxii. 39 *οἰκία εὑρίσκουσα δισχιλίας (δραχμάς).*

ὅταν—λαβεῖν, 'whenever there is a chance of getting more than his real value.'

VI.

1. ἐδόκει, 'And also with regard to testing the character of friends worth winning he seemed to me to give wise advice in the following conversation.'

ὦ Κριτόβουλε. Critobulus was the son of Crito (see note on ix. 1); but he had no taste for philosophy, and, in spite of his father's wishes, never became a member of the Socratic inner circle, being more remarkable for his personal beauty and gay life than for his interest in intellectual pursuits. He neglected his wife and his property, and was apt to be influenced by bad friends. Socrates took the greatest interest in him and sought to improve him by many conversations; e.g. in our passage he instructs him as to the choice of friends; in I. iii. he warns him against other temptations; and in the *Oeconomicus* he lectures him on the management of property. In Xenophon's *Symposium* (iii. 10) Socrates is represented as arguing, in a spirit of whimsical irony, that his own satyr-like countenance was superior in beauty to that of the handsome Critobulus. Though he never took to philosophy, Critobulus remained till the last a steadfast friend of Socrates, being present at the trial (Plato *Apology* 33 D) and in the prison (*Phaedo* 59 B).

ἆρα—ζητητέον; we should say in English 'Must we not seek?'

πρῶτον μέν, usually answered by ἔπειτα δέ, here by τί γάρ; ὅστις... at the beginning of § 2.

ἄρχει—ἀργίας. See note on i. 1 ἐγκράτειαν—πόνου.

οὐκοῦν τοῦ μὲν—εἶναι, an instance of *μέν solitarium*, as grammarians call it. The δέ-clause can easily be supplied in thought; cf. § 5 οἶμαι μέν.

ἀφεκτέον, verbal adjective of ἀπέχω,—'we must hold aloof.'

2. τί γάρ; 'Well then.'

ὅστις δαπανηρός. Supply 'Must we keep aloof from one...'

ὅστις – μὴ αὐτάρκης ἐστίν. μή is used here because this clause is really conditional; i.e. a case is supposed,—εἴ τις μὴ αὐτάρκης ἐστίν. Cf. Plato *Apol.* 21 D ἃ μὴ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι (= εἴ τινα μὴ οἶδα...).

αὐτάρκης, 'self-sufficing,' 'independent of others,' opposed to πολλῶν ἐνδεής (Plato *Republ.* 369 B), so also here to one who always 'wants something from his neighbours.' This is a very important word in the philosophy of the Cynics, of Aristotle, and of the Stoics. In the *Ethics* of Aristotle αὐτάρκεια is one of the characteristics of the Highest Good, which, he says (I. vii. 6), 'is held to be self-sufficient. In applying this term we do not regard a man as an individual leading a

solitary life, but we also take account of parents, children, wife, and, in short, friends and fellow-citizens generally, since man is naturally a social being.... For the present we will take *self-sufficing* to mean what by itself makes life desirable and in want of nothing.'

μὴ λαμβάνων, 'if he does not receive,'—*μή* again because of the condition.

τὸν μὴ διδόντα. Observe that even an attributive participle may involve a condition, as here; hence the *μή*.

3 **δυσσύμβολος** (opposed to *εὐσύμβολος*, § 5), 'hard to deal with,' 'fond of driving hard bargains.'

οὐ βούλεται. Some would read *μή*, comparing *ὅστις μὴ αὐτάρκης ἐστίν* above. But the change is not necessary; for *οὐ βούλεται* may be regarded as one word = *nonvult*. Similarly we find *ἐὰν—οὐ φῆτε* 'if you deny' (Plato *Apol.* 25 B), *εἰ οὐκ ἐᾷς* 'if you forbid' (Soph. *Ajax* 1131).

τί δ'; 'Again...'; cf. i. 3.

4. **ὅστις—κερδανεῖ**, 'Must we keep aloof from one who, owing to his love of money-making, has no leisure for anything else whatever than for discovering the source of some personal advantage?'

μηδὲ πρὸς ἕν, emphatic; cf. vii. 14 *οὐδ' ὑφ' ἑνός*, I. vi. 2 *οὐδ' ἂν εἷς δοῦλος*.

πρὸς ἓν σχολὴν ποιεῖται. Cf. III. vi. 6 *οὐδὲ πρὸς ταῦτά πω ἐσχόλασα*, and the Latin *vacare philosophiae* (Cicero), *vacare in grande opus* (Ovid).

εἰ δέ—ἀντευεργετεῖν, 'And what if a man *were to have* (*ἔχοι*) none of these defects, but *does not mind* (*ἀνέχεται*) being well-treated without a thought of doing a service in return?' The change of mood—*ἔχοι*, *ἀνέχεται*—is noteworthy; the reason is that freedom from defects is more problematical than stolid acquiescence in kind treatment.

φροντίζων τοῦ ἀντευεργετεῖν. For the genitive cf. i. 24 and 34.

5. **οἶμαι μέν**, an excellent instance of *μέν solitarium*,—'I *think* (but I do not affirm)...' Cf. § 1.

ὃς ᾖ. '*ἄν* is sometimes omitted in general relative conditions with the subjunctive in lyric, elegiac, and dramatic poetry, as in Homer. A few examples occur in Herodotus; and even in Attic prose exceptional cases are occasionally found in the MSS.:—e.g. Soph. *O. C.* 395 *γέροντα δ' ὀρθοῦν φλαῦρον, ὃς νέος πέσῃ*. Plato, *Leges* 737 B *οἷς ᾖ* and *ὅσοις μετῇ*'—GOODWIN, *Moods and Tenses*, § 540.

τἀναντία, adverbial accusative, 'on the contrary'; cf. vii. 8 *τοὐναντίον* 'on the contrary.'

ἐγκρατὴς—ἡδονῶν. See note on i. 1.

τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν, 'pleasures coming through the medium of the body'; cf. I. iv. 5 *τῶν διὰ στόματος ἡδέων*, Plato *Phaedru*. 250 D *τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεων*.

εὔοικος. 'keeping a good house,' 'good manager'—a better-supported reading than either *εὔορκος* 'a man of his word,' or *εὔνους*.

φιλόνεικος—χρωμένοις, 'eager not to come behind in doing kindness to his benefactors, so as, by all these good qualities, to be useful to his associates.' For the participial construction with *ἐλλείπεσθαι* cf. iv. 7 *εὐεργετῶν οὐδενὸς λείπεται*.

7. καὶ ἄνδρα δὴ—εὐεργετήσοντα, 'So also with regard to an ordinary man, you mean that whoever is proved to treat his old friends well will be sure to be a benefactor to his later acquaintances also.'

καὶ γὰρ ἵπποις, 'Why, in the case of horses too....'

κἄν, *καὶ* with *ἄλλοις*, *ἄν* with *χρῆσθαι*.

8. εἶεν, 'Granted,' 'well!'

πρῶτον—ποιεῖσθαι, 'First we must watch for manifestations of the will of the gods, whether they advise us to make him a friend.'

ὅπως οὗτος θηρατέος, 'how he must be hunted for,' 'how we must capture him'; cf. § 28 *θηρᾶν τοὺς καλούς τε κἀγαθούς*, § 29 *θήραν ἀνθρώπων*, and the language of the Gospels:—'I will make you fishers of men,' 'Henceforth thou shalt catch men.'

9. κατὰ πόδας, 'close on his heels,' i.e. 'by hunting him down'; cf. III. xi. 8 *κύνας ταχείας παρασκευάζονται ἵνα κατὰ πόδας ἁλίσκωνται*.

10. οἷς, i.e. *ἐκείνοις οὕς*, relative attraction; cf. i. 8 *ὧν βούλεται*. Translate:—'They say there are certain incantations, which those who know them chant over any they wish and so make them their friends.'

11. αἱ Σειρῆνες. Cf. Circe's warning to Odysseus in Homer *Od.* xii. 39—52 (Morris's Translation):—

Now the Sirens first ye shall come to; and these are even they
Who bewitch and beguile all menfolk that chance to come their way.
And he that cometh unwary and heareth the Sirens' voice,
His wife and his little children o'er him shall never rejoice,
And nevermore stand by him and his happy homefare meet;
But the Sirens shall enchant him with their song the shrilly-sweet
As there they sit in their meadow, where great heaps of bones abound
Of dead men, rotting to nothing 'neath the waste skin wrapping them round
Sail by aloof, and the wax honey-sweet with hand do thou knead
To anoint the ears of thy fellows, lest a man of them hearken and heed.
But thou if thou willest may'st hearken: in thy ship the trim and fleet
Let those thy fellows bind thee full straightly hands and feet,
Upright in the step of the mast, whereto let the bonds be tied;
Thus hearing the voice of the Sirens in joy shalt thou abide.

In Homer the Sirens are two in number (ὄπα Σειρήνουιν, *Od.* xii. 52, ὄπα Σειρήνουιν, 167). Later writers make them three. In Greek art they are represented as bird-women, i.e. with the upper part of the body like that of a woman, with the legs of birds, and with or without wings. In Etruscan art they are no longer the sinister bird-women, but beautiful maidens beguiling by their presence as well as by their song. A very interesting examination of the Siren-myth is given by Miss J. E. Harrison in *Myths of the Odyssey*, pp. 146—182. 'As beautiful maidens,' she writes, 'the ancient world left its Sirens. But in later days the moral sense awoke again and would not have these Muses of seduction wholly fair; their song ended in death, and so to the beautiful maiden was fitly given the tail of an evil sea monster; and thus we find the Siren transformed into the modern mermaid. Brought at first perhaps by Phoenician mariners from the East, the land of wonder and mystery, they took fresh shape, fresh meaning, in the later mythology of the Greeks and Romans, and live as Loreleys and Undines in Teutonic waters.'

τοιάδε τις, 'something like this.' In our text of Homer the Sirens' song begins δεῦρ' ἄγ' ἰών, not δεῦρ' ἄγε δή. Morris renders the song as follows (*Od.* xii. 184—191):—

Come hither, Odysseus bepraised, thou fame of Achaean folk,
Stay here thy ship beside us that our song thou may'st hearken to-day;
For never hereby hath any in a black ship wended his way
Ere the honey-sweet voice he had hearkened that forth from the mouth of us flows;
And then in joy he departeth, and many a thing he knows:
For all the toil we wot of that erst in Troy the wide
The Argives and the Trojans of God must needs abide,—
Yea, all things that hereafter upon the earth shall be.

12. **τοῖς ἐπ' ἀρετῇ φιλοτιμουμένοις**, lit. 'those who were ambitious *on a basis of* virtue,' i.e. 'men of honourable ambitions'; cf. i. 27.

σχεδόν τι—ἰσχυρός ἐστιν, 'Roughly speaking you mean that we must adapt our incantations to each individual, so that when he hears them he may not think his charmer is laughing at him. For so he (the charmer) would only incur hatred and would repel men from himself, if he praised one who was conscious of being puny, ugly, and feeble, and called him tall, handsome, and stalwart.'

σχεδόν τι, 'pretty nearly,' 'roughly speaking,' often used to modify a statement gently, sometimes in modesty as here, sometimes in irony.

13. **Περικλῆς—ἐποίει αὐτὴν φιλεῖν αὐτόν**, especially by his marvellous eloquence. Grote remarks how the comic poets, who hated

Pericles, and whose trade it was to hunt down every eminent politician, exhaust their powers of illustration in setting forth his immense supremacy and his unparalleled eloquence: 'Cratinus, Eupolis, Aristophanes, all hearers and all enemies, speak of him like Olympian Zeus hurling thunder and lightning—like Heracles and Achilles—as the only speaker on whose lips persuasion sat and who left his sting in the minds of his audience.'

Plutarch in a well-known passage (*Pericles* 11) states that he also charmed the people by less creditable means:—*τῷ δήμῳ τὰς ἡνίας ἀνεὶς ἐπολιτεύετο πρὸς χάριν, ἀεὶ μέν τινα θέαν πανηγυρικὴν ἢ ἑστίασιν ἢ πομπὴν εἶναι μηχανώμενος ἐν ἄστει καὶ διαπαιδαγωγῶν οὐκ ἀμούσοις ἡδοναῖς τὴν πόλιν* 'He gave the reins to the people and shaped his policy to win their favour, contriving that there should always be in the city some public show, festival, or procession, and nursing the citizens in refined pleasures.' The last few words of Plutarch's statement contain more truth than the taunt with which he begins. Thucydides tells us (ii. 65) that Pericles did not speak with the view of currying favour, but that he had sufficient sense of dignity even to brave their displeasure on occasion. The great funeral speech shows, as Grote says, 'an anxious care for the recreation and comfort of the citizens, but no disposition to emancipate them from active obligation—and least of all, any idea of dispensing with such activity by largesses out of the revenue.'

ἐπίσταιτο—ἐποίει. 'In the *oratio obliqua* clauses dependent on an historical tense pass into the optative; but *not* if in the *oratio recta* they would have been in the imperfect or aorist of the indicative, in which cases those forms of the verb are retained'—MADVIG. In *oratio recta* the words, as Kühner points out, would have run *Περικλῆς πολλὰς ἐπῳδὰς ἐπίσταται, ἃς—ἐποίει.*

μὰ Δί'—αὐτῇ, well given by Mr Dakyns:—'Ah, that was not by incantation at all. What he did was to encircle our city with an amulet of saving virtue,'—i.e. (i) the walls of Athens (Thuc. i. 93), especially the fortification of Peiraeus, and (ii) the 'wooden wall' (Herod. vii. 143), viz. the introduction of a large permanent fleet.

περιάψας τι ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ. Cf. Plato *Republ.* 426 B *οὐδ' αὖ ἐπῳδαὶ οὐδὲ περίαπτα* 'amulets,' lit. 'things hung round the neck.' Cf. also Demosth. p. 460 *ἀντὶ καλῆς δόξης αἰσχρὰν περιάπτειν τῇ πόλει*, a frequent metaphor in Greek.

14. **εἰ μέλλομεν—κτήσασθαι**, 'if we are to get.' The emendation *κτήσεσθαι* is by no means necessary. Teachers will find some excellent

remarks on the constructions of *μέλλω* in Prof. Platt's article in the *Journal of Philology*, vol. xxi., pp. 39—44.

15. **ῥήτορας**, often, as here, in a bad sense, 'speech-mongers.'

δημηγόροις, generally in a bad sense, 'mob orators,' but here 'orators.'

16. **ἆρ' οὖν ποιεῖσθαι**, 'Then further—in reference to the matter we are discussing—do you know of any who, useless themselves, can gain useful friends?'

ἐκεῖνο—εἰ ἔστιν, 'now that we have got thus far (*ἤδη*), this question interests me, viz. whether it is possible....'

ἐξ ἑτοίμου, lit. 'starting from readiness,' i.e. 'readily,' 'at once'; cf. *Cyropaedia* v. iii. 57 *ἐξ ἑτοιμοτάτου διώκειν*. Cf. i. 20 *ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα*, also *ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος* 'in all likelihood,' *ἐκ τοῦ αὐτομάτου* 'by accident,' and Latin *ex composito, ex improviso*.

17. **ὃ ταράττει σε ὅτι**, 'What troubles you is the fact that....'

χαλεπώτερον—ἀνθρώπων, 'dealing more harshly with one another than they would with utterly worthless fellows.'

18. **ἰδιῶται**. Trench (*Study of Words*, p. 85) has some good remarks on the history of this word, which, as he says, is 'abundantly characteristic of Greek life.'

(i) It means a 'private individual' as distinguished from one clothed with office (in our passage, from the aggregate, *πόλις*). In this its primary use it is occasionally found in English. Thus Jeremy Taylor says, 'Humility is a duty, a duty in great ones as well as in *idiots*.'

(ii) It denotes an 'intellectually unexercised person' (sometimes a 'layman' as opposed to a professional)—this secondary sense bearing witness to a conviction deep in the Greek mind of the indispensableness of public life, even to a right development of the intellect. Prof. Skeat refers to 1 Cor. xiv. 16, where the Vulgate has *locum idiotae* and Wyclif 'the place of an *idyot*' (*A. V.* 'the room of the unlearned').

(iii) Our ordinary use of the word for one deficient in intellect is only this secondary sense pushed a little further.

προσιέμεναι, 'admitting,' 'approving'; cf. vii. 11, viii. 5.

19. **οὔτε** should be answered by another *οὔτε*. But the sentence is broken off by the interrogation which follows. What would have been the *οὔτε* sentence is given at the beginning of § 20.

20. **στασιάζουσι περὶ τοῦ πρωτεύειν**. The evils wrought by party-spirit in the Greek cities are painted in lurid colours by Thucydides (iii. 82—84). The following passage (from cap. 82) bears on our

sentence :—'The leaders on either side used specious names, the one party professing to uphold the constitutional equality of the many, the other the wisdom of an aristocracy, while they made the public interests, to which in name they were devoted, in reality their prize. Striving in every way to overcome each other, they committed the most monstrous crimes,...neither party observing any definite limits either of justice or public expediency, but both alike making the caprice of the moment their law. Either by the help of an unrighteous sentence, or grasping power with the strong hand, they were eager to satiate the impatience of party-spirit. Neither faction cared for religion; but any fair pretence which succeeded in effecting some odious purpose was greatly lauded' (Jowett's Translation).

φθονοῦντες ἑαυτοῖς μισοῦσιν ἀλλήλους. The reflexive and reciprocal pronouns are sometimes used indiscriminately; cf. vii. 12 *ἀντὶ ὑφορωμένων ἑαυτοὺς ἡδέως ἀλλήλους ἑώρων.*

21. ποικίλως. From its primary meaning 'many-coloured' *ποικίλος* comes to mean 'manifold,' then 'intricate,' 'abstruse'; cf. iii. 10 and *Oeconomicus* xvi. 3 *ὃ λέγουσι ποικιλώτατον τῆς γεωργίας εἶναι* 'the most intricate thing in husbandry.'

τὰ δὲ πολεμικά—φθόνος. Mr Dakyns points out that the diction is poetical, and translates thus :—'But there are seeds of war implanted also. The same objects being regarded as beautiful or agreeable by all alike, they do battle for their possession; a spirit of disunion enters, and the parties range themselves in adverse camps. Discord and anger sound a note of war; the passion of more-having, staunchless avarice, threatens hostility; and envy is a hateful fiend.'

πολεμικὸν—ἔρις καὶ ὀργή. With this and the two following sentences cf. iii. 1 *χρησιμώτερον νομίζουσι χρήματα.*

22. διὰ—διαδυομένη, 'stealing in through all these barriers.' Cf. *Wisdom* vii. 27 'Entering into holy souls she (Wisdom) maketh them friends of God and prophets.'

23. εἰς τὸ μεταμελησόμενον, 'to remorse in the future,' for *εἰς τὸ μεταμελήσεσθαι.* The participle with the article is sometimes used where we should expect the articular infinitive; cf. Thuc. v. 9 *τοῦ ὑπαπιέναι πλέον ἢ τοῦ μένοντος* (for *τοῦ μένειν*) *τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχουσιν,* i. 142 *ἐν τῷ μὴ μελετῶντι* 'in the absence of practice.'

οἰκεῖα, 'as their own'; cf. the proverb *κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων.*

24. τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν, partitive genitive with *κοινωνούς.* The word *τιμαί* denotes 'offices of dignity'; cf. Latin *honores* and Plato *Apol.* 35 B *ἔν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς.*

ἡδυπαθεῖν, lit. 'to have pleasant treatment,' i.e. 'to live in luxury,' the opposite of *κακοπαθεῖν* 'to endure hardness.'

25. τοῖς φίλοις τὰ δίκαια βοηθεῖν, 'to help his friends to their just rights.' *τὰ δίκαια* is cognate accusative.

ἄρξας, 'having obtained office.' *ἄρχω* means 'I hold office'; cf. *βασιλεύω* 'I am king,' *ἐβασίλευσα* 'I became king'; *πλουτῶ* 'I am rich,' *ἐπλούτησα* 'I became rich.' As Goodwin puts it, the aorist of verbs which denote a state or condition generally expresses the entrance into that state or condition.

ἀγαθόν τι—τὴν πατρίδα. For the double accusative cf. ii. 9.

26. πάντας—ἀγῶνας—ἐνίκων. For this cognate accusative cf. the phrases *Ὀλύμπια νικᾶν* 'to win an Olympic victory,' *ψήφισμα νικᾶν* 'to carry a decree,' and the Latin *vincere sponsionem* 'to win a wager.'

ἐκεῖ μέν, i.e. in the games.

οὐκ ἐῶσι. The subject is not expressed; but 'the stewards of the games' can be easily supplied from the context.

ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, supply *ἀγῶσι*, and translate 'in the political arena.'

κτησάμενον. The emphasis is on the participle, which agrees with *τινά* understood. Translate: 'Of course it must be beneficial that a politician should have the best men as his friends.' Cf. note on ii. 1.

τῶν πράξεων, 'in his political aims.'

27. καὶ τούτων πλειόνων, 'and these too in greater numbers'; cf. ii. 5 *καὶ ταῦτα πλεῖστα.*

καὶ μήν, 'And yet,' introducing a point not to be passed over; cf. iii. 4.

ἐλάττονας. Supply *ὄντας* from *πλείονας ὄντας.*

28. ἴσως—ἔχοιμι, 'And perhaps I too might be able to help you in your hunt for the beautiful and good.' For *συλλαβεῖν* cf. § 37.

διὰ τὸ ἐρωτικὸς εἶναι, 'because I am a votary of Eros.' Socrates is a 'lover of souls.' 'In Xenophon's *Banquet* he calls himself a *θιασώτης* of Eros, an adept in all Love's mysteries, and declares that he cannot remember the time at which he was not in love with some one or other. In the *Theages* again he tells us that the only science he is thoroughly acquainted with is the Erotic, *a poor thing, but his own* (*σμικροῦ τινὸς μαθήματος*). Neither must we forget the eloquent peroration of his speech in Plato's *Symposium*:—*καὶ αὐτὸς τιμῶ τὰ ἐρωτικὰ καὶ διαφερόντως ἀσκῶ...καὶ νῦν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ἐγκωμιάζω τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἀνδρείαν τοῦ Ἔρωτος καθ' ὅσον οἷός τέ εἰμι*.... That Socrates was to some extent serious in professing himself the votary of Eros there can be little

doubt. But with this seriousness was mixed in large measure that humorous affectation of qualities the opposite of his own which the Greeks knew as the *εἰρωνεία* of Socrates. Intellectually the acutest man of his age, he represents himself in all companies as the dullest person present. Morally the purest, he affects to be the slave of passion, and borrows the language of gallantry to describe a benevolence too exalted for the comprehension of his contemporaries'—W. H. THOMPSON, *Plato's Phaedrus*, pp. 152, 153.

δεινῶς, 'weirdly,' 'mightily.'

ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσω ἀνθρώπων. For the attraction of the antecedent to the case of the relative cf. Lysias xix. 49 *τὴν οὐσίαν ἣν κατέλιπεν οὐ πλείονος ἀξία ἐστίν.*

ὅλος—συνουσίας, 'Heart and soul I speed to love and be loved in return, to desire and be desired, to yearn for their society and in return to arouse a like yearning for mine.'

ὅλος. For this predicative use of *ὅλος* cf. Polybius iii. 94. 10 *πρὸς τὸ διακινδυνεύειν ὅλος καὶ πᾶς ἦν* and Caesar *bell. Gall.* vi. 5 *totus et mente et animo in bellum insistit.*

φιλῶν—ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι. In Plato's *Symposium* Socrates mentions Alcibiades as the special object of his affection. To quote again from Dr Thompson's brilliant essay, 'the Eros of Socrates is not that mystical emotion which Plato paints in the highly imaginative mythical discourse in the *Phaedrus*. If less exalted and poetical, it was more unequivocally pure. It was not the beauty of Alcibiades, but his splendid mental endowments, his great capacity for good or for evil, which excited the admiration and the solicitude of Socrates. *Οἱ εὐεργετοῦντες μᾶλλον φιλοῦσι τῶν εὐεργετουμένων* is the deep and true remark of Aristotle; and it was the memory of what he had done and suffered for his brilliant but erring friend which warmed the heart of Socrates towards Alcibiades, and prompted him to even greater efforts in his behalf. This affection was not diminished by the grievous faults in the character of its object, and would have remained equally strong had Alcibiades been as ugly as a Satyr. For an attachment like this, *φιλία* seemed and was too cold a word. Socrates could find no other name for it than *ἔρως*, and he represented himself as the *ἐραστής* of Alcibiades accordingly.' It is curious to find a parallel to this in a letter of Dr Thompson's friend, Edward Fitzgerald:—'I am an idle fellow, of a very ladylike turn of sentiment: and *my friendships are more like loves*, I think' (*Letters and Remains*, Vol. I., p. 25).

ἀντεπιθυμεῖσθαι τῆς συνουσίας. Observe that the genitive, which is

usual after ἀντιποιεῖν, is here constructed with the passive,—'to have my ... ty denied in return.'

29. ὁρῶ—δεήσον, 'I see that you too will stand in need of this art,' i.e. of catching men.

μὴ οὖν—ἀνθρώπων, 'Do not then keep me in the dark as to those whose friendship you may desire; for owing to my anxiety to please him who pleases me I am not, I flatter myself, without experience in the art of catching men.' Cf. III. xi. 7 οὐ γὰρ οὕτω γε ἀτέχνως χρὴ τὸ πλείστου ἄγρευμα, φίλους θηράσειν, and see note on § 9 θηρατέος.

33. κατειπεῖν, ironical, 'to bring an indictment'; cf. κατηγόρει and προσκατηγορήσω.

34. ἐὰν δέ—ἐμοῦ, 'And if I add to the accusation the statement that owing to your admiration of him you are also kindly disposed to him, will you think that I am misrepresenting you?'

καὶ αὐτῷ, very emphatic, denoting that the kind feeling springs up in him *naturally*.

35. οὐκ ἀποκάμνεις μηχανώμενος, 'you are not tired of contriving.' ἀποκάμνεις μηχανᾶσθαι would mean 'you cease to contrive through weariness' (Goodwin, § 903).

τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, very noteworthy; cf. Zeller, *Socrates*, p. 170:—'One consequence of the political character of Greek morality was that the problem proposed to the virtuous man was customarily summed up as *doing good to friends and harm to foes*. This very definition is put into the mouth of Socrates by Xenophon, who likewise feels it most natural to feel pain at the success of enemies. On the other hand, in one of the earliest and most historical of Plato's dialogues (*Crito* 49 A), Socrates declares it to be wrong to injure another; injury is the same as wrong-doing, and wrong-doing may never be permitted, not even towards one from whom wrong-doing has been suffered. The contradiction of these two accounts is hard to get over.... We must be content to leave it uncertain what were the real principles of Socrates on the subject.'

ἂν οἶμαι. The ἂν goes with εἶναι. Cf. § 38 τί ἂν οἴει—παθεῖν;

36. ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐπὶ σοὶ ὄν, 'as if it were not in your power.' Distinguish this from the accusative absolute construction exemplified in ii. 13 and iii. 3. Goodwin (§ 867) gives the following account of our present passage:—'ὥσπερ with the participle denotes a comparison of the action of the verb with an assumed case. The expression may generally be translated by *as if* with a verb; but the participle is not felt to be conditional in Greek, as is shown by the negative οὐ (not μή). The

if in our translation is a makeshift, which we find convenient in expressing the supposed case in a conditional form, which, however, is not the Greek form.'

ἐπὶ σοί, 'depending upon you,' i.e. 'in your power'; cf. *Anabasis* V. viii. 17 *ἐπὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐγένοντο.*

Ἀσπασίας. Aspasia, daughter of Axiochus of Miletus, made her 'salon' the centre of the literary and philosophical activity of Athens. According to the story, she was the teacher of Socrates. But the passages of Xenophon and Plato, on which this statement is based, are seemingly ironical. Owing to her beauty and extraordinary mental gifts she gained a great influence over Pericles, who, after separating from his wife by mutual consent, lived with Aspasia for the remainder of his life, Attic law not tolerating a marriage between a citizen and a foreign woman. Her son, however, was declared legitimate by a decree of the Ecclesia and was called Pericles.

ἔφη—ἐπαινεῖν, 'she stated that good matchmakers, if they truthfully reported the fine qualities of their clients, were clever at bringing about alliances; but that, if they told falsehoods, she was not prepared to commend them.'

προμνηστρίδας, derived from *προμνάομαι* 'I woo or court for another'; cf. *προμνησαμένην* below.

δεινὰς—συνάγειν, lit. 'clever *for bringing together*'; cf. note on i. 3 *τῷ ἄρχειν παιδευομένῳ.*

37. **σὺ μὲν ἄρα**, 'you, it seems, are such a good friend to me as to help me, if I myself have any qualities serviceable for the winning of friends.'

οἷος—συλλαμβάνειν. See note on i. 15 *οἷος—λυσιτελεῖν.*

εἰ δὲ μή—ὠφελείᾳ, 'Failing that, you would not be ready to fabricate some allegation for my advantage.'

38. **κοινῇ**, answered by *ἰδίᾳ* below. Translate:—'if I were to induce the state at large....'

ὡς ἂν στρατηγικῷ. Supply *ὄντι.*

οἰκονομικῷ, 'practised in the management of a household.' So *Οἰκονομικός* is the title of Xenophon's treatise on Domestic Economy.

39. **ὅ τι—πειρᾶσθαι**, 'that, in whatsoever you desire to be thought good, in this you should try actually to prove good.' Cf. Aesch. *Sept. c. Theb.* 588 *οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει.* Contrast the cynical opposite of this in Coleridge's *Table Talk* (May 1st 1832):—'Horne Tooke's advice to the Friends of the People was profound: *if you wish to be powerful, pretend to be powerful.*'

ὅ τι—ἀγαθὸς—τοῦτο—ἀγαθόν. For the cognate accusative with ἀγαθός cf. Homer *Il.* xv. 641 *ἀμείνων παντοίας ἀρετάς*, Plato *Gorgias* 516 B *ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικά.*

ἄλλως γιγνώσκεις, 'you hold a different view'; *γιγνώσκω* often means 'I decide' rather than 'I know'; cf. *Anabasis* v. vi. 32 *οὕτω γὰρ γιγνώσκω* 'this is my view.'

VII.

1. τὰς ἀπορίας—ἐπαρκεῖν, 'He had two ways of dealing with the difficulties of his friends: where ignorance was the cause, he tried to meet the trouble by a dose of common sense; or where want and poverty were to blame, by lessoning them that they should assist one another according to their ability'—DAKYNS.

ἃ σύνοιδα αὐτῷ, 'which I know with him,' i.e. about him; cf. Plato *Symposium* 193 E *εἰ μὴ ξυνῄδειν Σωκράτει.*

Ἀρίσταρχον. This Aristarchus is otherwise unknown.

τοῦ βάρους, partitive genitive, as usual after verbs of sharing; cf. § 13 *μεταδίδως—σίτου.*

ἴσως—κουφίσαιμεν, 'Perhaps even we might lighten your load somewhat.'

τι, cognate accusative used adverbially.

2. ἀλλὰ μήν, 'Yes indeed.'

ἐστασίασεν ἡ πόλις, 'Athens was torn by civil strife.' The Thirty were established in May, 404 B.C. Their rule was a Reign of Terror; Critias was the Robespierre of the movement. Owing to the excesses of the Thirty (of which the most flagrant was the execution of Theramenes) Thrasybulus, with about 70 democratic exiles, occupied in the autumn the fortress of Phyle in the frontier range between Attica and Boeotia and held it for two or three months. His force having grown to 700, he defeated the Thirty and their followers about two miles from Phyle. The Thirty then seized Eleusis as a citadel of refuge.

πολλῶν, i.e. many democratic sympathisers, who joined Thrasybulus in the Peiraeus, whither, at the beginning of 403 B.C., he marched with a thousand men and occupied the heights of Munychia. The Thirty were defeated and Critias was slain. They were deposed after a rule of eight months; and the Ten were appointed in their stead. The power of Thrasybulus now grew rapidly, and in the summer of 403 B.C. the democracy was fully restored.

ὡς ἐμέ, 'to me.' *ὡς* is used as a preposition to express motion to a person or something equivalent to a person, e.g. Soph. *O. T.* 1481 *ὡς τὰς ἀδελφὰς τάσδε τὰς ἐμὰς χέρας*, *Trachiniae* 366 *δόμους ὡς τούσδε*, where the house readily suggests the household. Teachers will find some interesting remarks on the construction in Prof. Ridgeway's paper in the *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, 1883, pp. 32, 33.

τοὺς ἐλευθέρους, subject:—'so that the free-born people in the house number fourteen.'

οἱ ἐναντίοι, i.e. the Thirty and their adherents.

ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκιῶν, 'from our house-property' in Athens.

ὀλιγανθρωπία, 'depopulation,' due to the massacres of the Thirty, the flight of democrats to the Peiraeus, and migrations to Thebes and Megara.

τῷ ἄστει, as opposed to the Peiraeus.

τὰ ἔπιπλα, 'the things on the surface,' i.e. 'moveable property' (*res moventes* in Livy), furniture, utensils, etc. The word is used by Thucydides (iii. 68).

ἄν τις—δοκεῖ. The *ἂν* goes with *εὑρεῖν* and *λαβεῖν*. Cf. vi. 35 and 38.

δανειζόμενος, 'by borrowing.' The active *δανείζω* means 'I lend'; cf. ὁ *θείς* 'the mortgager,' ὁ *θέμενος* 'the mortgagee.'

περιορᾶν ἀπολλυμένους, lit. 'to overlook one's relatives being starved to death,' i.e. 'to stand by and see them starved.'

ἐν τοιούτοις πράγμασιν, 'amid such troubles'; cf. i. 9, ix. 1, x. 4, *Anabasis* VI. iii. 6 *οἱ μὲν σὺν πράγμασιν, οἱ δὲ ἄνευ πραγμάτων*.

3. τί—ὅ τι, 'How is it that...?'

καὶ πλουτεῖν, 'to be really wealthy.'

4. ἀπὸ τῶν πονηροτέρων, 'with (lit. *starting from*) his baser household.'

ἐλευθερίως πεπαιδευμένους. Aristarchus is shocked at the thought of free-born Athenians engaging in industrial pursuits. This was the ordinary Athenian idea; hence the enormous number of slaves in Attica. Beloch estimates the number of slaves in Attica at the end of the Peloponnesian war at 65,000 as against 20,000 citizens. A great deal of menial and industrial work was done by slaves. Thus the citizens had leisure for liberal education (*ἐλευθερίως παιδεύεσθαι*), for their public duties, and for abundant recreation. 'In Aristotle's view,' writes Mr Warde Fowler (*City-State*, p. 179), 'the *raison d'être* of slavery was to make a noble life possible for the master; and where the master actually lived such a life, and at the same time did his duty by his slaves, the institution might be justified. Tried by this

test, Athens is not to be wholly condemned as a slave-holding state; she may at least claim far more indulgence than Sparta or Rome.'

5. ἱμάτια ἀνδρεῖα καὶ γυναικεῖα. 'At all periods of Greek life the characteristic out-door garment, both of men and women, was a mantle or shawl, consisting of a rectangular piece of cloth.... In Athens much importance was attached to the nice adjustment and elegant wearing of the *ἱμάτιον*. To leave the left shoulder free instead of the right was a true sign of a barbarian' (*Dictionary of Antiquities*).

χιτωνίσκοι, strictly 'little shirts.' 'The *χιτών* was a shirt or shift, and served as the chief under-garment of both men and women.... Many attempts have been made to discover definite differences between *χιτών*, *χιτώνιον*, and *χιτωνίσκος*, but without success. That they were indefinite, even in classical times, is shown by a glance at the inscription recording the garments in the treasury of Artemis at Brauron (*C. I. A.* ii. 754). In it *χιτώνιον* is used ten, *χιτών* thirteen, and *χιτωνίσκος* thirty times; but in each case defining epithets of colour, material, pattern, shape, and size are added, showing that the difference, if any, cannot have lain in these obvious characteristics' (*ibid.*).

χλαμύδες. The *χλαμύς* was a short mantle. 'It differed from the *ἱμάτιον* in these respects, that it was much smaller, also finer, thinner, more variegated in colour, and more susceptible of ornament. It moreover differed in being oblong instead of square. It was the dress of hunters, of travellers, especially on horseback, and of soldiers. It was worn at Athens by the *ἔφηβοι*. The more ornamental mantles, designed for females, were decorated with a border' (*ibid.*).

ἐξωμίδες, 'vests.' 'The *ἐξωμίς* was originally a tunic fastened over the left shoulder only, leaving the right shoulder and part of the breast free.... It was specially characteristic of workmen and slaves. Hephaestus as a god of labour was commonly represented clothed in the *ἐξωμίς*, as was also Odysseus' (*ibid.*).

πάντα μὲν οὖν, 'nay rather all,' Latin *immo omnia*.

6. ἀφ' ἑνός. The preposition *ἀπό* is frequently used to denote the *source* of a livelihood; cf. *ἀπὸ ἀρτοποιίας* and other instances in this section.

Ναυσικύδης. Nausicydes is alluded to in Arist. *Eccles.* 426 as a mean and wealthy meal-merchant (*ἀλφιταμοιβός*) and he may be the same as 'Nausicydes of the deme of Cholargeis' mentioned in Plato, *Gorgias* 487 C.

λειτουργεῖν, 'to perform a *liturgy* or public service,' which could only be undertaken by a wealthy man. 'The first part of this word

contains the adjective λῆτος or λειτος (from λεώς), which is said to be an ancient synonym for δημόσιος but does not occur in Greek literature, although we learn from Herodotus (vii. 197) that the Achaeans called a town-hall by the name λήιτον. Again, the lexicographer Hesychius explains ληίτη and λήτη as synonymous with ἱέρεια 'a public priestess.' As regards the spelling of the word, ληтουργεῖν and ληтουργός are mentioned as Attic forms by the ancient grammarians; and the forms in λη-, although unrecognised by our comparatively modern MSS., may still be seen in inscriptions of the time of Demosthenes'—SANDYS, Introduction to *Leptines*, p. iii. The λειτουργίαι were (A) those connected with the pursuits of peace,—(i) χορηγία, the providing of the chorus in public representations, (ii) γυμνασιαρχία, the maintenance of the torch-race (Sandys, l. c. p. viii), (iii) ἑστίασις, the feasting of one's tribe, (iv) ἀρχιθεωρία, the superintendence of sacred embassies to the Panhellenic festivals or to holy places such as Delphi; (B) those connected with preparations for war,—(i) τριηραρχία, superintendence of the equipment of a trireme, (ii) according to some authorities, εἰσφορά or war-tax; but Boeckh excludes the war-tax from the list of 'services immediately rendered to the state.'

δαψιλῶς, rather a grand word, used by Xenophon alone of Attic Prose authors; translate:—'in the lap of luxury.'

ὁ Κολλυτεύς, 'of the deme of Collytus,' which was in the centre of Athens.

χλανιδοποιίας. The χλανίς was a cloak made of Milesian wool, thinner and of finer make than the χλαῖνα, which was a warm garment.

Μεγαρέων. Aristophanes (*Acharnians* 519) alludes to Μεγαρέων τὰ χλανίσκια being informed against as contraband at Athens.

ὠνούμενοι βαρβάρους ἀνθρώπους. 'The generous and reasonable spirit of Athenian democracy was itself not without influence on the condition and prospects of the slave population. In no ancient state were the slaves so materially comfortable; in none perhaps were they so exclusively drawn, not from Greek, but from foreign and semi-civilised peoples'—WARDE FOWLER, l.c. p. 179.

ἐγὼ δ'—συγγενεῖς, 'whereas my relatives are free-born ladies.'

7. τοὺς—ἐπιμελομένους, 'who give their attention to employments, useful for the life of man, in which they have skill.'

ἀργίαν—ἀμέλειαν—ὠφέλιμα ὄντα. See note on iii. 1 *χρησιμώτερον νομίζουσι χρήματα*.

οὐδὲν χρήσιμα, 'useful in nothing.' For this cognate accusative with an adjective cf. vi. 39 τοῦτο καὶ γενέσθαι ἀγαθόν.

8. ἔμαθον δέ—ἐπιμελόμενοι, 'Pray, when those relatives of yours were taught what you tell me they know, did they learn it as barren information which they would never turn to practical account, or, on the contrary, as something with which they were seriously to be concerned some day, and from which they were to reap solid advantage? Do human beings in general attain to well-tempered manhood by a course of idling, or by carefully attending to what will be of use?'—DAKYNS.

9. τὴν προγεγονυῖαν χάριν, 'the original good-feeling.'

ἐὰν δὲ προστατήσῃς—ὦσι, 'if you provide for the employment of their talents.' In several passages Xenophon uses *προστατεύω*, not *προστατέω*, in the sense of 'provide,' e.g. *Anabasis* V. vi. 21.

ἐνεργοί. Cf. Plato *Leges* 674 B *ἐνεργοὶ δικασταί* 'judges in full work.'

ἀγαπήσουσιν, 'will treat you with warm regard.' Notice the uses of *ἀγαπάω*,—(i) in Homer, 'welcome,' 'entertain,' 'treat with outward signs of affection,' (ii) in Attic, 'be content with,' 'acquiesce in,' and rarely, as here, 'regard warmly,' (iii) in Greek Testament, 'love.'

τὴν ἀπ' ἐκείνων χάριν, 'the kindliness arising from benefits.'

10. ἔμελλον ἐργάσασθαι. See note on vi. 14 *μέλλομεν—κτήσασθαι*.

νῦν δέ, 'But as it is....'

11. προσιέμην. Cf. vi. 18, viii. 5.

δοκῶ—ποιῆσαι, 'I think I can bring myself to do it, so as to raise capital for the work.'

ἀφορμήν, 'capital,' lit. 'starting-point'; in Thucydides 'base of operations.' Cf. Demosth. p. 958 *πίστις ἀφορμὴ πασῶν ἐστὶ μεγίστη πρὸς χρηματισμόν* 'good faith is the best capital of all for business.'

12. ἐργαζόμεναι ἐδείπνουν. The force of the tenses is well brought out by Mr Dakyns:—'ever whilst they breakfasted they worked, and on and on till work was ended and they supped.'

ἀντὶ ὑφορωμένων ἑαυτούς, lit. 'instead of people suspecting one another.'

ἑαυτοὺς—ἀλλήλους. Cf. vi. 20.

13. οὗπερ—ἔχεις σίτου. *οὗπερ* is an example of relative attraction; cf. i. 8. *σίτου* is partitive genitive, as usual after a verb of *sharing*.

14. οὐδ' ὑφ' ἑνός, emphatic, 'by no one at all'; cf. vi. 3 *μηδὲ πρὸς ἕν*.

VIII.

1. διὰ χρόνου, 'after an interval of time'; cf. *Cyropaedeia* I. iv. 28 *ἥκω διὰ χρόνου*, Soph. *Philoct.* 285 *ὁ μὲν χρόνος δὴ διὰ χρόνου προὔβαινέ μοι*, lit. 'time after time went on for me,' or, as we might say, 'month after month....'

Εὔθηρε. Eutherus is otherwise unknown.

ὑπὸ τὴν κατάλυσιν τοῦ πολέμου, 'just at the end of the war'; cf. *ὑπὸ νύκτα sub noctem*, Thuc. ii. 27 *ὑπὸ τὸν σεισμόν* 'just at the time of the earthquake.' The Peloponnesian war came to an end in the summer of 404 B.C. with the capture of Samos by Lysander, who then returned to Sparta in triumph. Athens had already surrendered in April, and its walls were demolished.

ἐκ τῆς ἀποδημίας, '(I have come) from my stay abroad.'

νυνὶ μέντοι αὐτόθεν, 'but now from here on the spot,' i.e. Athens. The *μέντοι* answers *μέν*, as not unfrequently.

αὐτόθεν. Contrast the use of this word in § 3.

ἐπειδὴ γὰρ—κτήματα, 'since we (i.e. my family) were robbed of our possessions over the frontier'; cf. Xen. *Sympos.* iv. 31, where Charmides says:—*νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ τῶν ὑπερορίων στέρομαι καὶ τὰ ἔγγεια οὐ καρποῦμαι καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας πέπραται, ἡδέως μὲν καθεύδω ἐκτεταμένος.*

ἀφῃρέθημεν τὰ—κτήματα. Verbs of *depriving* sometimes take a double accusative, and in the passive construction the accusative of the person becomes the subject; cf. *Cyropaedeia* VI. i. 12 *ὅσοι αὐτῶν ὅπλα ἀφῄρηνται, ταχὺ ἄλλα ποιήσονται· ὅσοι τε ἵππους ἀπεστέρηνται, ταχὺ πάλιν ἄλλους ἵππους κτήσονται.*

δέεσθαι. '*δέεται, δέεσθαι* are sometimes uncontracted, Xen. *Anab.* VII. iv. 8, vii. 31, *Memor.* I. vi. 10, II. viii. 1, III. vi. 14, IV. viii. 11. These instances (from the MSS.) would seem to show that Xenophon sometimes did not avoid using certain forms *open* which are usually contracted in this verb'—VEITCH.

ἄλλως τε καὶ—δανειζοίμην, 'especially as I have no property on which I could borrow money'; cf. Demosth. p. 822 *ἐπὶ ἀνδραπόδοις δανείζειν* 'to lend money on the security of slaves.'

2. πόσον χρόνον—εἶναι, 'How long do you consider your body is capable...?' There is no need to read, as some do, *πόσον ἂν χρόνον*... 'How long do you think your body would be capable...?'

μισθοῦ, genitive of price, 'for hire'; cf. i. 20, v. 2 and 3.

3. οὐκοῦν ἐπαρκέσει, 'It is better then to attack *at once*

(*αὐτόθεν*) such work as will also stand you in good stead when you have grown old.'

ἔργων ἐπιστατοῦντα. See note on v. 2 *ἐπιστάτην εἰς τἀργύρεια*.

4. καὶ μὴν—γε, 'And yet...'; so also in § 5. See note on iii. 4.

5. ὅλως—προσίεμαι, 'In a word, I do not altogether fancy being responsible to any one.'

οὐ πάνυ is frequently used with a slight tinge of irony; cf. our 'not quite.' There is a beautiful instance of this in Plato *Sympos.* 195 E *κρανίων ἃ ἐστιν οὐ πάνυ μαλακά* 'skulls, which can scarcely be called soft things.' It is a mistake to say that *οὐ πάνυ*=*omnino non*. Riddell (*Digest of Platonic Idioms*, § 139) holds that in Plato the universal meaning of *οὐ πάνυ* is 'hardly,' 'scarcely.'

ἀγνώμονι κριτῇ, 'a harsh critic.' Cf. x. 3 and contrast § 6 *εὐγνώμονας*.

καὶ οἷς νῦν—διαγίγνεσθαι, 'I wonder whether it is easy to go through even the occupations, at which you say you work at present, without criticism.'

6. χρὴ οὖν—διαρκέστατα, well rendered by Mr Dakyns:—'Let me tell you what you should do. You should avoid censorious persons and attach yourself to the considerate and kind-hearted, and in all your affairs accept with a good grace what you can and decline what you feel you cannot do. Whatever it be, do it heart and soul, and make it your finest work. There lies the method at once to silence fault-finders and to minister help to your own difficulties. Life will flow smoothly, risks will be diminished, provision against old age secured.'

IX.

1. Κρίτωνος. Crito 'was the oldest and dearest friend of Socrates, a man of wealth and position and high character. His sympathy with Socrates was probably much more personal than intellectual. Plato's picture of him is as of a sensible and kindly man of the world, looking upon life from the point of view of an honest Athenian gentleman, but without any capacity for philosophy. Indeed, if the anecdote in Plato's *Euthydemus* (304 D) has any foundation in fact, Crito may sometimes have remonstrated with his friend for his philosophical eccentricities. Diogenes Laertius however (ii. 121) gives a list of seventeen dialogues attributed to him, some of which have such ambitious titles as *περὶ τοῦ γνῶναι, τί τὸ ἐπίστασθαι*. We can hardly suppose that they contributed much to the solution of these problems. Diogenes sums up the true

interest of the man when he says:—*οὗτος μάλιστα φιλοστοργότατα διετέθη πρὸς Σωκράτην καὶ οὕτως ἐπεμελεῖτο αὐτοῦ ὥστε μηδέποτε λείπειν τι τῶν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, Crito was most affectionately disposed towards Socrates and tended him with such care as never to leave any of his wants unsupplied*' (Archer-Hind, Introduction to *Plato's Phaedo*, p. 42). To Crito Socrates addressed his last words:—'Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius; pay the debt and by no means neglect it,' meaning thereby that death would restore his soul to purity and health, and that therefore the customary sacrifice was due to the God of Healing.

χαλεπὸν ὁ βίος. See note on iii. 1.

τινες εἰς δίκας ἄγουσιν, i.e. *συκοφάνται.*

πράγματα ἔχειν, 'to have trouble'; see note on i. 9. *πράγματα* is frequently used of legal trouble.

2. ὦ Κρίτων, κύνας δέ. For the order cf. Homer *Il.* vi. 429 *Ἕκτορ, ἀτὰρ σύ....*

ἀπερύκωσι, 'ward off.' This word is used by Sophocles and Herodotus, but by no Attic Prose writer except Xenophon.

ἐθέλοι—δύναιτο. For these attracted optatives see note on i. 18.

ὅπως μή, far less common after verbs of *fearing* than the simple *μή.*

3. πολλῷ—ὠφελεῖσθαι. The stress of the sentence is on the participles; cf. note on ii. 1. Translate with Mr Dakyns:—'Do you not see that to gratify a man like yourself is far pleasanter as a matter of self-interest than to quarrel with you?'

οἵῳ σοὶ ἀνδρί, by attraction for *ἀνδρὶ οἷος εἶ σύ.* Cf. i. 8 and *Hellenica* II. iii. 25 *τοῖς οἵοις ἡμῖν τε καὶ ὑμῖν*, Plato *Sympos.* 220 B *πάγου οἵου δεινοτάτου* 'a frost as severe as possible.'

εἰσὶν—χρῆσθαι, 'there are in Athens men of this type who would be very ambitious to have you as a friend.'

τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρῶν, partitive genitive depending on *οἵ*,—lit. 'there are who among such men....'

φίλῳ σοι χρῆσθαι. Cf. i. 12 *δούλοις χρῆσθαι* 'to treat as slaves.'

4. ἀνευρίσκουσιν. Observe that the historic present is not so common in Greek as in Latin. We have it again in § 5.

Ἀρχέδημον. Possibly this Archedemus is the leader of the popular party mentioned in *Hellenica* I. vii. 2 *Ἀρχέδημος ὁ τοῦ δήμου προεστηκώς.* His political opponents are very severe upon him. Lysias (xiv. 25) calls him a 'blear-eyed person who embezzled not a little of the people's money'; and Aeschines (*de fals. leg.* 76) says that he 'corrupted the people by distributions of money.' Grote, however, hesitates to adopt

the identification, seeing no similarity at all in the points of character noticed.

ἱκανὸν εἰπεῖν τε καὶ πρᾶξαι, lit. 'capable both for speech and action,' a good illustration of the dative origin of the Greek infinitive; cf. i. 3 *τῷ ἄρχειν παιδευομένῳ*, vi. 36 *δεινὰς συνάγειν*.

εἰπεῖν τε καὶ πρᾶξαι, the object of Athenian education; cf. *Anabasis* V. vi. 28 *λέγων καὶ νοῶν καὶ πράττων ὁποῖα μέλλει ὑμῖν τε κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἐμοί*. 'Other Greeks,' says Grote, 'could act with bravery and in concert; but the Athenian Xenophon was among the few who could *think*, *speak*, and *act* with equal efficiency. It was this tripartite accomplishment which an aspiring youth was compelled to set before himself as an aim in the democracy of Athens.'

οὐ γὰρ ἦν—λαμβάνειν, 'For he was not the man to make profit in every possible way, but a lover of honesty who remarked that it was the easiest matter in the world to make blackmailers disgorge their gains.'

οἷος—κερδαίνειν. Cf. vi. 37 *τοιοῦτος οἷος συλλαμβάνειν*, and the common use of *οἷός τέ εἰμι* 'I am able.'

συκοφαντῶν, 'informers'; cf. the *delatores* of the early Roman empire. The origin of the word is very doubtful. Liddell and Scott quote an interesting suggestion made by Mr Shadwell that the word originally meant 'one who brings figs to light by shaking the trees'—the figs having been hidden in the thick foliage; hence metaphorically 'one who makes rich men yield up their fruit by informations.' Cf. Antiphon 146. 22 *ἔσειε καὶ ἐσυκοφάντει*, St Luke iii. 14 *μηδένα διασείσητε μηδὲ συκοφαντήσητε*, Arist. *Equites* 259 *κἀποσυκάζεις πιέζων, κ.τ.λ.* 'you shake them off like figs, squeezing them to see which is ripe.'

συγκομίζοι, optative of frequency; cf. *θύοι* below, § 8 *ὀνειδίζοι*.

ἀφελὼν ἂν ἔδωκε, 'he would set some apart and give it to Archedemus.' For the frequentative use of *ἄν* with the aorist cf. Thuc. vii. 71 *εἰ ἴδοιεν τοὺς σφετέρους ἐπικρατοῦντας, ἀνεθάρσησαν ἄν* 'they would pluck up courage,' *Anabasis* II. iii. 11 *ἔπαισεν ἄν* 'he would give a blow.' It is also used with the imperfect, e.g. *Mem.* IV. vi. 13 *ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανῆγεν ἂν πάντα τὸν λόγον*.

ἐκάλει, 'he used to invite him,' i.e. to the sacrificial feast; cf. iii. 10 *ὁπότε θύοι καλεῖν σε ἐπὶ δεῖπνον*.

5. περιεῖπεν, 'treated with attention,' imperfect of *περιέπω*, a favourite word with Xenophon, and used by him alone among Attic Prose authors; cf. *Symposium* viii. 38 *τοῦτον ταῖς μεγίσταις τιμαῖς περιέπειν*, *Cyropaedeia* IV. iv. 12 *τοῦτον ὡς εὐεργέτην καὶ φίλον περιέψομεν*.

του—ἐχθρούς, 'in respect of one of Crito's blackmailers, he finds that he has not only committed many crimes, but also made many enemies.'

προσεκαλέσατο. The proceedings in a *δίκη* were begun by the service of the summons (*πρόσκλησις*). This was often done by the plaintiff in person, accompanied by one or two witnessses (*κλητῆρες*).

δίκην δημοσίαν. *δίκη* 'signifies generally any proceedings at law by one party against others. The object of all such actions is to protect the body politic or one or more of its members,—a distinction which has in most countries suggested the division of all causes into two great classes, (1) *public*, (2) *private*. The first of these were implied by the terms (*a*) *δίκαι δημόσιαι* or (*b*) *γραφαί*; causes of the other class were termed *δίκαι ἴδιαι* or simply *δίκαι* in its limited sense; cf. Pollux viii. 41 *ἐκαλοῦντο αἱ γραφαὶ καὶ δίκαι, οὐ μέντοι καὶ αἱ δίκαι γραφαί*' (*Dictionary of Antiquities*).

ἐν ᾗ—παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτῖσαι, 'where it would have to be determined what was to be his punishment or fine,'—the stock formula for assessing damages or determining punishment after judgment had been pronounced.

6. **συνειδὼς αὑτῷ**, 'being conscious'; contrast *σύνοιδα αὑτῷ* in vii. 1.

πάντ' ἐποίει—ἔδωκεν, 'left no stone unturned to be rid of Archedemus; but Archedemus was not to be got rid of until the blackmailer had let Crito loose and also paid a sum of money to himself.'

ἀπηλλάττετο, a noteworthy instance of the imperfect,—'was not for being got rid of'; contrast the aorists which follow.

8. **οὐχ ὅτι**, *οὐ* (*λέγω*) *ὅτι*, i.e. 'not only'; cf. *μὴ ὅτι* in I. vi. 11.

εἰ δέ τις—κολακεύοι αὐτόν, 'And if any of those whose dislike Archedemus had incurred taunted him with repaying Crito's kindnesses by cringing to him...'

διαφέρεσθαι, 'to be at variance with.'

ἢ τοὺς μὲν καλοὺς—ἀντ' ἐκείνων, 'or to make enemies of good men and true in attempts to do them wrong, and by co-operating with scoundrels to endeavour to make friends with them, preferring their society to that of their betters.'

X.

1. **Διοδώρῳ.** This Diodorus is otherwise unknown.

τίς σοι—ἀποδρᾷ. For the *dativus incommodi* cf. § 2 *τίς σοι κάμνῃ* and *Hellenica* VII. v. 25 *φυγούσης αὐτοῖς τῆς ἐναντίας φάλαγγος οὐδένα ἀπέκτειναν.*

ἐπιμελεῖ ὅπως ἀνασώσῃ, 'do you take pains to get him safe back?'

2. **καὶ ἄλλους γε—ἀνακηρύττων,** 'Yes, and I call others to my assistance, offering rewards for him.'

σῶστρα, used also by Herodotus, e.g. rewards for lost horses (iv. 9), thank-offerings for the recovery of a son (i. 118). For the termination cf. *θαύμακτρον* 'a conjuror's fee.'

ἀνακηρύττων, 'proclaiming by the *κῆρυξ* or crier.'

3. **καὶ μὴν—γε,** 'And yet...'; cf. iii. 4, viii. 4, 5.

ἀγνώμων, 'heartless'; cf. viii. 5.

Ἑρμογένης. Hermogenes, the son of Hipponicus, was one of the inner Socratic circle along with Crito, Chaerephon, Chaerecrates, Simmias, Cebes, and others (I. ii. 48).

ὑπηρέτην, the object of *ἔχειν.*

ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, 'on his own account.'

4. **μικροῦ—πρίασθαι.** For the genitive of price cf. i. 20, v. 2, viii. 2.

διὰ τὰ πράγματα, 'thanks to our troubles' due to the Reign of Terror; cf. vii. 2 *ἐστασίασεν ἡ πόλις,* and for this use of *πράγματα* cf. i. 9, vii. 2, ix. 1.

5. **ὡς ἐμέ.** See note on vii. 2.

τοῦ αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν, 'than that you should go yourself.'

6. **ᾤχετο,** 'was off at once.'

οὐ πολὺ τελέσας—Διόδωρον, 'at no great expenditure of trouble gained a friend who made it his business to see what he could say or do to help and cheer Diodorus.'

ἢ λέγων ἢ πράττων, an excellent example of the emphatic participle; see notes on ii. 1, ix. 3.

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